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THE PROBLEM OF UNITY AND DIVERSITY IN THE MODERN AFRICAN STATE:
A CASE STUDY OF THE SUDAN
Rosemary Ann Squires 
ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the problem of human diversity within the modem 
African state, and in particular the efforts of one African state, the 
Sudan, to maintain its territorial integrity and to come to terms with 
its human diversity. The work begins by tracing the development of the 
nation state as a foim of spatial and political organization expressing 
the relationship between the nation, the homeland and the political state. 
The variety of means employed by governments to adjust the relationship, 
and the forces within states which can lead to disintegration are examined. 
A set of criteria involved in the development of secession movements is 
suggested, and subsequently used as guidelines in the study of the 
phenomenon of secession in Africa. Consideration is also given to the 
variety of power-sharing formulae enployed by governments as solutions 
to such problems. The traditional African concepts of spatial organization 
and attitudes to human diversity are examined to form the basis for an 
understanding of the effects of the inposition of colonial rule, and of 
the resultant post-independence experience of threatened disintegration 
and secession in several African states. In the latter part of the work 
an examination of the experience of the Sudan demonstrates the degree to 
which a history of resentment, followed by questionable colonial and post­
independence policies, resulted in threats to her territorial integrity.
The solution to the problem is examined and an assessment made of the 
possibility of success for the current, more accommodating policy of 
recognizing the reality of diversity and of encouraging decentralized 
government.
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PREFACE
The subject matter of this thesis falls within the broad field of 
political geography, defined as the study of the centrifugal and 
centripetal forces at work within and between states. Tb date very 
little has been written on the political geography of Africa. (1)
And yet the continent presents the political geographer with a rich 
variety of issues and problems. Africa now has a larger number of 
independent nation states than any other continent, and most of these 
states have had less than two decades of experience in nation-making. 
Moreover, fourteen of the states are land-locked, and the colonial 
boundaries, largely continued into the modern pattern of independent 
nation states, show little regard for ethnic or geographical realities.
For the purposes of the present study, attention is directed first to 
the problem faced by so many African governments in trying to create 
a sense of national unity - to identify and foster the centripetal 
forces within their own national boundaries. Secondly, and more 
specifically, the thesis focusses on the background to and characteristics 
of past, present and potential secession movements. (2) Finally, this 
specific issue is examined at some length for one African state - the 
Sudan - where secession has been a long-standing issue of great 
importance, not only to the Sudan, but also to its neighbouring countries,
Ihis study is based partly on field visits made to Africa between 1974 and 
1976 which included a stay of some twentyfour months in the Sudan. Despite 
considerable financial and logistical problems I was able to visit Juba, Wau, 
Aweil, Tonj, Nimule and Ivlalakal in the Southern Region and Khartoum, Kassala, 
Kashm El Girba, Suakin, Port Sudan, New Haifa, Wad Medani, Kbsti and the 
Nuba Mountains in the North. I was particularly fortunate in being permitted 
to travel in the Southern Region during a politically delicate post-war 
period, for which I am grateful to the Sudan Government.
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In the difficult problem of transliteration of Arabic, Dinka, Nuer,
Zande and the many other non-English words encountered in any study 
of the Sudan, I have opted for the use of conventional forms, which I 
feel will best assist the reader. For place names I have followed the 
example of the Sudan Survey Department, and for personal names the spelling 
found most conrnonly, or used by the people themselves.
It will be appreciated that following such a long period of civil war 
there^ little reliable statistical data available for the Southern 
Region, and given the profound difficulties of travel in the area, little 
opportunity for an individual to collect sufficient data for a meaningful 
statistical analysis of the economic situation. However I am grateful 
to the various Regional Ministries for permission to work with what was 
available.
Part of the fieldwork was made possible by financial assistance from the 
Central Research Fund of the University of London. I am also indebted to 
the staff and students of the Department of Geography at the School of 
Oriental and African Studies, and particularly to my supervisor, Prof. 
B.W.Hodder, who provided valuable criticism, helpful advice, but most 
inport ant of all, constant cheerful encouragement. Dr. David Pool kindly 
read ana commented on part of the first draft and in the preparation of 
the final manuscript I am grateful for the contributions made by Mrs A,F.Hayes 
and Ms, Wendy Seale.
The University of Khartoum provided me with facilities, and the members 
of the Department of Geography and the Institute of African and Asian 
Studies with encouragement and advice, especially Dr. Yusef Fadl Hassan and 
Dr. Mohammed Oner Beshir. I should also like to record the contributions
Of
of the many Government officials in Khartoum and^ the many members of 
the public who patiently corrected mistaken impressions.
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It is impossible here to name the many kind people who assisted me in 
the Southern Region, but I owe a great deal to the mentoers of the 
Regional Government who gave of their precious time during a period of 
great pressure of work, particularly Their Excellencies Hilary Logali,
Natale Olwak Akolawin, Mading De Garang, Lawrence Wol Wol and Lawrence 
Lual Lual. A valuable insight into the economic situation in the 
Southern Region was afforded by a period of employment with the Regional 
Development Corporation.
A special mention must be made of those friends in Juba who gave me 
hospitality as well as encouragement at a time when there was little 
enough to share; Bertram Buth Peat, Jacob Akol, Robin Mills, Duncan 
Willetts, Alastair Mackie and especially David Benzimra. Finally, for a 
real perspective on the life of the North and the South I am indebted to 
Dr. Salih Abdullah El Arifi and His Excellency Bona Malwal Madut Ring, 
and I would like to thank them for their patience and much valued friendship, 
and to beg their forgiveness for any errors I may have made in what follows.
Rosemary Ann Squires 
Oxford 
January 1978
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CHAPTER I
rIHE NATION STATE AND THE PROBLEM OF DIVERSITY 
The Concept of the Nation State
In theory, a nation state is an expression of the relationship between
a particular cohesive human group, its political organization, and a
specified territory. In this sense a state is the result of a continuous
history of the interaction of man and land, where interaction has reached
such a level that the human group is capable of maintaining itself,
organizing its people and defending its boundaries, to the extent that its
identity is universally recognised. In the modern world, however, it is
more likely to be the result of the imposition of spatial and political
organization by outside forces anxious for world order. In practice none
of the three factors in the relationship may be found to be ideal. The
e
human group living within the territory is rarely homogenous; the morphology
/s
of the occupied territory may be ill-defined and ^certainly not universally 
accepted; and the political organization may vary in its degree of 
centralization and perceived legitimacy.
the origins of the modem nation state have been the subject of much 
discussion and not a little confusion over what constitutes a nation and 
what a state, with many of the argunents being used to buttress a desired 
foreign policy. Macartney in 1934 saw the nation state as part of a 
continuun ' .., .reaching back into the misty dawn of pre-history1 (1) and 
Hayes in 1937 described primitive tribalism as 1 .. .small scale nationalism’^ 2) 
Cbbban discounts the importance of a tribal inheritance of common 
language and culture. To him the term nation state corresponds to some 
cmcrete political foim and although in many tribal societies certain 
cultural affiliations formed the basis for Hie development of a nation 
’ .. .until it has some permanent institutional embodiment it cannot be 
regarded as a political fact, or as belonging to the same order of things 
as the nation state. ’ (3)
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The envelopment of cultural affinity has more often been the result of 
statehood rather than its cause. In medieval Europe, groups of related 
or unrelated peoples were welded into political unity by the use of force 
and the development of military supremacy. Powerful dynasties laid the 
foundations of the English, French and German nations, but there was no 
real belief in any necessary connection between politics and culture.
The maintenance of political power through a considerable time period 
encouraged the development of cultural affinities. Different peoples 
serving under the same yoke began to perceive a common destiny and gradually 
became a nation. Although the work of the great medieval monarchies was 
primarily one of political consolidation, the development of political unity 
naturally stimulated the growth of a common language and culture, and the 
assimilation of alien cultural elements. People began to identify with 
broader political unities and by the sixteenth century a number of 
nation states existed in Western Europe. What Cobban termed the ' .. .perpetual 
unstable equilibrium on the system of balance of power1 permitted the 
survival in 1 . .geographical contiguity and close association’ (4) of a 
nuiber of states, none having the military capability of uniting the whole 
continent under its domain. Only in Europe do we find this kind of political 
pattern caitinuing over a period of several centuries.
By the end of the eighteenth century the nation state had ceased to be a 
simple historical fact and had become the subject of a theory, beginning to 
appear in its modem form with the association between the ideas of the 
political and the national community. People began to matter. The French 
Revolution and the War of American Independence were to result in a major 
change in the political ideas of the Western world. They introduced the 
concept of government as a manifestation of the democratic will. As Aron 
has put it ’The case altered after the French Revolution when two new ideas 
gradually won mens minds: the juridical equality of members of the 
collectivity; the aspiration of the governed to belong to a community of 
their choice, a community of their own.’ The general concept of the state 
came to embody three ideas: 'Legitimacy is democratic, the state is neutral
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in relation to beliefs which relate to individual conscience, and authority 
is excercised through the intermediary of a bureaucracy.' (5) In practice 
the Jacobins and^ later, Napoleon replaced the original revolutionary hope 
of decentralization and participatory democracy with a new centralization 
of power in Paris. Policies were determined in the capital and only then 
delegated to the eighty-three departments or units of local government, but 
a chain of cormunication between the centre and the periphery was, for the 
first tine, established. By raising the walls of sovereignty and national 
consciousness with regard to neighbouring nations, while breaking down the 
former provincial loyalties, France became a relatively homogenous nation.
While the democratic ideals of the French Revolution were discredited during 
the reign of terror, the conquests of Napoleon strengthened sentiments of 
nationalism, making it a much more important force in the Europe of 1815 
than was democracy. However this was a nationalism which glorified the 
romantic and the exclusive. In Germany people were taught to reverence the 
1 Volksgeist' or peculiar national character which was presented as the 
foundation of all good culture and civilization. The government reorganized 
the state very much in line with French reforms, with the building of a 
strong central authority, a truly national army, and a system of national 
education designed to infuse a common spirit into the whole people: a 
devotion to the cause of Geiman nationalism. By the destruction of the 
Holy Roman Empire and the creation of the Confederation of the Rhine, 
Napoleon paved the way towards greater unification, German nationalism 
began as a strange mixture of benefits derived from adopting French methods 
and institutions such as the Code Napoleon, and resentful reactions against 
French domination. In Italy as in Germany, Napoleon's reduction in the 
number of states encouraged ideas of ultimate unification. The savagery 
of the Peninsular War fostered the rise of Spanish nationalism, despite 
the lack of an important middle class, the characteristic basis for 
nineteenth century national movements; and in Poland, although the Grand 
Duchy of Warsaw was to be short-lived, the Code Napoleon, with the ideas of 
of the French Revolution embodied in it, had been introduced. In England, 
war with France continued the process of national cohesion.
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During the nineteenth century the belief in the ideal nation state, 
that is the ideal relationship between our original three determining 
factors - the nation, the homeland and the political state - became widely 
accepted in Europe and, with the rise in European imperial ambitions, 
both the theory and the practice were widely exported to the rest of the 
world. But before we can examine the results of this on the morphology 
of states and on the spatio-political division of the globe it is necessary 
to consider the principle of self-determination, by the application of 
which these ideal states were to be created, and which was to become in the 
twentieth century both a convenience and a thorn in the side of those who 
undertook to re-arrange the world.
The Right to Self-Determination
The principle of self-deteimination developed from the democratic ideals of 
the French Revolution, when * .... the Divine Right of Kings ... .was replaced 
by the Divine Right of the People. Under the influence of the new national 
and democratic ideas, the people ceased to be an atomic dust of individuals: 
it took shape and form, became a whole, was called the Nation, endowed with 
sovereignty, and identified with the state. The revolutionary theory that 
a people had the right to form its own constitution and choose its own 
government for itself easily passed into the claim that it had a right to 
decide whether to attach itself to one state or another, or constitute an 
independent state by itself. The effect of revolutionary ideology was to 
transfer the initiative in state-making from the government to the people. 
Nation states had formerly been built up from above, by the influence of 
government: henceforth they were to be made much more rapidly from below 
by the will of the people. The logical consequence of the democratisation 
of the idea of the state by the revolutionaries was that nationalism took 
the form of the theory of national self-determination.1 (6)
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This theory was to advance to a position of apparent universal acceptance 
after the outbreak of war in 1914. The general disruption caused by war 
encouraged minorities throughout Europe, as did the Allies' professed 
cause of the rights of small states, and similar sentiments expressed 
in the aims of the Russian Provisional Government of 1917 and the Americans 
under President Wilson. While the allies deliberated during the closing 
stages of the war, wherever there was a minority or a subject nationality, 
national armies were gathering and national governments being established.
When the Peace Conference opened in 1919 the Allies were only just 
becoming aware of the difficulties that would be presented by the attempt 
to reconcile the principle of self-determination with their realistic and 
imperial ambitions.
The Italians and Hie French, being more directly concerned in the ultimate 
re-drawing of the map of Europe, were the first to retreat frcm an absolute 
acceptance of the principle. The Italians discovered that ethnic 
considerations would effect the security of their northern border, and the 
French considered self-determination a carte blanche for the convenience 
of any minority group. The major difficulty frcm Britain' s point of view 
was the existence of a large subject empire; she was uncomfortable in 
demanding for some people rights which she was not prepared to grant in India, 
Egypt and Ireland, and was forced to fall back on the argument that the 
principle could not be expected to apply to all peoples and especially to 
those firmly under governmental control. The importance of not creating 
a precedent outside of Europe prompted the following comment from General 
Smuts: 'The German colonies in the Pacific and in Africa are inhabited
by barbarians, who not only cannot possibly govern themselves, but to whom 
it would be impracticable to apply any idea of political self-determination 
in the European sense,' (7)
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The Americans had begun to realize that the situation they had done so 
much to bring about, was potentially explosive, but Wilson remained 
firmly conmitted to the creation of a new international order based 
on the idealisation of popular democracy, rather than the working out 
of a modus vivendi for post-war Europe. They were constantly harrassed 
by petitions from subject peoples. The whole situation was succintly 
put by Cobban ' ... .the British and American delegations were anxious to 
confine self-determination to Europe, while the French and the Italians 
would have preferred to confine it to Utopia.' (8)
In addition to the ideological inconsistencies, certain practical 
difficulties presented themselves. In many cases claims had already been 
made and territory occupied and only military action could have changed 
the situation. It was often difficult to ascertain which leaders 
actually represented the true wishes of any one group. In altering 
frontiers the Allies found themselves creating new minorities as well as 
the greatest problem of all - one which highlighted the basic shortcomings 
of the policy. This was - who was to decide, and how, what constituted 
a nation? And when was the disintegrative process to be halted? Various 
indicators were tried, among them language. Although in many cases this 
was a useful criterion, the exceptions were extensive, and states would 
only permit its use where it suited them. For example, the Poles claimed 
territory from Germany on this basis but refused to allow the same principle 
to apply in East Galicia where non-Polish tongues were spoken. On the basis 
of language, Germany could have claimed the whole of Austria. Similar 
problems attended the use of the plebiscite, although it could be said to 
be an implicit part of the whole principle of self-determination. States 
were wary of the possible outcome and, as in the case of Schleswig, 
reserved the right to take geographical and economic factors into 
consideration.
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In view of these difficulties it is scarcely surprising that the states 
created after 1919 were far from arbo dying the strict principle of 
self-determination. Instead a rather different set of ideals was put in 
its place: a belief in the equality of states, the justifiable existence 
of small states, and a belief in the right of absolute national sovereignty, 
ideals which were to form the basis for the establishment of the League of 
Nations. Among public opinion, however, the principle of self- 
deteimination still retained its predominance, and when the many failures 
of the Allies to apply the principle fairly came to light, the peace 
settlement seemed shorn of all idealism.
The conflict between the principle of self-determination and territorial 
sovereignty had been institutionalized in the League of Nations, and was 
to be a major world problem for the next fifty years. Whatever the 
shortcomings in the 'national1 composition of any state, once it had been 
established, the principle of territorial sovereignty prevented any 
interference in how it managed its affairs or treated any minority within 
its borders. As Duchacek put it, 'The right of national self-determination 
so passionately applied against the former masters, is now to be denied or 
its cause (polyethnicity) eliminated in one way or another. As both a 
consequence of and a reaction against the disintegrative effects of the 
principle of self-determination, the new right to ethnic homogeneity will 
be evoked by the new elites of the new states.' (9)
The survival of large and diverse minorities in many countries provided 
airple occasion for the agitation for self-determination, and the new states 
varied in their response. Minority treaties were meant to apply in the 
new states to guarantee civil rights and liberties, but in mast cases the 
minority situation steadily deteriorated, as the international ccximunity 
came to realize that nothing could be done to protect the new minorities, 
or to enforce the guarantees, without encountering all the dangers of 
intervention. Added to this, the major powers were beginning to suffer 
from increasing minority unrest, both at hone and in their respective 
enpires. The British were threatened by violent nationalist movements
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in Egypt, India, Iraq and the rest of the Arab world and, nearer home, 
in Ireland, Scotland and Wales. American control was being questioned
p
in the Phil^ipines and in Central America. The French saw the rise of 
problem areas in Alsace and Brittany, and in Spain, Basques and 
Catalans were increasingly restive.
Two forces, both b o m  of the principle of self-determination, thus began 
to work against each other, once the ideal identification of 'cultural1 
nation and 'political' state had been accepted. Nations, and parts of 
nations, aspired to statehood, while states in their own defence tended 
to act as though culturally united or, if in fact this was not the case, 
endeavoured to make the facts correspond to the ideal, regardless of the 
rights or liberties of minorities within their borders.
The Management of Minorities
In the past the state evolved a common national consciousness by a slow 
and natural process. The modem belief in the identity of nation and 
state with the idea of the cultural nation, as part of the legitimacy 
of the state, has provided a strong incentive among newly-created states 
to hasten the process by governmental action. Irredentist claims are 
made concerning nationals outside its borders and a variety of means used 
against subject minorities to hurry their assimilation. The political 
idea of 'national unity' has usually been a response to a disunity resulting 
frcm internal anarchy or foreign domination; it is therefore primarily 
a means to an end, and that end the maintenance of law and order. The choice 
of means to this end has varied frcm state to state. Duchacek cites five 
measures which have been enployed to remove the possible cause of future 
territorial disintegration - genocide, mass expulsions, boundary changes, 
the biasing of immgration controls and forcible assimilation. (10) Genocide, 
an act intended to destroy wholly or in part a national, ethnic, racial or 
religious group, may be used directly as in Stalin's Russia against the 
Tartars and Chechens or, indirectly, as government-inspired mob violence 
towards meirbers of a minority group, as that against the Batutsi in Rwanda 
in 1963-64.
Mass expulsion was a commonly used method of achieving ethnic homogeneity 
in post-war Eastern Europe; Poland and Czechoslovakia expelled about ten 
million people from their old and new territories, and more recent times 
have seen the mass expulsion of East African Asians. Boundary changes 
have been few and far between, other than between territories in the 
same empire. Independent states will back their own irredentist claims (11) 
with the right to ethnic homogeneity, but are less willing to accord the 
same right to their neighbours. Immigration controls may be enforced in an 
effort to maintain a balance or to allow the creation of a desired ethnic 
majority. Somali nationalists accused Prance of building up the Afars 
population in Djibouti in order to obtain a popular vote in favour of 
continued association with France. (12)
Economic and social considerations tend to result in the eventual assimilation 
of minorities into the melting pot of capital cities, industrial employment 
and the national army, where the use of the dominant language and recog­
nition of the majority's social mores have definite economic advantages.
But it is occasionally a process carried out by force. Groups may be deprived 
of the right to use their own language in schools and official conmunications, 
the practice and development of their religion may be discouraged, and no 
provision made in the country's legal framework for their traditional law 
and custcm.
The application of these extreme measures, except where the state machinery 
is both strong and ruthless, has invariably contributed to the very thing 
the government wished to avoid: a threat to the state's territorial 
integrity. This kind of repression will help to change a territorial 
interest group into a movement for secession.
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Disintegration and Secession
The right of secession is the necessary corollary of the principle of 
self-determination and, in the same way, its virtues are extolled only 
when it suits a state’s purpose. The difficulty, of course, is that the 
right to national sovereignty and the right of secession are in inevitable 
conflict. Furthermore, the universally-held view among governments is 
that if one secession movement be allowed to succeed, anarchy will threaten. 
However, secession movements have been successful without resulting in 
a profusion of similar claims. The reason must be that the mere existence 
of a territorial minority group is not sufficient in itself to lead to 
demands for secession. What, then,are the criteria for secession? It 
could be argued that there are seven:-
(i) A transference of loyalty
(ii) A history of bitterness and resentment
(iii) Economic disparities
(iv) Social and political disparities
(v) Racial, ethnic, linguistic and religious motivations
(vi) A defensible location
(vii) International support
The rest of this section expands on each of these criteria. A variety of
writers (13) have stressed the importance of racial, ethnic, linguistic 
and religious factors as reasons behind the formation of secession movements, 
whereas in actual fact, while they may become significant, they are not 
always necessary. What is important is that a cohesive human group, within 
a defined territory, has lost all faith in the state of which it foims a 
part. Whatever loyalty it ever had to that state has been transferred to 
the new entity it wishes to create. It sees its future interests, both in 
terms of material welfare and in the ’quality of life'* as being best served 
by an independent existence in which its destiny is governed by its own
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decisions. It wishes to change what it perceives to be a functional 
unit into a formal unit. How then has the group readied this position?
Such a situation does not develop overnight, so the problem is almost 
certain to have a background with a long history of bitterness and 
resentment. The Sinn Fein rebellion in Ireland was not against the 
misgovemment of a twentieth century British Government: it was a revolt 
in the name of four centuries of history.(14) The historical basis to 
the claim may rest on a legacy of neglect and repression (that has 
produced the necessary cohesion) or on the memory of a former glorious 
independence.
From the material point of view, the supporter of a secession movement 
envisages a brighter economic future with independence. He feels the state 
has failed to allot to his group its fair share of the state’s prosperity.
The area in which he lives may have been neglected or exploited by the 
centre. He often considers his position to be essentially colonial. He 
may feel there is prejudice by the centre against the enployment of members 
of his group - their exploitation, or barriers against their admittance to 
the decision-making process. Alternatively, the economic ambitions of the 
group may be essentially selfish; in such cases as Katanga and Bougainville, 
for example, the specific location of valuable resources has contributed 
to secession movements, where a territorial interest group does not wish 
to share the proceeds with the disadvantaged majority, Of the sum of 
factors behind a movement for secession, economic considerations will often 
be found to be most important.
Social and political disparities must not however be underestimated. A lads of 
educational opportunities will have a direct bearing on the economic prospects 
of the group and their chances of influencing national policy. Inadequate 
representation at the national level may be compounded by a similar 
situation in local government; there may be no communication between the 
government and the people. Where the group does possess a common cultural 
heritage, the state may have circumscribed the development of that tradition.
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Here we must re-introduce the racial, ethnic, linguistic and religious 
factors in their correct context, as very potent factors, not in the basis 
of the wish to secede, but in the process of motivating the people. . 
Motivation, and dedication to a cause, over a long period of time is 
vitally important to the success of an action which, given the aforementioned 
attitudes of nation states, will be essentially violent, and often violent 
in the extreme, as is the nature of civil war. It is not necessary for 
the dissident group to share a common religious, linguistic or racial 
identity. What they have in oorrmon may be not belonging to the majority 
faith, culture or race..
Strictly geographical factors, such as the location of the area, are 
obviously important in the development and feasibility of secession movements. 
The dissident group should, ideally, occupy a compact area, peripheral to 
the state core, at a distance from the capital, of proven opportunities for 
defence and presenting problems for attacking government forces. Given the 
unlikelihood of the movement having the available funds to finance a 
direct military confrontation with the government forces, guerrilla warfare 
will provide the greatest chance of success. Remoteness from the state 
core and difficulty of terrain will harass the government forces, while 
adaption to the terrain and local knowledge will aid the guerrillas.
While it may be impossible for the movement to claim a decisive military 
victory, their ability to occupy a large and costly government force for 
a long period of time will greatly strengthen their bargaining position.
p
This has been the case in the Kurdish, Eritrean and PhilJftLpine examples.
The defence of a peripheral territory will have other advantages. The 
existence of a friendly neighbouring population on the other side of the 
state boundary will obviously assist the movement’s supply position and 
may provide a safe haven from government forces.
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It would seem to be appropriate at this point to discuss the contribution 
of the type and status of boundaries to the problem of a state’s: ability 
to maintain its territorial integrity. Both the phenomenological 
classification system of Boggs (15) and the sequential system of Pounds (16) 
have proved useful in an analysis of the ways in which boundaries create 
or avert conflict; what has proved less than useful is the division into 
’natural’ and 'artificial' boundaries. The expression ’natural boundary' 
has too many connotations, gives incorrect associations and has far too 
variable a content and signicance during different periods.(17) As Hartshome 
has pointed out ’All political boundaries are man-made, that is artificial; 
obviously they are not phenomena of nature. Consequently man, not nature, 
determines their location; we must eliminate, therefore, any distinction 
between "natural" and "artificial" political boundaries.’ (18) In the past, 
those with the power to re-determine boundaries supported their claims or 
decisions by reference to historical, economic, strategic, or national 
considerations. Historical considerations have proved to be an essentially 
dangerous basis for boundary determination, with almost every boundary in 
Europe embodying two or more irreconcilable historic rights. Economic 
factors proved less than useful as no state can now aspire to be an economic 
unit, or avoid close economic connexions with its neighbours. With 
accelerated technological advance there is really no longer any such thing 
as a strategic boundary; no strategic frontier can defend a weak country 
against a strong one. With a degree of international consensus on these 
facts of life, it is the boundary which divides a nation that is perceived 
as having the greatest conflict potential. With the creation of many new 
states following the collapse of colonial empires, and the change in status 
of many, formerly rather arbitrary,boundaries, a high degree of conflict 
was expected to result. There have been many irredentist claims made, and 
a number of movements seeking national unification. However, as will be 
shown in the case of Africa, the conflict potential of the situation has 
remained low. Again we find that a single factor such as a disputed boundary 
is not of itself sufficient ground to threaten the integrity of a nation 
state. In the cold-war conditions that have prevailed, the majority of 
states remain committed to the principle of national sovereignty.
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One other factor is of great importance. The secession movement must 
conceive of a fair degree of international support for the new state 
it seeks to create: it is,afterall, a movement to secede, not to commit 
group suicide. Although almost any such movement in the present climate 
of international relations will receive some support during its fight for 
independence, it must be sure that it is capable of running its own 
affairs and of economic survival in the realities of the world situation, 
and its Initial survival may well depend on continued support from the 
world community.
While our seven criteria may lead to demands for secession, the necessary 
sacrifices, the disruption, the violence and the almost mandatory heavy 
loss of life may persuade many secession movements to withdraw from the 
brink and accept some form of compromise with the state. In many cases 
it has always been their intention to do so, their claim to the right of 
secession having been an extreme bargaining position which they abandon 
if assured some recognition of their needs, and an institutionalized 
channel of communication with the central gpvemment.
Decentralization and Regional Power Sharing Solutions
States have pursued a number of policies other than force, in accommodating 
territorial interest groups and so maintaining their territorial integrity. 
These communities may be granted effective political, institutional and 
constitutional protection through some form of territorial distribution 
of authority, with the advantages to the central government of a sharing of 
the burden of administration, a mobilization of local initiative, support 
and responsibility, the translation of national goals and policies and the 
proper appreciation of local needs and discontent. The territorial division 
of authority is but a geographical expression of the oore creed of a free 
society: to make the authority responsive and responsible to the will 
of the people, the people must be able to participate, A balance may be 
struck between '...the desire of territorial interest groups to obtain or 
preserve their autonomy and the need of central authorities to rely on 
territorial units for local initiative, responsibility and self-rule.1 (19)
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This process may be termed decentralization -the delegation of a portion of 
centrally held power to sub-national centres -and may vary in degree from 
the wide autonomy of some federal systems such as the USA, to a mere 
observance of local customs. It is a process which is dynamic with a 
constantly changing relationship between the central and territorial 
authorities. It may represent a system of power sharing inposed from above 
by the central government or the decision of foimerly separate territorial 
authorities to pool some of their resources and responsibilities.
Older a unitary system - that is where power is delegated from above - four 
broad categories of territorial self-rule may be distinguished, showing 
varying degrees of central control, (i) Agencies and officials at the 
local level may be appointed by, and be directly responsible to, the central 
authority, (ii) Alternatively, officials may still be directly appointed, 
but their appointment may be confirmed by some kind of limited plebiscitary 
procedure as in the USSR, where only party members selected by the central 
government may be elected, (iii) In some countries the problem is solved 
by a combination of centrally appointed officials in charge of local 
government with locally elected councils. This system, which will be 
further explained in the case study of the Sudan, is also employed in France.
'.. .in the departements, a prefect, appointed by Paris, is responsible 
"for the national interests, for administrative supervision, and for seeing 
that the laws are respected." Besides the prefects as appointed heads of 
the 95 departements, there is also a network of sub-prefects in charge of 
departemental subdivisions ... .also appointed by Paris ... .Although the 
French Constitution seams to guarantee territorial autonomy, it actually 
places the civil servant above the locally elected representatives who
foim the Departemental Council.,, .The whole arrangement illustrates ___ the
implied confidence in highly professionally trained civil servants.1 (20)
In other unitary states, such as Japan, there is no system of central 
appointment, and sub-national government is based on direct popular vote, 
with constitutional safeguards against territorial discrimination by the centre.
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There are, of course, a huge variety of territorial distributions of 
authority within these four broad categories, varying from country to 
country and from region to region in their scope of authority and 
accountability, and varying with time as new balances of power and 
territorial units reflect changes in population distribution and mobility. 
Ideally, the system is well fitted to the state that aims at uniform 
development and progress via a strong central policy assisted by local 
flexibility, responsibility and initiative; but it essentially assumes 
a certain degree of confidence in the canmitment of territorial interest 
groups to the state, or the overwhelming potential power of the central 
government.
Movement from diversity to unity may result in either a loose or a 
tightly-knit structure. Where this is a forced association the result is 
imperialism, which is not our concern here. What we are concerned with 
is an examination of the voluntary association of territorial coimunities, 
who wish to co-operate by agreeing to some common goals and some common 
procedures or machinery. This association may range from a mere informal 
understanding to a system such as a confederation requiring legal expression. 
The reasons for such an association may include geographical contiguity, 
cultural contiguity, commonly perceived functional, economic, military 
and political interests, or a common external threat. The association will 
establish some common machinery, usually in the form of a council or 
assembly of representatives to legislate for the common good, and each member 
community will accept scare limitations on its individual free dan of action.
If the individual members perceive the benefits to be sufficient, the 
alliance may gradually progress towards confederation and eventually to 
federation - that is the establishment of a new supraterritorial nation 
state.
Conversely, a former unitary nation state may adopt a federal system as 
an acknowledgement of a high degree of diversity, so involving a 
deccncentration of authority in the opposite direction. Evidently, then,
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a federation is best described, not in terms of the historical process, 
but in terms of its content - that is the territorial division of political 
authority into separate jurisdictions, the national and the provincial 
both operating directly on the people, and the simultaneous assertion of an 
indivisible yet composite nation state. Duchacek describes a federation 
as 'an unfinished nation' (21) in that it admits of the existence of 
several component territorial communities as yet unready to abandon their 
entire sovereignty but recognising a common goal in some areas.
Obviously the system is not without its shortcomings. Given a high degree 
of diversity, not all territorial or ethnic communities can be 
recognised, and some may emerge after the striking of the original federal 
bargain. The drawing of intra-state boundaries will meet some of the sane 
problems discussed earlier and the reinforcement of a sense of territorial 
identity may lead to eventual disintegration of the association. One of 
the greatest dangers lies in the inevitable regional inequalities. This 
may be in the problem of representation of states of unequal size in the 
federal legislature, or in their basic inequality of resources and therefore 
of needs and demands. The principle of equal representation of unequal 
component units has been adopted by many federations including Australia, 
Switzerland and the USSR. In others, Such as India, less populous states 
are favoured but not to the extent of equality with the more populous.
The problem of regional inequality has beset the majority of nation states, 
whether unitary or federal, with inequalities being perceived in terms of 
size, population, political power, administrative skills, wealth, economic 
development and strategic importance. The better-endowed areas resent their 
support of poorer partners and the less well endowed are suspicious of the 
undue influence of the rich. Similarly, federal assymetry may arise due to 
the excessive growth of the federal centre, especially where there is a 
federal capital city, a one-party political system or a military regime. 
Where economic and political assymetry is compounded by racial, cultural or 
religious differences, the situation may easily became unmanageable.
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From this very brief look at unitary and federal systems we can see that 
they are essentially a form of compromise to accomodate the principles 
discussed earlier of national sovereignty and the right to self-determination, 
within the concept of the nation state. Whether a state be described as 
unitary or federal, each will surely contain elements of the other. In the 
following chapters we will see exactly what degree of compromise was 
necessary in attempting to mould these government forms to the very 
particular conditions pertaining in Africa at the time of independence, 
and with what degree of success these essentially European concepts could 
be exported.
Conclusion
We have seen that the European or Western perception of the organization 
of space was based on the concept of territory as property, capable of 
sale or exchange, and so requiring accurate demarcation. All land must 
be allotted or owned and the concept was extended to the global level 
with the division of the world into nation states, each actively defending 
its boundaries and protecting its exclusiveness. The recognised ideal 
was that the inhabitants of such a state should be a homogeneous group 
living in harmony within these boundaries. l£ this was not the case, the 
aforementioned variety of means would be employed to produce the eventual 
coincidence of the functional region with the formal region. With the 
European imperial expansion, these ideas were imposed on much of the worldj 
and as Soja has reminded us, 'It has become difficult to accept the fact 
that not all the worlds people share this perception of space, that in 
many societies clearly defined boundaries assumed to have some permanence, 
were until recently, virtually unknown, and that large areas could and did 
remain acceptably unorganized and outside the jurisdiction of any group.' (22)
-  28 -
CHAPTER II
THE AFRICAN EXPERIENCE OF HUMAN DIVERSITY
This chapter will outline the approach to human diversity among 
traditional African societies and the effect on the processes of incorporation 
and accommodation of the superimposed political framework of oolonialism.
It will conclude with an examination of the resultant post-Independence 
situation, in which cultural sub-nationalism has posed such problems.
It is not the intention here to discuss the vexed question of the 
classification of traditional African political systems —  a question over 
which there has been considerable disagreement among anthropologists and 
political scientists whose concern it more truly is. Suffice it to say 
that it is becoming increasingly apparent that the range of political 
systems was infinitely wider than previously imagined, extending frcm the 
simplest of hunting bands to what some writers have termed empires. (1) Our 
concern here is to examine the factors which brought different societies into 
contact, how the process of incorporation gained momentum, was intejupted, 
reversed or redirected by an interval of colonial rule, before being 
resumed in the new atmosphere and situation of independence.
The Perception of Space in Traditional African Society
Bohannan has described the African view of space to be ', . .based on the 
regulation of social relationships.1 Of the Tiv of Nigeria he says 'The 
idiom of descent and genealogy provides not only the basis for lineage 
grouping, but also for territorial grouping ... the Tiv map is constantly 
changing both in reference to itself and in its correlation with the earth. '(2) 
Soja (3) has described this as a 'genealogical map' changing in response 
to altered situations - a functional region. There may have been relatively 
permanent nodal points, such as wells or shrines, but in general there was 
'a social definition to territory rather than a territorial definition 
of society.1
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At the simplest level there was little true ownership of land. There were 
rights to the use of land, but not to its absolute ownership as a form of 
real estate. With a limited supply of manpower and a low level of technology, 
only a very limited amount of cultivation could be undertaken, and among 
the majority of peoples there was no shortage of cultivable land, and 
therefore no great value ascribed to land. In acephalous societies, the 
community assumed the right to the use of the area immediate to the village 
for cultivation and burial. Among the Berriba of Zambia and the Gonja of 
Ghana, rights to land hardly existed, neither individuals nor kin groups 
bothering to lay claim to large areas, since land was virtually a free 
good. (4) A low level of population density coupled with poor soil fertility 
and shifting cultivation made ownership of land more or less pointless.
Few restrictions on the use of land encouraged mobility, contact and 
incorporation. In imore centralized societies the distribution or allotment 
of land was in the power of the chief, it being his decision as to who 
should cultivate what land, and where homes and villages should be located.
In some cases the chief was able to demand the unpaid agricultural labour 
of his subjects for his own personal ends, but in such a system the value 
lay in the ability to coerce or in the ownership of slaves, not in the 
ownership of land. Chief ship was the political control of people, not of 
territory. (5) In Hausaland there was an administrative system known 
as bin kanu or following heads, by which rulers continued their control 
over nomadic peoples. (6) As Gluckman has pointed out, before the arrival 
of long distance trade and technological innovation in terms of the 
production and storage of food, the standard of living of a chief was not 
a great deal higher than that of his subjects. To this he ascribes the 
failure, or perhaps disinterest, in the pre-colonial extension of political 
power. There was little to be gained from it, 'one man can only eat so 
much porridge.' (7) Che is tempted to wonder whether the glorification 
of obesity among same peoples was an attempt to find a visual expression 
of social stratification. As long distance trade developed much of it was
channeled through the state machinery, with the chief controlling trading
privileges and rights of passage, and in areas where the state did not
directly undertake to trade income was raised for the state by market taxes,
customs dues and transport charges. In the political control over people,
therefore, a sphere of influence was of far greater value, extending as it
tKe.
might over long distances: * power of a chief extending in theory as 
far as his most far-flung subject, although not necessarily encompassing 
the territory between.
States invariably contained several ethnic communities, owing allegiance 
to the chief, but having a degree of local autonomy, which might overlap 
into adjacent states without causing conflict between the two state cores. 
Paden (8) has noted that in the pre-colonial city-state of Kano a complex 
system developed to accommodate a variety of communal identities. Despite 
the assertions of many independent African governments, in only a very few 
cases, such as Bomu or Rwanda, were special place-names used to identify 
the land in which the polity was concentrated.
Rarely do African societies seem to have conceived of territorial boundaries 
in a physical sense as a European might, but rather conceived of a fading 
effect of control of people with distance. Neither is the European concept 
of a buffer zone applicable in most cases. A more useful method of 
description might be a scale of tie percentage of the population owing 
allegiance to the state being at its highest at the state core, and its 
lowest at the core of the neighbouring state. In most cases, rather than 
actual physical boundaries there was an area of interaction. This scale 
can obviously be paralleled by one measuring the decreasing effectiveness 
of administration over distance. Of course this is not to say that 
physical features never formed barriers between peoples. Obviously in sane 
cases they did, and in areas of low population densities there would be 
an unoccupied no-mans-land between the two states. Where population levels 
were high, customary law usually provided for joint consultation before 
any necessary demarcation. (9)
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Human Diversity in Traditional African Society
A cursory look at the literature on pre-colonial Africa will reveal, 
therefore, not a pattern of completely separate self-contained societies, 
but a dynamic situation of economic and therefore cultural and political 
contact and interchange, happening at varying rates dependent on a variety 
of factors. At the siirplest level, a diversity of environment produced a 
diversity of economic systems and specializations, and therefore the basis 
for inter-group trade for which a favourable social atmosphere and 
occasion, such as a market, had to be initiated. As this voluntary, 
functional inter-dependence developed, groups had to devise means of 
ensuring the continuance of mutually beneficial intergroup relations - a 
situation of trust,making continued specialization permissible. As Cohen 
and Middleton have noted among many African peoples, a very marked degree 
of specialization endured until eventually eroded by the introduction of 
a system of universal education. (10)
Several types of association on a gradient of degree of centralization have 
been identified in pre-colonial Africa. (11) Intermittent associations 
across cultural boundaries by either groups or individuals was common among 
decentralized or acephalous societies. Links were forged by such means as 
inter-marriage or blood brotherhood, but without any political central­
ization any closer association was inpossible. Small numbers of people 
could be incorporated by such devices as genealogical fictions, as among 
the Nuer, but if a decentralized society was subjected to increasing outside 
pressure the tendency was towards tacit withdrawl, and until the caning of 
European administration such intermittent associations were the only means 
by which private trade between distant communities could be established.
A symbiotic relationship, involving societies as a whole, developed as a 
result of marked differences in ecological conditions or geographical 
mobility and characterised the relations between sedentary and nomadic 
groups, such as between the Hausa and the Fulani. Such relationships,
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although corip lementary, were often unequal and involved a degree of tension.
A variety of forms of closer association such as the Ashanti Union involved 
some degree of joint decision making. Such federations arose as a response 
to a cannon external threat, or were directed towards peaceful coexistence.
At the extreme end of the scale there are examples such as the Lozi, where 
assimilation had progressed to the need for only a single body of law. (12)
The process of incorporation of minority groups was not however always of 
a voluntary nature. Environmental factors such as drought, famine, pressure 
of population as well as invasion and war, brought societies into 
involuntary contact, and whereas most types of pre-colonial African society 
seem to have been able to accommodate a certain degree of cultural change, 
once the 'transaction flow' (13) increased or the numbers of newcomers 
rose above a certain level, their ability to cope with the situation 
depended much on their political organization. Generally the more 
centralized the society, in terms of a single ruler, office holders, and some 
kind of institutionalized administration, however sinple, the better the 
chance of accorrmodation with neighbours. Weaker, less organized societies, 
tended to be subjected, with the invaders becoming the rulers of a society 
whose resultant culture might include features from both groups. Hie invaders 
were not necessarily in the majority. A minority group was sometimes able 
to conquer the majority by superior military strength and organization, and 
then change its own cultural practices, for exanple the Fulani over the 
Hausa or the Tutsi over the Hutu,
Cue important effect of this involuntary contact was the introduction 
of social stratification. A ruling caste might be forced upon a decen­
tralized society which had previously had a high level of social equality, 
in which leadership was the preserve of the more able, rather than the 
absolute right of a small minority. However, a stratified society 
provided more opportunities for further incorporation than did a simple 
acephalous society; there were subordinate positions available to newcomers. 
South African warrior groups incorporated subject populations by appointing 
relatives as local province chiefs. The Swazi attempted national inte­
gration by organizing subject peoples into age groups that disregarded 
local kinship ties, and by the device of diplomatic marriage, wives being 
selected by chiefs from among many subject groups. (14) In many societies 
the laws of exogamy forced the seeking of wives frcm outside the clan.
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Cohen and Middleton have stressed the importance of common values between 
groups. Throughout sub-Saharan Africa status was attached to the ownership 
of cattle by the cattle-owning and the non-cat tie-owning alike. (15)
Similarly, value was widely ascribed to strong leadership and ritual 
effectiveness such as rainmaking, and the invitation to rule by one group 
to another was by no means uncommon. The existence of such common values 
facilitated eventual integration, although initial contact between groups 
may have been violent.
In many ways attitudes to cultural change seem to have been essentially 
pragmatic, with little of the emotional overtones common to the European 
experience. There was, for exanple, a high degree of flexibility regarding 
language. The inposition of the language of the conquerors on their subjects, 
as in the case of the inposition of Sotho on the Lozi, was not universal.
It was far more likely that the children of conqueror fathers would be 
taught the language of their subject mothers. There is some evidence 
to suggest a certain amount of multi-1 ingualism in pre-colonial Africa. (16)
Trade, Technological Change and External Influences
It must be remembered that Africa was involved in a vast network of long­
distance trade long before the colonial era. While this trade depended 
on long term peace between groups it was certainly facilitated by the 
presence of rulers and very much encouraged the growth of more centralized 
societies. Profitable trade seems to have been definitely linked with 
political centralization and incorporation. With their involvement in 
international trade, the Hausa began to develop a considerable influence 
through the increasing activity of their traders and the consequent spread 
of their language and culture. Political control of trade routes facilitated 
trade which in turn began to finance the machinery of the state.
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This was very much the case at the beginning of the slave trade.Organization, 
and therefore centralization, was required either to participate in the 
trade or to protect the group against its ravishes, The establishment 
of an organized slave trade in the immediate pre-colonial period affected 
the process of incorporation in a variety of ways, fbr those people 
unable to organize their cwn defence, or unprepared to participate in a 
client-overlord relationship, withdrawl or decimation were the only 
alternatives. In a later chapter we shall see how an increase in the 
demand for slaves in the Sudan reversed the former peaceful process of 
incorporation. The more centralized societies co-operated to exploit 
the possibilities of slavery, and as a result, with the sophisticated 
arms the trade made available, were able to bring smaller, weaker peoples 
under their control.
Che of the most important aspects of the slave trade was that it 
facilitated the growth of states, state machinery and, in some cases, 
empires, by making available to some societies a kind of wealth 
previously unimagined. For much of sub-Saharan Africa, economies were 
based on an agricultural system which lacked the wheel, the plough, 
significant water control, had only limited manpower, and was not therefore 
capable of the production of real wealth. Profits from the slave trade 
enabled the importation of new technology. Among the societies of the 
Sahel, slaves were exchanged for horses, with a resultant mobility 
enabling not only further development of the trade, but the extension 
of administration, the collection of taxes and tribute on a scale never 
before possible, and therefore the extension and consolidation of pcwer.
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Similarly, the introduction of firearms to the peoples of the coast 
facilitated the growth of states, and of course also their destruction.
Such technological innovations were not available to all societies, Ihe utility 
of the horse extended only as far as the tsetse-free areas, and was therefore 
confined to the grassland areas. The gun arrived via the sea-borne trade, 
and some states such as Ashanti and Dahomey restricted its passage through 
their territories so as to prevent its use upon themselves.
During the pre-colonial period, some traditional African societies were 
subject to outside influences. As has already been noted, trade in both 
goods and slaves modified the organization of these societies and therefore 
their attitudes and procedures for dealing with human diversity. Perhaps 
the most significant influence in this period was the coming of Islam. On 
the East African coast, Arabs came initially to trade guns and cloth for 
ivory and slaves and by these innovations altered the balanoe of power between 
the existing African communities. Among the more centralised societies, 
trade was carried out by negotiation, but among the nomadic acephalous peoples 
disinterested in trade considerable force was employed. By 1847 Arabs were 
assisting in the expansion of Buganda, by the supplying of firearms. (17)
Ihe Arab presence was initially diffuse, their numbers never exceeding a few 
hundred, but their influence was extensive as they involved themselves in 
local politics, accepting office and intermarrying. Their religious in­
fluence was essentially selective, conversions being largely confined to the 
ruling elite, as to convert the masses would have prohibited their enslavement. 
However, large-scale conversions did take place until countered by the 
arrival of Christian missionaries. The establishment cf the British Protectorate 
of Uganda destroyed the political power of Islam, but it remained as a 
permanent legacy to unite or divide traditional African societies.
In West Africa Hie influence of Islam was very much more extensive and 
introduced into the pattern of acephalous and centralized societies a further 
variety, the theocratic. This was a type of society which divided believers 
and non-believers into distinct religious and political collectivities, where 
the non-believers were politically excluded and subordinate to the eonmunity 
of the faithful. In addition, adherence to Islam prescribed the organization 
of believers into a political eonmunity In the form of a state with a ruler 
and a hierarchy of officials, whose legitimacy was based on religion.
Therefore in one respect Islam was divisive, but in another incorporative in 
that religious belief became more important than local kinship ties .
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As in all theocracies, the very religion which formed the basis of the state's 
legitimacy was an abundant source of grounds for conflict. The initial 
influence of Muslim traders spread the sense of brotherhood in Islam, which 
coupled with the mobilizing powers of jihad resulted in the West African 
Islamic revolution of the eighteenth century, by which time Islam had ceased 
to be the religion of courts and kings, a mere public facade, and become the 
religion of the ordinary man, and in particular that of the nomadic Fulani.
The accumulated grievances of the Fulani against the ruling Hausa, coupled 
with their mobility, transformed what had begun as a movement for refoim into 
a revolt. The Fulani spread the ideology of Islam and the machinery of the 
theocratic state over much of the savannah zone, reaching as far as Adamawa 
in the south-east, and the very borders of Oyo to the south. (18) Whether 
Islam would eventually have unified such a large area is hard to tell. By the 
late 1880’s administrative supervision of the far flung emirates was beginning 
to be under strain, and the whole basis of the economy, the trans-Saharan trade, 
was about to be superceded . by maritime trade. However, as we shall see in 
the case of Northern Sudan, the incorporative potential of Islam over large 
geographical areas and great diversity of peoples was considerable.
Throughout pre-colonial Africa, traditional societies had evolved new political 
organizations to meet the new situations and increasing outside influences 
and stimuli. The kingdoms of Ashanti and Dahomey, the Oil River States,and the 
Fante Confederation were all, in different ways, intelligent responses to 
changing circumstances.
From this necessarily brief examination we can appreciate that in pre-colonial 
Africa, political development was by no means static. A variety of different 
factors - environment, location, coronon values, trade (both domestic and 
international^ technological innovation and outside influences of all kinds 
assisted the process of incorporation and accommodation of many different 
ethnic groups at varying rates and with varying outcomes, resulting in a wide 
range of political systems. While some societies may have disappeared 
through decimation or complete assimilation, others were developing in terms 
of both size and complexity into nations, with the submergence of sane social 
and cultural differences to the ooirmon good.
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The Colonial Framework
The essentially fluid nature of traditional African society was to be 
transformed by colonial rule and the imposition of the European concept 
of spatial organization, with its insistence on the formal definition of 
space and the elimination of any vacuum. As we have seen in chapter I, 
this concept demanded not only the rigid formal division of territory, 
but also recognition of the principle of sovereignty. European attitudes 
towards the capabilities of the indigenous inhabitants did not necessitate 
introducing the corrplication of recognising the right to self-determination.
A quick glance at the political map of Africa will illustrate the effects 
of this policy. The total land area had to be divided and allotted,
regardless of value. Given the limitations of European knowledge of either
the physical or the human landscape, geometrically determined boundaries 
predominated. (19) Where a suitable ’natural1 boundary was known to exist, 
it was seized upon and considered as adding legitimacy to the process.
The division of the continent was a process carried out ultimately by 
negotiation between European powers, to their own ends, and with little 
reference to the wishes of the inhabitants. In many cases boundaries 
depended on the location of certain known and valued resources, such as 
coastal access, rivers, fertile areas and lines of cormiunication. Away from
such 'resources' much less attention was given to delimitation.
The claims to territory made by the imperial powers rested either on treaty 
or conquest: treaty where there was little resistance, conquest where there 
was. Through the making of treaties, African leaders often participated in 
the allocation of territories and the making of boundaries, but such part­
icipation was often the lesser of two evils. As Allott has noted, it was 
nothing new for an indigenous ruler to place his eonmunity under the juris­
diction of a nore powerful neighbour. (20) However, the question of the legit­
imacy of such treaties rests on whether local chiefs had the right to enter 
into contracts over land, and whether, given the divergence of attitudes to 
space between Europeans and Africans, there was not a fundamental misunder­
standing over the ownership and use of land. 'Europeans assumed they were
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purchasing permanent ownership of land when traditional African leaders 
believed they had only granted temporary privileges.1 (21) Traditional 
African spatial organization limited the usefulness of such treaties.
In the negotiations between Britain and Portugal over the border between 
Angola and Northern Rhodesia, agreement had been reached to use the 
western boundary of the Barotse Kingdom. When this proved inpossible 
to determine, lines of longitude and latitude had to be used. (22)
When efforts were made to take notice of ethnic considerations, lack of 
local knowledge and the undefined nature of traditional spatial organization 
limited their effectiveness. The basing of European claims to territory on 
treaty was further complicated by the fact that many treaties had been 
made by individuals, or chartered companies, rather than by governments. It was 
the insistence of the participants at the Berlin Conference of 1884 that 
effective occupation was to be a condition for recognition of annexation 
that first put many of these treaties to the test, and started the race 
away from the coastal footholds towards the interior, to ensure control of 
resources and lines of communication. The boundaries drawn by the imperial 
powers presented them with few problems, in that export production at minimum 
cost was their main interest.
In the early colonial period, the boundiaries drawn between European possessions 
created little difficulty for the local population. Only a very small part 
of such boundaries could be said to be in any sense ' administered1 , and it 
was not until relatively late in the colonial period that administration made 
the lines drawn on a map in Europe into impermeable barriers. Consequently, 
in many border areas social interaction continued without any real disturbance. 
However, the drawing of lines within each large territorial possesion was to 
have, in many cases, very far-reaching effects on social interaction and 
attitudes to human diversity, particularly where boundaries, drawn merely 
for administrative convenience, were subsequently to become state boundaries.
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Internal Boundaries and Compartment alization
Boundaries within a territory were, of course, very much less stable than
those arrived at by international agreement. They were frequently changed
or adjusted in the light of experience and increasing knowledge, but usually
at the request and convenience of administrators. Touval has recounted the
numerous changes concerning the territory eventually to become Upper Volta. (23)
The rate of metropolitan technological change during the colonial period
affected the ascribed value to certain resources and therefore territories,
e
and boundaries were changed. There was a general tendency to try to foresee 
the future and arrange Africa accordingly. Some of these arrangements 
depended on grandiose schemes, such as the Cape to Cairo railway, which were 
in fact never to reach completion. In subsequent chapters an examination 
of the British governments indecision over the future of Southern Sudan 
will explore the subject more thoroughly*
It was local administrative boundaries which were to prove the most disruptive. 
The European system of spatial organization was based essentially on order; 
what the colonialists found in Africa seemed to them to be chaos. So, true 
to form, they laid down a framework of administrative units. As the 
prevailing system of administration was necessarily 'indirect1 - that is 
dependent on the surrender of sane degree of responsibility to local leaders- 
the framework reflected the colonialist's ideas of the traditional political 
pattern. However their knowledge of this pattern was sketchy to say the 
least, and a great deal has been written about the problems experienced in 
identifying a legitimate authority and deciding on the physical extent of 
their powers. (24) These problems do not concern us here. What does is the 
effect of this policy on the economic and human landscape. Because of the 
European's lack of knowledge, associated with a need for 'order*, the formal 
region replaced the functional region. As the boundaries of the formal 
region came to be administered, the traditional interaction and incorporation 
between societies was dislocated or reversed.
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Hie drawing of local boundaries took little account of African attitudes 
to land, and caused much emnity and misunderstanding the African being 
accustomed to 'rights to use' and a degree of mobility; the European to 
'ownership' and therefore permanence. The practice of shifting cultivation 
added further complications, with boundaries being drawn in areas which the 
European considered unoccupied, whereas in fact they were lying fallow.
Land which might appear unoccupied often formed a tacit buffer zone between 
two peoples with a history of enmity. Neither were the migratory patterns 
of pastoralists fully understood. Morgan, in a study on Kenya, has shown 
how land, traditionally the grazing grounds of the Masai, was allocated in 
their temporary absence to other peoples.(25) In the case of Kenya there 
was the added problem of European settlement which was undertaken with 
little knowledge of local population/land relationships, and what amounted 
to a determination to remain unaware.
A lade of understanding of the system of land use not only replaced human 
interaction with tension, but also upset the economy and had, in some cases, 
far reaching effects on the environment. Middleton and Greenland have 
discussed the effects of the imposition of European 'order' among the 
Lugbara of West Nile in Uganda. (26) A high degree of individual mobility 
had previously meant that there was sufficient land available, of three 
required kinds - under cultivation, fallow and pasture - to enable the 
economy to operate. There were no stable boundaries between clans and 
lineages, the entire society being in a permanent state of territorial 
adjustment. The colonial administrators fixed boundaries between clans 
and villages and created chiefs in an effort to stabilize what was a 
fluid system of social organization. In consequence there was an ever- 
increasing disparity between the distribution of population and the 
carrying capacity of the land, with the population density of one village 
being very much higher than that of a neighbouring village. The period of 
fallowing had to be severely curtailed in some areas; there was a shortage 
of grazing, and eventually considerable soil erosion. Land scarcity led to 
a high rate of labour migration, which seriously threatened the smooth 
functioning of social organization.
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The Concept of the Tribe and Indirect Rule
With the coming of colonialism, for probably the first time over much 
of Africa, the inhabitants came to adopt a definite 'tribal' identity 
associated with a precisely defined area. The manner in which this 
' tribal' identity was produced by administrators has been demonstrated 
by Turner in the case of the former Belgian Congo. (27) He explains how 
the inhabitants of the Congo, the majority of whom spoke similar languages 
and lived under similar political systems, were separated more by 
geography than social difference and, with an underlying cultural unity, 
the result of frequent contact, came to be seen by Belgian administrators 
as forming 250 different peoples and exhibiting a Unique ethnic diversity .(28) 
Early attempts at ethnographic study, such as that among the Kongo of Van 
Wing '... contaminated the oral history and aroused ... a sense of Kongo 
unity ’ (29) and produced among administrators a dependence on 'tribal' 
stereotypes. Ethnic antoiguities were commonplace. A lingua franca among 
peoples trading on the River Congo was mistakenly thought to be 'Balanga', 
and so this ethnic category was wrongly ascribed. 'The Balanga identity 
is 'artificial' in the sense that it had no pre-colonial basis, but most 
Congolese identities seem 'artificial1 to some extent because they have 
undergone substantial modification since the coming of the Europeans, Some 
of the European labels stress unity, others stress separateness.' (30)
Administrators favoured some 'tribes' above others;that is, they found than 
more amenable, better suited to the colonial system, and so supported their 
leaders and extended their territory and influence - a policy which was 
occasionally to back-fire as in the case of the Luba who became strong enough 
to revolt against Belgian rule. (31) The phenomenon of ascribing certain 
talents to certain 'tribes' was found all over colonial Africa, and resulted 
in various peoples considering membership of certain trades and professions 
as a tribal' preserve. The division of Africa has often been criticised 
for not taking account of the human landscape. If the lack of knowledge 
was generally such as described in the case of the Congo, as seems likely, 
the employment of straight lines might have been ultimately less destructive 
than the building of elaborate ethnic fictions.
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This' compartmentalization1 of peoples into ' tribes' with ' tribal homelands1 
was essential to the colonial system of administration. After much 
discussion as to the merits and denarits of the British and French admin­
istrative theories, it has generally been admitted that in practice the 
differences were not great. (32) In practice the method of administration 
was largely a response to local conditions and financial constraints. Over 
much of Africa, administrators were very thin on the ground. One man might 
be given control of a vast area. His budget would not allow for European 
assistance, so it was essential that he operate through traditional political 
authorities, and if they did not exist then he had to create them. The 
expedience of delegating authority and responsibility may be dignified 
by the name of ' indirect rule' or Association', but it was essentially a 
pragmatic response to local conditions.
However, if there was little practical difference between French and British 
systems of administration, there was a discernible difference in psychological 
attitudes to indigenous authorities. The French administrator, often the 
product of a military training, brought with him a French desire for 
uniformity, a dislike of the concept of monarchy, and a reluctance to 
relinquish a control gained by conquest. Although he may have used traditional 
African forms of organization to facilitate government, he saw them only as 
a convenience. It was not his wish merely to modify them for his own purposes, 
but to work towards their eventual replacement. There lingered on a desire, 
with the concept of the colonies as a part of France, not only to introduce 
French culture, but actually to create Frenchmen.
Tb the British, the role of the administrator, in his relationship with
traditional leaders, was to act as an adviser who, as long as nothing happened
to offend British morality or interests, should interfere as little as 
possible. The British also believed that their occupation would undoubtedly 
benefit the African, but not at the French level of conviction, and with no 
real intention of inparting their whole culture, or offering the ultimate 
goal of citizenship, political opportunity or equal status. Continued 
emphasis on the 'native authorities', rather than the educated elite, was 
to create a tension between the traditional and modem sectors that was
to continue into the era of independence.
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On balance the attitudes of the French seemed more likely to contribute 
towards the formation of a unified state, while the British attitude, like 
the Belgian, by limiting interaction, definitely contributed to the 
development of cultural sub-nationalism. Problems associated with this 
development seem to have dogged the subsequent political life in the 
former British territories to a much greater extent than in the former 
French possesions.
Colonial Administration and the Growth of Cultural Sub-Nationalism
The factors contributing to the growth of inter-group tension and subsequent 
cultural sub-nationalism were mainly the result of colonial policies. In 
order to operate a system of indirect rule, centralized local political 
authorities had to be created in areas where they had not previously existed. 
In Uganda, the appointment of the favoured Baganda as British ' agentsr in this 
respect resulted in an inevitable resentment among the governed and an over­
emphasis on their own importance among the Baganda. (33) The desired 
coincidence of ethnic group and administrative unit, together with the 
bureaucratic style of administration, provided an institutional expression 
for cultural distinctiveness. British support for traditional leaders 
increased their power by supplanting the traditional checks and balances 
on their behaviour, and so removing threats to group unity. The success 
of seme stable and centralized societies, in finding the favour of the 
British and in gaining some control of their own affairs, encouraged other 
peoples to work towards a similar unity, despite the lack of such a tradition, 
in the hope of similar treatment.
The importance given to the maintenance of law and order between ‘tribes' led 
to their separation, physically, administratively and legally, so that the 
legitimacy of local feeling was intensified and peaceful interaction between 
groups effectively proscribed. Where social development was thought to 
endanger law and order it was kept at a minimum, as with the Karamoja in 
north-east Uganda. (34) The keeping of peace was often the administrator's
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most crucial role - without peace there could be no production - but it 
would be a mistake to think of inter-group hostility as something 
commonly prevailing in the pre-colonial period, controlled during imperial 
rule, only to re-emerge on independence. In fact most of the ethnic 
identities, and thus most of the ethnic antagonisms, have arisen or undergone 
substantial modification during the colonial era. (35)
Cultural Change: Eeligion, Education and Language
The effects of these three factors on the traditional human landscape of 
Africa cannot usefully be separated. Over most of the continent, 
responsibility for inparting European culture to the African was entrusted 
initially to the Christian missionary. Christian principles had been 
employed in the rationale behind the conquest and occupation of Africa, 
and having 'been in at the start1 the various missionary societies would 
not be denied the opportunity to save souls and civilize. The colonial 
administration was quick to realize the advantages and the accompanying 
saving of money. Consequently, in many areas, permission to operate 
within a territory depended on the founding of schools. If several 
different missions offered their services, the administration, true to form, 
divided them on the territorial principle, allotting each group a 'sphere 
of influence.' The attitudes of the missionary towards the African had 
much in cannon with that of the administrator: they were, after all, products 
of the same cultural system. As a result we see them bringing to bear very 
similar concepts: the production of ethnic fictions, (36) '.tribal stereotypes', 
good natives and bad natives. Their religious teaching reinforced the 
demands of the administration, by introducing a moral compulsion to the 
need for law and order and the merits of increased production.
In the French and Belgian territories the spread of Christianity had some 
unifying effect, in that most missionaries were Roman Catholic. In British 
territories the religious tolerance and diversity of the metropole had to 
be mirrored, so that a difference between peoples arose, not only in terms 
of their traditional culture, but also in terms of their inposed culture.
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A disruption of the language pattern was a further result of the arrival 
of the missionaries, lb enter the modem sector some western education 
was essential; this meant not only the acceptance of Christianity, but also 
often the adoption of new languages. Mastery of English constituted not 
merely a status symbol, but evidence of mastery over a whole range of 
skills wherein, in some way, the colonialists^power and prestige was 
held to reside; it was therefore a mark of social stratification. (37)
For the most part the mission decided on the lingua franca of local 
education, and a child often had to master a new vernacular to benefit 
from primary school. Considerable tension arose over the employment of 
one local language rather than another. Part of the resentment in Uganda 
towards the Baganda agents of the British was the spread of Luganda at 
the expense of other vernaculars. The support of some nationalist parties 
in East Africa for the widespread adoption of Swahili was not so much 
a regard for its worth as a means of corrmunication as a reaction against 
the importance given to some local languages by missionaries and subsequently 
the colonial administration. It might be thought that the imposition of 
one language throughout a territory, such as French or English, would have 
had valuable unifying effects. However, as mastery of the language of 
administration was not universal, but rather confined to the more favoured 
areas, it became yet another expression of resentment at the inequalities 
of colonial rule.
The missionary societies spread the Christian religion and therefore 
education, unevenly. As we have already noted they had their own ’tribal’ 
stereotypes influencing location, but in addition the demands of indirect 
rule had to be accommodated, with no disruptive influence being allowed into 
Muslim areas. The results of this policy will be expanded in the case of 
the Sudan. The effect was to localize modernity. Many conflicts which 
appeared to have a religious context were in fact more a conflict between 
modernity and tradition, expressed through religion.
-  46 -
As might be expected, education was more readily available near the capital 
city and among the more ’receptive tribes’ . Kasfir has noted the over­
representation of the Baganda in the secondary school and university system 
in Uganda. Of the 1698 persons who entered Makerere University College, the 
only university in East Africa before 1954 , 40% were Baganda. Educated 
Baganda demanded education for their children, so that built into the 
early provision of education to Baganda was a demand for its continuance (38)- 
a demand met at the expense of the rest of the country. Once an imbalance 
had been established it showed a tendency to increase. Twaddle has noted 
that the early establishment of education among the Baganda led to their 
being trained as teachers and employed in non-Baganda areas, with the 
expected resentment of other groups. (39)
The demands of indirect rule often decided, not only the location of the 
school, but also the scholars. Administrators encouraged school attendance 
among the legitimate heirs of 'tribal chiefs'. They were to be trained, 
not for the future, but to better maintain the past. Eor the other pupils, 
the education also reflected the needs of the administration rather than the 
caimunity. Schools became islands of academic theory in a sea of agricultural 
practice. They were designed to produce clerks rather than better farmers.
In areas where education provision was minimal, the first few who went to 
school became, regardless of ' tribe'j the ultimate in age-sets. They were 
as distinct from their home caimunity as are now men who have been to the moon. 
However, this elite could not act as a corporate modernising force, because 
the colonial administration had decreed that political expression must be 
local, must reflect administrative units, must in the final analysis be 
'tribal'. When the educated elite sought employment in the towns they found 
themselves with two jobs rather than one. They may see themselves as civil 
servants within an elite corps; but their family, their kin, their 'tribe' saw 
them also as their representatives, the guardians of their rights and 
aspirations.
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As the manpower requirements of the administration increased, the favoured 
products of the educational system had to be employed outside their home 
areas, and were sent to assist in the administration of the less fortunate.
In Nigeria in 1947 there were 538,000 primary school pupils in the south, 
compared with only 71,000 in the more populous north. Sklar has noted the 
effect of the transfer of thousands of southern clerks and artisans to 
the cities of the north. (40)
Economic Development and Employment
Inequalities in education were compounded by uneven economic development.
The resentment over education was paralleled by that felt by the migrant 
worker, from a disadvantaged area, on arrival in the capital city. Again, 
distance from the capital was sufficient to provide a rough indicator of 
the degree of modernity. In the simplest terms, the existence of the 
city, the demands of the inhabitants, the development of regular markets, 
all stimulated production and consumption in the surrounding countryside, 
and encouraged the farmer to enter the money economy. The existence of 
optimum conditions for the cultivation of cash crops and associated markets 
was another advantage open to some but not all. Profits could be substantial 
and permit the purchase of more land, investment in trade and the education 
of children. Western education meant a greater chance of employment in the 
infant industrial sector, and mastery of Erench or English could result 
in domestic employment by European administrators or settlers, and the 
adoption of their values. Proximity to the capital city meant greater 
provision of secondary schools, hospitals and social services. In most 
territories the dominance of the capital was absolute. Only in the Congo 
was there multi-polar development. When the growth of the capital city or 
area of resource exploitation exhausted the supply of local labour, 
opportunities for migrant workers developed. The obvious comparisons with
their hcane areas and the fact that in the city they inevitably formed the 
lowest social strata, increased their resentment. Their migration rarely 
benefitted their already disadvantaged area, meaning as it did the removal 
of much of the effective labour force from the agricultural sector. Low 
wages and an increased cost of living in the cities left insufficient to 
be remitted to effect any real change. Their labour benefitted mainly either 
the European, the Asian or the emergent local African entrepreneurial class.
From this brief look at colonial Africa we can see how the three agents 
for change - the administration, the churches and economic development - 
corrfoined to compartmentalize the African, to force him into a territorial
to
and ethnic framework, substantially Acre ate the concept of the 'tribe'.
e
Having done this, all three proceeded to deal unfairly and inequitably with 
their creation and produced a deep-felt resentment, not only to their rule, 
but also to those very few who had benefitted from it. As the British, the 
Belgians and, to a lesser extent, the French, could not conceive of Africans 
in central government, when pressure began to be exerted for some kind of 
African participation it was directed towards local government. As a 
result, power was shifted fran traditional rulers to democratically elected 
representatives without eliminating the ethnic basis of their power. In 
much of the subsequent political development, the district rather than the 
'nation' was to be the organizing focus. In the last part of this chapter 
we shall see the inevitable beginnings of cultural sub-nationalism, the 
efforts of the departing imperial powers to minimize its effects through 
constitutional safeguards, and its destructive re-emergence in independent 
Africa. The macro-political framework which the imperial powers bequeathed 
to Africa was the only one they knew - the nation state. Since their 
'scramble' to leave Africa they have attribut ed its mal-function to the 
inability, inexperience or self-interest of their successors rather than 
to the human landscape which they, porhajps unwittingly, created.
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Decoloni zation
The alteration in the world balance of power after World War II brought 
the principle of self-determination once more to the fore in world political 
thinking, and for the first time it began to affect future developments in 
Africa. The increased power and position in the world eonmunity of anti­
colonialists such as America and Russia, stimulated demands for the 
implementation of the principle and the dissolution of empires. France, 
Belgium and to a lesser extent Britain found themselves in a very much 
weakened position, dependent to some extent on America, and the colonial 
possessions, onoe their pride and joy, a considerable source of embarrassment.
The African elites, their horizons broadened by education, travel,
e
involvment in the war and the associated supportive economic development,
/w
were becoming aware of the independence achievements of the Asians, and of 
the recognition of the validity of their demands for self-determination in 
such documents as the Atlantic Charter. New international forums, such as 
the United Nations, presented opportunities to both anti-colonialists and 
colonial nationalists to air their views and, with the rising importance of 
the Arab-Asian group arid the beginning of the cold war, world opinion 
gained increasing importance. As a result, the necessary conditions for a 
move towards decolonization came to exist: demands for change in both the 
colony and the metropole.
Post-war changes on the continent of Africa encouraged nationalist parties 
and hastened the process. Unlike the situation after World War I, ’enemy 
territories' were not parcelled out to victorious colonial powers, but 
either granted independence, as in the case of Libya, or attached to 
independent states (such as Eritrea to Ethiopia) after some consideration of 
the best interests of the community. Political advancement in one territory 
tended to engender similar desires in adjoining territories. Once the 
process had begun the 'preparedness1 of the country scarcely affected the 
issue, as the Belgians were to discover in the Congo. 'The self-confidence 
of nationalism grew with its success. When mass parties in 'pacesetter' 
states succeeded in capturing the peoples imagination, leaders elsewhere 
shared vicariously in the exhilaration.' (41)
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As the nationalist movements gathered strength they realized the advantages 
of forcing the colonial powers to apply their European values to the issue. 
Much of Europe had been involved in a war in the defence of democracy, and 
democracy inplied that self-government could not be refused in Africa. The 
use of the principles of equality, political freedom and majority rule made 
legitimate the claims of the nationalist leadership, and the transplantation 
of democracy by the colonial powers permitted '...departure with honour,.' (42) 
and satisfied world opinion. However, the willingness of the colonial 
powers to give up their possessions should not be overstated. Although they 
appeared willing to bow to world opinion and relinquish direct control, they 
continued to envisage their former territories as extensions of their 
influence. Trance, Britain and,to a lesser extent,Belgium through 
organizations such as the Commonwealth and the Trench Ooranunity, envisaged 
their future role as one of directing, if not actually controlling.(43)
Having as yet failed to appreciate how limited their strategic role would 
be in the post-war commmity, and over-emphasizing the cold-war situation, 
they wished Africa to be considered as part of the Western defence system. 
Their thinking in respect of continuing direction was perfectly correct,
They realized much better than did the nationalists that the economies of 
their former possessions were so closely linked to the metropole that the 
achievement of political independence would , in only a few extreme cases 
such as Guinea, materially affect the relationship.
Having been, to some extent, forced to relinquish control of Africa, the 
colonial powers sought once again to adjust its spatial organization. Both 
the Trench and the British, after half a century of dividing and compartment­
alizing Africa, discovered the need to create viable units and embarked on 
the foimation of large-scale federations. The majority were a failure, for 
a multiplicity of reasons, not here our immediate concern except in one 
major respect. The nationalist leaders, having fought for control of a 
territory, were not prepared to relinquish any hard-won political power 
to a federal system, which may have some advantages but which they saw as a 
means for the continuance of metropolitan influence.
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Nationalist leaders, as we shall see later in regard to attitudes to 
post-independence boundaries, accepted fully the Western model of the 
nation state, allied with the concept of sovereignty.
The conflict arose between the concept of the nation state and the spatial 
pattern inposed by colonial rule. The localization of African political 
and governmental participation had resulted in the administrative district 
and the tribe becoming the power base for the majority of nationalist 
leaders. Although the fight for independence had been a cohesive force, as 
soon as independence seemed imminent local issues resumed importance.
Uganda provides a case in point. 'All the (District Councils) made it 
plain that they are bent upon reaching the status of a native state. Their 
object is to achieve a constitution as like that of Buganda as possible. In
short they aim at Home Rule Moreover, it seems to them that this is
the logical development of past administrative policy, dan barriers have 
been broken down, sections have been amalgamated, a tribal organization has 
been created and a tribal loyalty has been developed.' (44) The greatest 
problem was in those areas where indirect rule had been most successful, and 
where neo-traditional ruling groups, such as the Northern People's Congress 
in Northern Nigeria, and the Kabaka Yekka in Buganda, had added electoral 
support to historical legitimacy. The greater centralization of French 
administration and social mobility of elites produced nationalist and anti- 
colonial movements which tended to tranpend administrative boundaries. In the 
Belgian Congo the severe repression of political activity had resulted in 
the formation of cultural organisations, such as ABAKO, the Association for 
the Maintenance, the Unity and the Expansion of the Kikongo Language, which 
in time became political parties with inevitable tribal associations.
Throughout much of Africa 'nationalist' parties developed as coalitions of 
district political notables, rather than as centralised national organizations. 
The district became the constituency for the return of elected representatives 
. and therefore, by necessity, the natural unit of party organization. In the 
Uganda election of 1961, of a total of 185 African candidates, only nine were 
b o m  outside their constituencies. (45) In some territories, such as Oubangui- 
Chari, there was also much European interference to prevent the development of 
larger-scale organizations of an unacceptable complexion. (46)
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As independence approached, cultural sub-nationalism intensified. Without 
the inposed order of the colonial governments, the more favoured tribes 
sought ways to institutionalize their advantages, and the weak minority 
tribes feared subjection and an erosion of their rights. The strong 
invariably favoured the institutionalization of their dominance or advocated 
secession, as in the case of the Baganda or the Barotse. The weak tended 
to band together into coalitions which were in effect more 'national' but 
were based on a fear of dominance rather than on any concrete policy.
A multitude of 'native states' could not possibly have survived in the modem 
world, and the colonial powers, especially the British, were faced with the 
problem of creating Unitary states or workable federations from diverse 
units of their own manufacture. Their solutions to the problem were embodied 
in the various constitutional arrangements they devised. Ideally they would 
have preferred to establish unitary structures, as in Ghana, but in many 
cases seme kind of federal structure was evolved, as in Libya, Uganda and 
Nigeria, in an effort to provide a democratic system. The atmosphere tended 
to be one of mutual suspicion with the federal authority lacking sufficient 
power to control the msntoer states, or with too great an identification 
between the federal authority and the dominant ethnic group. In the majority 
of cases, instead of satisfying the demands of sub-nationalism, the 
extremely complex pol j tical systems tended to exacerbate than. By awarding 
legitimacy to ethnic stands no coherent national policy could be formulated, 
and in the majority - these federal arrangements the politicians and their 
parties were very qui.-xly to loose credibility in the independence era.
Fear and resentment was inevitable, but it must be remembered that for 
resentment to become cultural sub-nationalism - a reaction against human 
diversity - some contact with the modern world was necessary. There had to 
be people who understood the role of organizers and publicists. There had 
to be supporters who had entered the money economy and could provide some 
financial backing, as well as those who could negotiate with the central 
government. This may partly explain the involvement of certain 
disadvantaged groups, and the non-involvement of the completely neglected.
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Independence and Spatial Organization
Despite some fears to the contrary the concept of spatial organization 
imposed by the colonial powers - that is the nation state - was to endure 
into the independence era. The nationalist leaders had fought for control 
of just those territorial units, however arbitary or superimposed their 
boundaries. They were to form successor governments. As they succeeded 
to the power, so they succeeded to the delimitation of that power. As 
individuals they had formed their power bases in terms of colonial 
administrative boundaries and tribal fictions, and so these relics of 
colonial administration had to be taken into the independence era. The 
formal regions mapped out during the scramble for Africa had become, at 
least in the political field, functional regions. Everything that was 
modem - the administration, the money economy, transport, education, as 
well as the political organization - post-dated the majority of state 
boundaries. The African had gained control of twentieth century Africa.
It was soon to become evident that however much gpvemments might glorify 
the idea of the traditional African society, there was to be no going back.
Although much was written about the inherent dangers of upgrading the 
lines on the colonialists map to the status of international boundaries, 
their conflict potential has so far been low. There have been exceptions.
In the past decade Morocco has advanced territorial claims to large areas 
of Algeria, the former Western Sahara, Mauritania and Mali, These claims 
have been supported by the contention that the sovereignty of the Moroccan 
Kingdom extended to the Senegal River, before the disruption of the 
nineteenth century Sherifian Empire by the French and the Spanish, (47) and 
that people in these areas still consider themselves subjects of the Sultan 
and members of the Muslim community. A policy was adopted soon after 
independence, as part of a compromise between the King and various political
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interests, that it was the duty and the responsibility of the state to 
reclaim the lost Saharan territories. Similarly, during the dispersal 
of former Italian colonies between 1945 and 1948, the Ethiopian government 
argued from history its claim to Eritrea and part of Somaliland. It 
maintained that before the nineteenth century partition of the Horn area, 
Ethiopian jurisdiction had extended from the Shoan Plateau to the coasts 
of the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. In both the Moroccan and the Ethiopian 
cases, pre-colonial history was used to support territorial claims. It 
should be noted that this kind of claim, based on historical continuity, was 
advanced by states atypical in African terms, both at the time being 
monarchies, both having suffered only short periods of colonial rule and 
both being able to translate traditional factors into modern foreign policy.
As the majority of African states were not in this position, they were 
unable to advance credible claims on the basis of indigenous political history.
In the case of Somalia, not only traditional political factors are involved 
but also ethnic and functional considerations. Somalia's conflict concerns 
both Ethiopia, Kenya and to some extent Trance, and is over the restitution 
of traditional grazing grounds in the Haud and Ogaden areas, and the right 
of Somali people under foreign domination to self-determination. Somalia's 
boundaries have only become important since the independence of her 
neighbours, when civil and military administration was brought to the borders, 
and boundaries became barriers, impeding the free movement essential to a 
stock-herding economy. The significance of the Somali case is that, alone in 
Africa, Somalia could truly be termed a nation state with a single language., 
common Islamic faith, common ancestry and history, and a clear cultural 
differentiation from its neighbours. The social organization, based on 
a segmented lineage system, has led automatically to a sense of national 
identity, and the cultivation of a direct linkage between local and national 
affairs. Somalia continues to be a threat to the security of her neighbours, 
and to the development of their border regions, not only because of her 
increasing military capability, but also because of the large nunbers of 
Somalis outside her borders.
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The majority of border disputes have tended to be minor affairs rarely 
involving any real hostility, and in most cases having their root cause 
in factors other than boundary delimitation. The primary conflict between 
governments was often caused by factors such as personal antagonism between 
leaders, competition in the African arena, support for opposing groups, 
a chain of mutual suspicion and subversion, or an attempt to apply pressure 
and so exert concessions in other matters. (48) The following examples 
will illustrate the greater importance of mutual antagonisms in such disputes, 
rather than the desire to revise boundaries.
The dispute between Ghana and Upper Volta in 1963/66 appeared to concern 
the delimitation of the boundary, but in fact reflected a growing antagonism 
between the two governments, with complaints of attempted subversion on 
both sides. (49) Similarly, the dispute between Ghana and Ivory Coast 
reflected the opposed ideologies of their respective leaders, rather than 
any real attempt at expansionism. It is significant that upon the removal 
of President Nkrumah in 1966 rapprochment was possible , and it seems likely 
that a distrust for his Pan-African ideology had been a major contributory 
factor in boundary disputes involving Ghana during his period of rule.
The dispute between Malawi and Tanzania in 1967 exhibits similar characteristics- 
two leaders pursuing policies in absolute contradiction to each other. On the 
one hand Nyerere began to be seen as the prime mover against the colonial 
regimes of Southern Africa, while Banda moved increasingly towards a position 
of political and economic dependence on those regimes. (50) The close accord 
between President Maga of Dahomey (Benin) and President Diori of Niger minimized 
concern over the ownership of Lete Island in the River Niger, until the 
fall of Maga in 1963 produced fears of subversion in Niamey over the 
support by the new Dahcmean regime for left-wing Niger exiles. Concern for 
the status of the boundary diminished following the restoration of con­
fidence between the two governments in 1965, (51)
It would seen, therefore, that despite the earlier claims by many 
nationalist leaders that Africa's boundaries were 'artificial' and merely 
relics of colonial rule, there were few determined efforts at any major 
revision. In fact, of the twenty border disputes listed by Tbuval, as
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opposed to secession attempts, in only seven was there resort to any 
degree of violenoe, and in nineteen cases no revision of the boundary 
resulted from the conflict. In almost all twenty cases, a change in the 
continental pattern of politics, or the increasing confidence of state 
governments, resulted in the disputes becoming quiescent. The decision 
by African states to respect the existing boundaries and to accept the 
colonial spatial organization of Africa, was based on the fact that they 
were all equally vulnerable, and that any equitable solution to the 
problem was virtually impossible. There was also the constant fear of 
non-African intervention. It was soon realised that the rejection of 
colonial boundaries would inevitably lead to chaos, and the decision was 
made at the Addis Ababa Summit Conference of 1963 to freeze the existing 
boundaries and maintain the current position. There has been a general 
adherence to this policy, and recent exceptions should be considered as 
individual acts, rather than reflecting any change in general African 
thinking. There has been general condemnation of Libya's annexation of 
part of northern Chad (52) and little attention accorded President Amin's 
claim in 1975 to parts of Kenya and the Sudan,(53) Even in the potentially 
dangerous situation in the Horn of Africa, given the unpopularity of 
the Ethiopian regime, there has been a marked reluctance among African 
states to accord any real support to the expansionist aims of the Somalis, 
or to be seen to be taking sides.
Having accepted the colonial framework, African governments obviously 
accepted the morphology of the new states. In many cases they had 
succeeded to territories never intended to function as independent states, 
but rather as administrative areas in large-scale colonial territories. 
Some were fortunate and inherited compact areas with coastal access, while 
others inherited vast land-locked areas thousands of miles from the sea.
In some new states there were abundant resources, if undeveloped; others 
were little more than desert. Sane were inherited as 'going concerns' 
while others had never had any economic viability and had always been in a 
dependent position. In several, especially those with a 'white settler'
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component, there were the beginnings of a social infrastructure, in others 
it was non-existent. Some problems were common to nearly all the new states. 
Capital cities, with a high degree of primacy, were rarely located so as to 
facilitate administration. Transport systems, where they did exist, joined 
the point of exportation to the prime areas of production, and areas of 
modernization were exctremely localized.
However dysfunctional the moiphology of the state, the independent 
governments, having established their legitimacy, did set about the 
transformation of boundaries into borders, to mark by administration, 
not only the extent of their territory, but also the extent of their power.
Over much of Africa, for perhaps the first tine, the lines on the map began 
to affect the life of the ordinary African. The closure of borders limited 
the social interaction of neighbouring groups, restricted trade and caused 
considerable loss and hardship among nomadic herdsmen. The slightest 
disagreement between governments might precipitate a border closure with 
resultant chaos. In February 1977 Tanzania closed the border with Kenya 
after the collapse of the jointly owned East African Airways, so marooning 
hundreds of Kenyans and Kenyan vehicles on the wrong side of the border, 
and substantially affecting Kenya's important tourist trade. The interior 
states are obviously in the worst position. During the hostilities on the 
Kenya-Uganda border in 1976, there were severe fuel shortages in Rwanda and 
Southern Sudan. In an effort to re-direct trade, states have developed new 
transport routes which better reflect their alliances rather than the 
old agreements between colonial powers, for example the Tan-Zam railway, but 
their utility still depends on continued good inter-African relations.
The creation of nation states introduced the modem concept of nationality, 
and immigration control, so limiting free movement of manpower. The change in 
status from French colonial subjects to Dahomean (Benin) nationals resulted in 
thousands of civil servants being expelled from Ivory Coast, Senegal, Gabon, 
Congo and Niger. In some cases migration continued, but in most cases the 
demand was for unskilled labourers. Ivory Coast still permits the immigration 
of thousands of people from Upper Volta to perform menial tasks.
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Of course, immigration control depends on the officials* ability to 
recognize their own nationals, often no easy matter where ethnic groups 
may spread over national boundaries . In the Sudan there are considerable 
difficulties experienced with migrant workers, refugees both political 
and apolitical, those in search of health services unavailable at home, 
not to mention pilgrims on their way to Mecca. A lack of ability to 
control border movements has also produced problems. Different national 
price policies on cocoa in West Africa and ooffee in East Africa have led 
to widespread smuggling into high-price zones. States have found them­
selves with huge refugee problems, and have found their efforts at human 
and animal health control constantly frustrated.
The hopes at independence were that African states would benefit from 
inter-state economic oo-operation, in many cases having inherited the 
organizational structuresjfeuch as the East African Community and the 
Union Douaniere Economique de I'Afrique Centrale. This has not in 
practice been the case. With national cohesion has grown a parallel 
economic nationalism, and despite the obvious advantages of economic union, 
co-operative organizations such as the EAC are now on the verge of 
collapse.(54) Apart from participation in various United Nations 
continental health programmes, co-operation across borders has not really 
been meaningful. Despite the Pan-African rhetoric of the sixcties, national 
development has been the prime motive of African governments.
Territorial Disputes and Secession
With the departure of the colonial governments, the cultural sub­
nationalism movements whose beginnings we traced earlier in this chapter, 
came to the fore, and several states were threatened with disintegration.
A simple typology can be attempted in terms of the avowed aims of these 
movements. In addition to the case of Somalia already mentioned, the 
Sanwi Liberation Movement in Ivory Coast, and the Ewe movement in Ghana, 
appear to have had ethnic unification as their main aim. Both seem to have
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been most active during the Nkrunah period in Ghana, and probably owed 
something to his somewhat disruptive influence in West Africa. Both 
movements displayed a low level of popular involvement, and seem now to have 
been sucessfully reabsorbed into their respective states. The rarity of 
claims for re-unification would seem to support our earlier contention 
that the successor states had become the functional political region.
If this had not been so, one might have expected a proliferation of such cases 
throughout Africa. Significantly, part of the Ewe demand was for the 
restoration of the 1914 colonial border, rather than the recognition of a 
traditional Ewe polity.
In the case of the Tbuareg in Mali, the arabised peoples of Northern Chad, 
and of the Lozi in Zambia, the aim appears to have been the gaining of 
greater recognition of their needs and demands within the state, and 
especially of their'economic grievances. Threats of secession may have 
formed part of the rhetoric, but have never seemed feasible. Absolute 
independence has not yet been a practical possibility and no neighbouring 
state has as yet openly offered union. In the extremely complex situation 
in Northern Chad, In which only a small splinter group has ever aimed at 
secession, the caning to power of a military regime in 1975 has resulted 
in a more equitable distribution of power among the different ethnic groups, 
but does not as yet seen to have resulted in any better understanding with 
tiefragmented rebel factions. In 1975 the situation was further complicated 
by the annexation of part of Northern Chad by Libya. While the insurgency 
continues in Chad, the Lozi in Zambia seem to have accepted life within 
Zambia, although there is still only one Lozi prcminent in the Zambian 
government. The reluctance of the Touareg to succumb to any kind of 
administration was largely dissipated by the ecological disaster in the Sahel. 
The Buganda and Kuwenzururu movements had as their major aim a redistribution 
of power within Uganda, rather than a real desire for independence. Buganda 
wished to retain its former autonomy and reassert its former dominant status. 
The Kuwenzururu movement of the Baamba and the Bakonjo peoples initially 
demanded detachment from the Kingdom of Toro, and only subsequently considered 
secession. Both movements were suppressed and can be considered as being 
refrigerated during the current period of Ugandan military rule. These cases 
substantiate the observation made in chapter I, that the mere existence of a 
territorial minority group is not sufficient in itself to lead to a continued 
demand for secession.
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Only four cases of cultural sub-nationalism have had as a definite and 
sustained aim the formation of a separate independent state. These are 
the Southern Sudan, Katanga, Biafra and Eritrea. Southern Sudan we shall 
of course, consider in detail in subsequent chapters. However it will be 
useful here to examine the remaining cases in terms of the criteria for the 
foimation of secession movements suggested in chapter I.
The first criterion was a transfer of loyalty from the existing state to 
the proposed new entity. In considering African situations, we have already 
realized that this criterion will require some amendment. Loyalty to the 
nation state, at the time of the carmen cement of these movements, had not 
yet been created in any meaningful sense. People identified and gave their 
loyalty to human groups and territories, to some extent the creation of 
colonial administration, and were not yet prepared to combine with other 
groups and extend their loyalty to the nation state. In the case of Katanga 
resistance to the idea was an immediate reaction; in Eritrea and Biafra, an 
initial willingness to participate in a larger unit was subsequently felt 
to be a mistake. To understand the unwillingness to transfer loyalty from 
the territorial interest group to the nation, we must introduce the second 
criterion: the historical background. All three cases have relatively long 
histories of bitterness and resentment.
In the Nigerian pre-colonial period, the Ibo of Eastern Nigeria were divided 
into over two hundred independent groups, organized into clans and lineages 
with a high degree of group autonomy, but strong social and couriercial links. 
Although there was no recognisable central authority, the local style of 
political organization was ccmnon to all groups. Leadership and political 
office were based not oily on lineage ascription, but also on achievement 
and wealth. Egalitarianism, individualism and achievement were important 
in the value system with a resultant high degree of popular participation in 
the decision-making process. Aggressiveness and initiative were rewarded.
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It is easily realized that such a group would be in inevitable conflict 
with the value system of the constitutional monarchy of the Yoruba^ and 
the theocratic dynasty of the Hausa. In the simplest terms, colonial rule 
tended to entrench these differences,with the Hausa and the Ibo being the 
extremes. While in the North traditional culture was conserved,and in fact, 
reinforced, the East was open to all kinds of European influences and 
innovations, of which the value system of the Ibo enabled him to take full 
advantage. Although European influence came first to the Yoruba, the Ibo 
had quickly overtaken them, and the acquisition of new skills resulted in 
their migration throughout Nigeria, and their increasing domination of the 
modem sector. The advance of the Ibo, especially in government service, 
resulted in growing resentment among Yoruba and Hausa and alerted than to 
the necessity of defending their position within the country. The approach 
of independence intensified ethnic hostilities and resulted in widespread 
violence in 1956. (55) The efforts of the various nationalist parties, both 
to gain power and at the same time to protect the interests of their 
majority ethnic followings, politicized what had previously been mainly a 
cultural conflict. The years after independence were characterized by in­
creasing violence, much of it aimed at the Ibo, and with the military 
take-over tending to introduce a professional element into violent conflict.
By 1966 large numbers of Ibo were returning to the ■ East, feeling they could 
no longer protect their interests within the framework of a federal Nigeria. 
With the decision to further sub-divide the country into twelve states, they 
felt their power to be further eroded, and in May 1967 the secession of 
Biafra was announced.
This is hardly the place for a detailed discussion of the history of Ethiopia* 
However, for our purposes, the most important factor is that there has been
S
over the past few hundred years a definite policy among successive emperors 
to re-establish and expand the empire, maintain political unity and indepen­
dence amid ethnic diversity and fight against Muslim encirclement, (56)
The antiquity of the Ethiopian empire gave the country and its leader a 
degree of influence and prestige unknown among other African states, and a 
quite disproportionate credibility in the world conramity. After World War II, 
the future of the former Italian colony of Eritrea was brought before the 
United Nations and, despite much local resistence, the credibility of Ethiopia
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persuaded the United Nations to approve the creation of a federation of 
Ethiopia and Eritrea. In some respects there are similarities with the 
Biafran case. Here was a more sophisticated, politically aware group being 
expected to settle down happily with a feudal autocratic regime. Eour of 
the five members of the United Nations Ccannission for Eritrea, reporting 
in 1950, agreed that the country should not be added to Ethiopia, They had 
witnessed the intimidation of Eritreans by Ethiopians and could see no 
prospect of success for the proposed federation. However by 1952 the 
General Assembly had accepted the plan, and Eritrea became an autonomous 
area, with a supposed right to a democratic regime. During the British 
Administration of the territory, political life had developed rapidly with 
the growth of a vigourous party system and Eritrean labour movement. lb 
these interests, federation with Ethiopia was a disaster; the political 
activity of the Eritrean Assembly was in stark contrast to the palace 
intrigue of Addis Ababa, and many political leaders, noting the increasing 
Ethiopianization, fled into exile. The increased pressure put on the 
Eritrean Assembly was not only the beginning of annexation, but also a 
response to Eritrean democracy. There was the great danger that other parts 
of the enpire might demand similar rights. Expression of democratic rights 
met with increasing violence, and by 1962 the Eritrean Assembly accepted the 
end of its autonomy, and Eritrea became Ethiopia's fourteenth province.
The majority of Eritrean people did not accept annexation. Neither did 
they accept the end of their special rights which had been the better part 
of their colonial heritage. The suppression. of labour unions, the banning 
of political parties, the inposition of increased taxation, and the abolition 
of the two official languages of Eritrea, combined with a deteriorating 
economic position to drive political activity underground. The
response of the central government was increased repression, and the people 
of Eritrea realized that they had exchanged one colonial ruler for another 
that was infinitely worse. The result was the foxmation of the Eritrean 
Liberation Eront and the Eritrean Popular Liberation Eront, which became 
mass movements demanding Eritrean independence.
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Perhaps the most complex case history is that of the former Belgian Congo, 
where the tensions produced during the colonial era caused the almost 
complete disintegration of the state at independence. The attempted 
secession of Katanga was enabled by the coalition of two groups, one group 
feeling themselves to have been for long disadvantaged, and the other 
wishing to maintain their former advantages. The black 'authentic Katangans1
(57) had long felt threatened by the presence of large numbers of 'stranger' 
Africans in Katanga, and aligned themselves with the white Belgian settlers
(58) who wished to reserve for Katanga the fruits of her considerable 
resources.(59) The resentment of the ’authentic Katangans1 had grown with 
the development of the area, as increasing numbers of Africans from other 
parts of the Congo had emigrated as labourers to Katanga, and by the 1950's 
were not only in the majority in some towns, but were both socially and 
professionally in the ascendant.(60) In Elizabethville in 1957, 53% of 
employed workers were 'strangers' . (61) The rallying platform proposed by 
the 'authentic Katangans' was therefore that of self-defence against the 
'strangers' , and especially against those from Kasai. However, although 
there was an ethnic factor in the formation of their party OCNAKAT (62) there 
were also broad factors of social competition, as well as cultural and 
political opposition. OQNAKAT felt its members had been unfairly treated 
by the main employer, the Union Miniere du Haut-Katanga, and when unemployment 
grew severe in 1958/9 the 'authentic Katangans' were again hardest hit.
The resentment of the African was paralleled by resentment among white 
settlers. They had long been politically organized, to resist pressure 
from Leopoldville and Brussels alike, and to encourage white immigration 
into Katanga. Similarly they had long advocated decentralization in the 
Congo, and real autonomy for the provinces. 'Nothing in the past of the 
Congolese justifies any rights whatsoever to the whole of the country. They 
have never created anything, not a wheelbarrow - nothing. We have lifted 
them out of cannibalism and slavery.'(63) Whites were vehemently opposed to 
the Brussels policy for the creation of a unitary state in the Congo, and 
sought to adjust the Katanga boundary to include the Kasai diamond fields 
and to improve transport links with Rhodesia. Within Katanga they sought 
a transfer of social tension from the ethnic to the class level, and en­
visaged the creation of a black bourgeoisie. With Brussels constantly 
confirming her adherence to the unitary structure, and with the growing power 
of the mass-nationalist parties, both black and white in Katanga needed 
support. The white settlers sought African support to legitimize their claims,
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and the 'authentic Katangans1 sought European support against the 'strangers'
and the mass-nationalist parties. Their alliance was inevitable, and
together they attempted to present a moderate front against what they claimed
to be the increasing 'anarchy' in the rest of the Congo, and the'dangerous
left-wing extremists' of Brussels. Pressure for a federal structure for
c
the new state was sucessful, and while OCNAKAT dominated the group in power 
in Elizabethville, their position in the central government was much 
weaker than anticipated. The settler population was much alarmed at the 
accession of Lumumba as President. The Congo Republic achieved independence 
in June 1960, but after only five days sections of the army mutinied and, 
without invitation,Belgium flew in troops to 'protect her nationals' .
On 11th July, blaming the breakdown of law and order, the chaos in the 
central government and fears of its 'comnunist intentions' , Tshontoe announced 
the long expected secession of Katanga.
In all three cases a history of resentment and fear of domination by other 
groups prevented the growth of any loyalty to the new state, and in fact 
intensified loyalty to the province. The general feeling was that inde­
pendence from the proposed larger unit would further the group's interest 
both in terms of the 'quality of life' and its material welfare. Which brings 
us to the third of our original criteria-economic disparities. The three 
secession movements we are considering have had three different economic 
motives. In Katanga, secession would have reserved the major part of the 
state's potential and actual wealth to one small group. In Biafra, both the 
resources and the results of Ibo entrepreneurial skills would have all accrued 
to the new state, rather than being deployed in supporting the conservative 
and under-developed Northern Region, and in Eritrea secession would terminate 
an essentially colonial economic relationship with Ethiopia, and at least 
permit Eritreans to plan their own development with the maximum benefit of 
international aid and assistance.
In Eritrea and Biafra economic issues were inportant, but in Katanga they 
were paramount. In the discussions prior to independence, OCNAKAT had 
demanded that 'the resources of each province be properly its own.' , and 
that central government machinery be financed by voluntary contributions from 
the provinces. They also wished primary power over mining matters to be 
reserved to the province. The ’authentic Katangans' wished to re-inforce 
their claim to highly paid wage enployment and entrepreneurial opportunity, 
while the white settlers considered the wealth of Katanga to be a purely
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European creation, which only their continued involvement could ' .. .put at 
the disposal of humanity' .(64) Further to this policy that all public 
bodies should ' .. .reinvest the capital in the regions from which it came' , 
there should be an increased reliance on private enterprise for all 
public works, and maximum protection accorded local agriculture and industry. 
Above all, the white settlers desired strong, continued economic links 
with Belgium. Their attitude was basically a determination not to be forced 
to share the wealth of Katanga with thejrest of the Congo. Their rationale 
was that the revenue from mining in the province was required for the 
development of agriculture and industry, against a time when the mining 
receipts should begin to diminish. However they also wished to reassure 
Leopoldville that they would never '... .act as miserly relatives and 
(should) always be ready to render assistance in the federal framework to 
the territories which (were) less favoured.'(65)
Economic considerations were also a factor in the development of the Eritrean 
secession movement, in that a province that was already poor resented the 
threat of even greater poverty. The first infusion of capital for
T*
development occured during the brief Italian occupation. Eritrea was 
developed as a base for the exploitation of the Ethiopian hinterland, and 
as a result there was a great deal of constructional activity. The building 
of roads, airports, harbours and settlements provided wage employment for 
a large number of Eritreans. The British occupation of Eritrea in 1941 
continued the process of modernization. In 1941 Eritrea became the British 
GHQ Middle East and a number of military projects were undertaken, so 
providing employment, creating a domestic market with same purchasing power, 
and providing a stimulus for the development of a light industrial economy. 
The value of exports rose from £494,000 in 1943 to £1,678,000 in 1945.(66) 
Attention was also given to agricultural development, and between 1939 and 
1946 the area under cultivation rose by 500%. Despite this expansion
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and the importance of her entrepot trade, there was little improvement 
in Eritrea's adverse balance of trade. The Italian regime had habitually 
balanced the budget by grants-in-aid from the Italian government, and the 
British found themselves committed to maintaining a standard of administration 
and public services out of all proportion to the territory's resources, at 
a time when Eritrean expectations were rising. Although the development of 
Eritrea had been the result of quite exceptional circumstances, and could 
not be expected to continue, what was Important was that large numbers of 
Eritreans had come into contact with the modem sector as wage earners, clerks 
in the administration and small traders. Similarly, the rural population, 
especially on the plateau areas, had benefitted from the Italian's haphazard 
attempts at land reform, under which the traditional power of the absentee 
landlords had been eroded in favour of the landless peasants. Both the 
rural and the urban populations realized that the advantages they had 
gained under colonial rule were unlikely to continue in a federal relationship 
with Ethiopia. Since the annexation of Eritrea by Ethiopia, what little that 
has been spent on Eritrea has been concentrated on military and strategic 
projects, and the standard of living of the majority has dramatically declined. 
In addition the majority of top positions in the administration have been 
given to Amhara from Addis Ababa.
In the attempts at a federal solution to the problems of post-independence 
Nigeria, economic considerations have played a part. Again the pattern is 
one of a part of the country, in this case the south, being federated with 
a more powerful, but much less -developed, area with which it must share its 
resources, in this case oil. In the several pre-civil war federal arrangements, 
Northern Nigeria was in the ascendant in terms of population and therefore 
electoral power. To its partners in the south, it was a large, conservative 
and, above all, impoverished area, which they would be called upon to support 
at the expense of their own development. This was especially strongly felt 
by the Ibo of Eastern Nigeria, not only because they thought it would inhibit 
their considerable entrepreneurial skills, but because they had a history 
of economic conflict with the people of the north. Before the Nigerian 
civil war, the Ibo had risen to a position of some eminence in the most
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coveted sectors of society. They were particularly dominant in the 
administration and in education, as well as in the army. Although 75% of 
the infantry was of Northern origin, 60-70% of the technicians and officers 
were of Eastern origin, mainly Ibo. (67) Feeling against the widespread 
employment of Ibo was so high that until 1972 it was the policy of the 
Northern Region to recruit foreigners, rather than southerners, into its 
public services. (68)
The development of this kind of imbalance in employment and professional 
achievement cannot really be separated from educational opportunity, and so 
leads us to the next of our original criteria - social and political disparities. 
The effect of colonial policy on education in Nigeria has already been noted; 
where administration tended to be more direct, as in the south, educational 
opportunities and therefore subsequent employment opportunities were greater.
In Northern Nigeria, koranic schools continued, and secondary education was 
the preserve of the traditional elite. Education in the south was a very 
much more modernizing force than that provided in the north.
In Eritrea, the British administration reorganised and improved education 
and by 1952 there were over 14,000 pupils in full-time education. (69)
In the Ethiopia of the 1950's education was the monopoly of the Orthodox 
Church, and what few opportunities there were tended to be reserved for 
the Anhara elite, and even by 1970 only 2% of the population was in full­
time education. (70) The British administration also improved health facilities 
and by 1950 had provided 1,400 hospital beds, 32 dispensaries, mobile clinics 
and malaria control, compared with a situation in Ethiopia, where agitation 
for the provision of some kind of social infrastructure was not to emerge 
until well into the 1960's.(71)
Although the high rate of urbanization in Katanga -36% in 1959-should have 
facilitated the growth of social infrastructure, the 'authentic Katangans' 
felt that as education and health services were largely provided by the 
mining companies, the favouritism shown to 'strangers' operated against 
them in terms of education and health, as well as in texms of employment, 
especially in the rural areas. (72) In all three cases, both
in economic and social terms, the peoples of Biafra, Katanga and 
Eritrea had come to expect a higher standard of living. Closer contact
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with Europeans, whether as administrators or settlers, had better fitted than 
for the modern world, and with modernization came political awareness 
and representation.
In the development of Eritrean political awareness, the effects of the 
period of British Administration were particularly important not only in 
that it introduced modern ideas, but also in that the British were determined 
that their administration should be just and,especially, compare well with 
that of the Italians. Accordingly, they gave considerable attention to the 
problem of Eritrean political representation. The first step was the 
removal of the colour bar and the employment of Eritreans as administrative 
assistantsjso indicating British recognition of the Eritrean's right to 
acquire control of his own affairs. Italian law was replaced by native 
courts under local chiefs expected to shoulder wide responsibilities and 
appointed to Eritrean Advisory Councils. Later these councils included 
those with popular support and became vehicles for Eritrean opinion. The 
councils not only had power to advise but also the right to be consulted 
by the administration. In the economic depression which followed the 
war-time boom, there were many among the disenchanted intelligentsia of 
Asmara ready to take the opportunity to express their feelings. It was a 
period of great political uncertainty. There were fears that the country 
might be returned to the Italians, and Ethiopia was already pressing her 
claim through a political organization, the Unionist Party, based on the 
Orthodox Church of Eritrea. Its purpose was to engender fear and resentment 
of Italians, British, Arabs and Sudanese, and so encourage Eritreans to 
see union with Ethiopia as their only secure future. The Muslim population 
had reacted by forming the Muslim League and called for the maintenance of 
Eritrean territorial integrity and the granting of eventual independence.
By 1947 they had the support of both Muslims and the Christian separatists 
of Tigrai province, and the opposition to union with Ethiopia was intensifying.
A Four Power Commission, in an effort to assess the majority view, held 
a limited kind of plebiscite in 3947, and found that the population divided 
its support largely in terms of geography and religion, most Christians 
of the highlands being in favour of unconditional union with Ethiopia, 
and the Muslim population of the lowlands opting for independence or 
continued trusteeship. The interest shown in their future by the Commission 
intensified political awareness. In the vacuum left by the Commission's 
failure to agree, widespread violence broke out, with the majority of 
victims being opposed to union with Ethiopia. The problem of the future
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of Eritrea was transferred to the United Nations, who in 1949 set up a 
further coraioission. Their vist, during three weeks in 1950, coincided with more 
violence and intimidation by Unionists directed from Addis Ababa in an 
effort to give an impression of Eritrean disunity. The result was the 
undermining of the independence cause, already weakened by suspicions 
aroused by Italian support, and the Muslim League was forced to opt for 
a federal union with Ethiopia, As soon as negotiations were underway, it 
became obvious that Ethiopia was determined to gain control of Eritrea.
In the short period from 1941 to 1952, political life for Eritreans changed 
from one of total colonial subjection to one of federal autonomy with their 
own executive and legislature; however, their lade of experience prevented 
them from maintaining their autonorry, and the presence of an Ethiopian
Governor General, Ethiopian garrison, and a dependence on Ethiopian finance,
paved the way for Ethiopian annexation in 1962. However, it also sowed
the seeds of the movement for secession that, in the face of continued,
harsh, colonial attitudes by Addis Ababa, was to reunite Eritreans of all 
religions and political persuasions.
In Nigeria, the Biafran secession movement was based on the high degree of 
political awareness of the Ibo, conpared with other Conservative elements 
in the federal structure but,unlike the Eritrean case, the federal centre 
had insufficient power , rather than assuming too much power. In Katanga, 
in common with most Congolese, people felt they had had insufficient political 
representation. When , belatedly,political parties became permissible, to 
the 'authentic Katangans' there was the added stimulus of their believed 
domination by 'strangers' . The political chaos in the Congo gave them the 
opportunity to organize, and the white settlers provided the expertize and 
the means. Again, as in Nigeria, the federal centre was too weak to control 
the member states.
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In all three cases, entering into hostilities with the federal government 
required cohesion within the group, and the motivation of people to withstand, 
not only the resultant violence, but also the associated material hardships.
In Biafra a degree of cohesion was already present in the sense of Ibo 
awareness. Hie resentment of the elite was easily transferred to the 
ordinary people of Iboland; an attack on an individual was perceived as an 
attack on the whole group. Differences of religion were not really significant. 
What was important was a basic difference in traditional values. In Chapter I 
we noted how cohesion could be produced by awareness of differences from 
the ruling group, rather than common religious or ethnic factors. In Eritrea, 
the movement for secession found support among Christians and Muslims, and 
cohesion was built upon a sense of being non-Airharic. Eritreans of different 
creeds, classes and ethnic groups, came to regard Addis Ababa as the common 
enemy. In both these cases the struggle for secession involved a large 
part of the population. The Katanga case is somewhat different in not really 
involving the mass of ordinary Katangans, but being substantially an elitist 
movement supported by Belgian troops and other foreign mercenaries. (73)
The military feasibility of all three movements was enhanced by their 
defensible location, the next of our original criteria. All three operated 
in relatively conpact areas, peripheral to the state core. The greater 
military strength of Katanga and Biafra did not initially make opportunities 
for defence of such importance, but in Eritrea the rugged nature of the 
terrain is ideal for the conduct of a long guerrilla campaign. Friendly 
neighbouring states played an inportant part in both Katanga and Eritrea. 
Katanga’s communications with the outside world were good, and the movement 
received supplies, manpower and moral support from Rhodesia and Southern 
Africa. Eritrea's coastline facilitated support from across the Red Sea, 
and her border with Sudan provides both supplies and a safe retreat for 
civilians. In 1977 there were an estimated 100,000 Eritrean refugees in 
the Sudan. (74)
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The last of our original criteria was the expectation of international 
support, as a precondition for both the success of the secession movement, 
and the economic survival of the new state. The three movements we have 
been considering illustrate how attitudes towards secession have changed, 
both within Africa and the rest of the world ccmnunity. Seme international 
support for Katangan secession was implicit in its genesis; without Belgian 
involvement it is unlikely that it would ever have been contenplated. In the 
1960rs western commercial companies saw their interests as being best served 
by support for secession. By the time of the Nigerian Civil War this was 
no longer the case, and they were less concerned with the outcome, having 
realized that African independence did not adversely affect those interests. 
In the case of both Biafra and Katanga the control of valuable resources 
would have guaranteed sufficient international support for the new state.
In the cold war donate of the 1960's Katanga's secession was seen as a 
dangerous situation which might provoke east-west confrontation. By the 
tine of Biafra the climate had changed and the great pavers saw nothing to 
be gained from intervention, and had in any case moved their area of 
interest to South East Asia. Britain, the former metropolitan power, did 
not consider intervention, and adopted a traditional position of support 
for the federation it had largely created. While Eritrea lacks the valuable 
resources to motivate substantial international support, it does have 
sufficient strategic importance to generate assistance. Access to the Red 
Sea has become an increasingly important factor in terms of the Arab/Israeli 
conflict, and the rebel forces of the ELF and the EPLF have been able to 
obtain backing from a variety of Arab sources, the majority concerned with 
the security of the Red Sea and the confounding of earlier American and 
Israeli efforts to influence developments in Ethiopia. The change of 
government in Addis Ababa, and the increasing communist involvement in the 
country over the past eighteen months, has gained increased support for the 
rebels among more moderate states. Support has also been forthcoming at 
tines from Libya, as a purely religious response to the conflict. Arab 
involvement in Africa has increased substantially over the past ten years, 
and attitudes to Eritrea, both in and out of Africa, reflect an unwillingness 
to offend the Arab World and prejudice Arab investment and fuel supplies.
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At the tine of secession in Katanga,political opinion and allegiance in 
Africa was divided between radical and moderate groups. Their reaction 
to the situation in the Congo was generally one of alarm. At a time 
when many of them were yet to gain independence, they realized how 
easily a former imperial power could regain pcwer and reassert influence 
in Africa. They realized that they were all to some extent vulnerable, 
and that if the situation were to be repeated they were powerless to 
prevent intervaltion, whether it be by a former imperial power or a non- 
African multinational force such as the United Nations. They also realized 
that they were individually and collectively powerless to prevent the use 
of Africa as an arena in any east-west confrontation. As a result the 
majority of African states henceforth associated secession with potential 
metropolitan reassertion, and saw their only future in the cold war climate 
as being among the non-aligned. By the outbreak of the Nigerian Civil 
War, African attitudes to secession had been institutionalized in the 
charter of the Organization of African Unity, and only four states supported 
the Biafran secession attempt. (75) There was general African support for 
the respect of sovereignty and a strict policy of non-intervention. By 
1976, with the secession movement in Eritrea gaining increasing strength, 
adherence to this policy had intensified to such an extent that intervention 
in the affairs of Ethiopia by the majority of African states was unthinkable, 
and the Organization of African IJhity was becoming increasingly embarrassed 
over its inability to control the internal conduct of African extrejnists 
such as General Amin of Uganda. So in the very short time since 
independence, African states,with the exception of Somalia, had accepted 
the Western concept of the nation state; accepted their boundaries; and 
accepted the principle of sovereignty. In fact, the great majority of 
African states had totally accepted the Western concept of the organization 
of space.
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Nation Building
The response to secession attempts by African governments has invariably 
involved the use of considerable force. They have all begun under a 
civilian regime, subsequently discredited, and contributed to the 
imposition of military rule, which while perhaps temporarily exacerbating 
the situation, has finally brought peace (with the exception of Eritrea) 
and been in a position to maintain peace. This is surely no coincidence.
In every case the corrupt and partisan politicians have been largely 
discredited and the military has proved the only solution, being in most 
cases a modernizing force, not immediately exhibiting the old traditional 
ethnic cleavages. Where civilians have retained control in Africa, it has 
been mainly under a one party system. Mazrui sees conflict as playing a 
crucial part in the integrative process, in that the state which has 
survived hostilities has gained valuable experience in conflict resolution, 
and is more aware of the dangers inherent in its make up. (76)
In states fortunate in having avoided secession attempts, great emphasis 
has been placed on the building of national unity and on policies for 
national integration. The most important factor in such policies is the 
general awareness of the need for regional balance, and what Kasfir has 
called ’ethnic arithmetic' . (77) This means that however dominant One 
ethnic group may be, the need for representation of all groups is recognised.
In the sams way, the distribution of scarce resources is now affected by 
regional considerations and efforts are being made to develop the long 
neglected areas, sometimes at the expense of efficiency and profitability.
In some states, such as Tanzania, the proposed re-location of the capital 
is designed to break the colonial pattern of production, and involve more 
people more closely with the government and the development process.
While there is an awareness of the need for decentralization in administration, 
there is also a tendency to centralize control of integrative factors. The 
education systems of most African countries are currently undergoing changes, 
not only to better reflect the needs of the comnunity, but also to stress 
national similarities rather than regional or ethnic differences.
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The media tend to be very much under central government control and 
constantly underline the idea of national unity, using carefully selected 
national symbols. There have been several attempts to introduce a national 
ideology such as the Humanism of Zambia, the Negritude of Senegal, the 
Ujaama of Tanzania. The history of many states has been rewritten to 
emphasize national heroes rather than tribal leaders, The encouragement 
of a return to traditional values has also been widespread with emphasis 
being placed on local co-operation and self-reliance.
Over some matters, such as language policy, extreme tact has been necessary 
and many states have unwillingly retained a colonial tongue as the 
national language rather than opt for one with particular regional or ethnic 
connotations. In Zaire, Lingala seems to be making progress at the expense 
of Kikongp and Kiswahili; havever to attempt to syrribolize national unity 
and liberation from European rule by adopting Lingala as the national 
language would certainly be premature. (78) In addition to the nation 
building programmes, the inevitable process of modernization carries its 
own integrative factors. Increasing urbanization and industrialization 
are slowly producing a middle class in most African states, and rivalries 
are gradually becoming broader based. However, for many African countries 
the nation building programme will not change the monopolization of power 
by one group, whose policies are interpreted by the disadvantaged as an 
effort at acculturization and the entrenching of dominance.
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Conclusion
We have seen how the essentially fluid nature of traditional African 
society was transformed by colonial rule and the inposition of the 
European concept of spatial organization; how the African continent 
was divided and compartmentalized, and how a variety of factors 
produced wide disparities and contributed to the growth of cultural 
sub-nationalism. At independence the inposed spatial organization 
produced areas of conflict, fpn minor boundary disputes to demands 
for secession. We have traced the development of three such cases 
in terms of the seven criteria for the development of secession 
movements that were suggested in chapter I, and found them to be 
broadly applicable. In the following chapters we will examine more 
closely the experience of the Sudan and discover how the original 
human landscape was altered by colonial rule; how independence brought 
demands for secession and how an eventual solution to the problem was 
found that could accommodate the realities of the African human landscape, 
with the European concept of the nation state.
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CHAPTER III
THE PHYSICAL AND HUMAN LANDSCAPE OF THE SUDAN 
The Physical Landscape
The territory known as the Democratic Republic of the Sudan occupies 
an area of 967,498 square miles lying between latitudes 3° 45' - 22° O' N 
and longitudes 21° 48' - 38° O' E, and is the largest country in Africa.
It is about one third the size of Australia, more than ten times the size 
of the United Kingdom and borders on to eight other African states: Egypt, 
Libya, Chad, the Central African Empire, Zaire, Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia; 
it has a short coastline on the Red Sea.
Whiteman (1) distinguished the following dominant topographical features 
(i) the Nile Valley, a drainage system of considerable antiquity; (ii) the 
erosional scarp that bounds the Red Sea Hills; (iii) the series of great 
pediplains and prominent inselbergs covering thousands of square miles;
(iv) the vast depositional plains and basins; (v) the volcanic uplands 
of Jebel Marra and tfeidob in Darfur; (vi) the southern highlands bordering 
Kenya, Uganda and Zaire; and (vii) the foothills of the Ethiopian volcanic 
plateau. High ground is restricted to the periphery of a country best 
described as a vast shallow saucer dominated by the Nile and its tributaries 
the Atbara, the Blue Nile, the White Nile, the Sobat, the Bahr El Arab, 
the Bahr El Ghazal and the Bahr El Jebel. The most extensive geological 
formations in the Sudan are those of the Basement Complex (49%), assumed to 
be mainly Pre-Cambrian, which together with the Tertiary to Quaternary Urnm 
Ruwaba formations (19%) and the Cretaceous Nubian Sandstones (28%) occupies 
more than 96% of the total surface area. (2)
Barbour (3) describes the climate of the Sudan as wholly tropical and 
ranging from complete desert north of 18° O' N, through areas of semi-desert 
with rainfall of varying intensity and duration, passing southwards into a 
continental equatorial type of climate with a marked dry season.
Rainfall is seasonal and over much of the country is related to the position
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of the inter-tropical convergence zone and the descending easterly jet 
stream. Precipitation will vary in intensity during the wet season and
drought periods between rainfall can be prolonged in the lighter rainfall
regions. Temperatures are everywhere high, with a mean daily winter 
temperature of 60.81' in the north and 84F in the extreme south. The 
diurnal range in the northern desert is often as high as 40F. Humidity
is seasonal but can be very low. Winds often carry fine dust particles
that temporarily reduce radiation, which otherwise tends to be high. 
Evaporation will normally exceed precipitation for 9-10 months of the year.
The country can be divided into four broad ecological zones of desert, sani- 
desert, savannah and wet savannah woodland. Zonal boundaries are not 
clearly defined but are a gradual function of the rainfall which decreases 
from 1,500 mm in the extreme south to a negligible amount in the Sahelian 
areas of the north.
(i) The Desert covers the northern third of the Sudan. Rainfall
in this area is rare, the winds are consistent dry northerly
airstreams, bringing sandstorms in the winter; temperatures 
hay Be Q a*o
49 C in June C in January /February,
and precipitation ranges from nil to 50 ran per annum. The
area is bisected by the Nile River and the only agriculture is
confined to irrigated basins along its banks.
(ii) The Semi-Desert lies in a belt across the Sudan between
approximately 14°N and the true desert, and covers seme 20% 
of the country. Rainfall varies from 50 to 400 mm per annum, 
most of which falls during July and August, but evaporation 
is high; noimal agriculture is precluded and grazing sparse.
A„On . . . . .  _ As ASTemperatures 47 C in April - June
3°C in December - February. Northerly winds predominate but 
the rains come from moist southerly airstreams in June to 
September.
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(iii) The Savannah zone lies south of latitude 14°N and covers 40% 
of the land area. The rainfall which increases from 400 inn in 
the north to 1,000 ran in the south is sufficient to support 
extensive agriculture and livestock production. The natural 
vegetative cover of coarse grass, scrub and Acacia, thickens 
with the increasing rainfall. Within this zone lie the 
extensive flood plains of the upper Nile. With a lack of 
slope and heavy soils, they are subject to waterlogging and 
extensive flooding during the wet season, the gradient of the 
River Nile in the area being only 1:13,000. A large part of 
the area is covered by a papyrus swamp. The higher land of 
the flood plains can be cultivated, but during the dry season
there is a shortage of domestic water.
(iv) The Wet Savannah country of the south and south-west Sudan 
marks the end of the savannah plains. To the east of the 
Nile the landscape becomes one of broken hills rising to the 
highlands bordering Kenya and Uganda, while to the west the 
change is more gradual as the ironstone plateau rises gently
to the Zaire/Nile divide. Annual rainfall averages 900-1,300mn 
over six to eight months and reaches 1,300 - 1,600 ran with an 
eight to nine month season in the extreme south west. The 
vegetative cover is open savannah woodland with sane tropical 
gallery forest along river courses.
As far as geology, topography and climate are concerned, there is no
sudden division between the Southern Sudan and the rest of the country, but
rather a gradual progression from the absolute desert of the far north to 
the tropical forest of the Nile/Zaire divide.
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The single most Important environmental factor is the River Nile and its 
behaviour. In the Northern Sudan it is relatively well controlled, flowing 
in a broadly defined course and consequently concentrating settlement along 
its banks. In the Southern Sudan, the Nile and its tributaries appear to 
wander at will across a vast flat plain, dividing and sub-dividing, forming 
lakes and lagoons, flooding thousands of square miles, isolating towns and 
villages. The Bahr El Jebel, which enters the Sudan at Nimule as a raging 
torrent, seems, at Jonglei, scarcely to be moving, and to determine the 
main channel from the air is virtually impossible. Gradually the rivers 
converge in a vast area of swamp, to emerge as the White Nile near Malakal. 
The papyrus swamp or sudd - in Arabic, barrier - blocks the entrance to this 
vast river system, which rather than being a highway for the movement of 
peoples and ideas has contributed to the relative isolation of the Southern 
Sudan from the north until relatively recently.
The term sudd is now used to refer to the whole of the Nile swamps, but it 
originally refered to the barriers of vegetable matter blocking the river 
channels. The sudd is formed in large shallow lagoons, where reeds, 
papyrus and other aquatic plants take root. With a rise in the water level, 
the roots are loosened and large islands of closely tangled Vegetable 
matter float out into the river channel only to be eventually caught by a 
sharp meander where the island again takes root. With the arrival of other 
floating material, the channel is soon blocked. The river is forced beneath 
the barrier carrying fresh masses of sudd beneath the original until the 
channel is eventually plugged and the water spills over into fresh lagoons. 
In this way dams are constructed that are so substantial as to support the 
weight of elephants and may be up to twenty or thirty miles long. When the 
great force of the Nile breaks through a sudd it is swept away, but only 
to reform further downstream. (4)
vidomxa
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Other associated environmental factors contributed to the relative isolation 
of this ’., .dreariest and most hostile environment in the world. ' (5) 
Northern visitors quickly succumbed to malaria, and their transport animals 
to tsetse and other animal diseases. A horse will not survive long in 
the Southern Sudan and neither will a donkey. The only way was by foot 
and small canoe, and a very arduous m y  it was. Only to the far west* 
along the ironstone plateau, could the peoples of the north easily penetrate 
the Southern Sudan.
The Nile and it tributaries not only isolated the north from the south, 
but also isolated the different peoples living in the Southern Sudan, 
especially in the flood plain area, where paradoxically there is always 
either too much water or not enough. Large groups of people, probably 
originally relatively homogenous, came into the area, and the waters of 
the Nile splintered them into numerous small tribes, and each tribe into 
a myriad of small autonomous isolated units. ’Ah, land of whirring 
wings which is beyond the rivers of Ethiopia; which sends ambassadors by 
the Nile, in vessels of papyrus upon the waters! Go, you swift messengers, 
to a nation tall and smooth, to a people feared near and far, to a nation 
mighty and conquering whose land the rivers divide. '(6)
The Human Landscape
Early writers would seem to have over-emphasised the diversity of the 
peoples of the Sudan. They appear to have gained some satisfaction from 
merely adding names to the long list of tribal labels; names which were 
often inaccurate or merely nick-names, and often contradictory and 
potentially ambiguous, but which they assumed to represent distinct ethnic 
or political units, stable and unchanging. In recent years, other writers, 
in an effort to explain the conflict in the Sudan, have gone to the other 
extreme and divided the population into only two groups. Neither approach 
is helpful. As the physical landscape changes gradually from true desert 
to tropical forest, so the human landscape exhibits the same broad spectrum 
from the Rashaida to the Azande.
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Various means of classification have been attempted, (7) though perhaps 
the most realistic is that of Greenberg (8) in that it divides the population 
into essentially broad groups, while still demonstrating the currently 
unexplained inconsistencies. While there have been differences of opinion 
as to the validity of Greenberg’s classification among linguists, for our 
purposes a simplified version provides a useful framework, (Table 1)
The Indigenous Peoples
We shall begin with a brief account of the indigenous peoples whose 
ancestors probably formed the African substratum of the majority of the 
Sudanese population. Among the '...vast conglomeration of tribal and 
kinship groups.' in the Southern Sudan, the most numerous are the Nilotics.
A tall, slim, very dark-skinned people, they are believed to have entered the 
area from the west and established themselves in the central Bahr El Ghazal. 
They were believed to have been originally cultivators who became devoted 
pastoralists and subsequently spread over much of the upper Nile valley.
One group of nilotics who divided to become the Nuer and the Dinka 
travelled only a short distance to the swampy grasslands bordering the 
main tributaries of the Nile.
The Nuer occupy a band of grassland stretching from the banks of the Bahr 
El Ghazal in the west to the upper reaches of the Sobat in the east. They 
have developed an economy ideally based entirely on cattle, but supplemented 
by fishing and the small-scale cultivation of grain in times of need. They 
build semi-peimanent villages on the sandy ridges between the rivers, but 
the demands of their cattle, and the seasonal rise and fall of the rivers, 
necessitate transhumant movement in search of grazing or, during the dry 
season, domestic water. Their form of political and social organization 
has been described as a segmentary lineage system (9) and has none of the 
institutions normally associated with the European concept of government. 
True leadership, whether temporal or spiritual, tends'only to arise during 
time of war. Nuer society is egalitarian, land and cattle being essentially 
held in common, and there being a strong compulsion to share the proceeds 
of both among the immediate kin. Their simple requirements are almost 
entirely met by their cattle, with the result that their contact with other
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TABLE I
AFRQ-ASI ATI C
NICER-KORDOFANIAN
NILO-SAHARAN
LANGUAGES OF THE SUDAN
Semitic
Cushitic
Arabic
Beja
Adamawa-Eastern: 
Eastern Golo, Zande
Kordofanian Koalib-Moro group 
Teqali-Togoi group 
Masakin group 
Kadugli-Krongo group
Saharan
Maban
Fur
Shari-Nile: 
Eastern Sudanic
Berta
Central Sudanic
Coman
Zaghawa
Berti
Masalit
Fur
Nubian group 
Didinga-Murle group 
Ingassana 
Daju group 
Nilotic:
Burun group, Maban
Shilluk, Anuak, Acholi
Dinka, Nuer
Bari, Lotuho
Topotha
Berta
Bongo
Kreish
Moru-Madi group 
Koma, Gumuz, Uduk 
Ganza, Gwama, Gule
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peoples has been minimal. Collective action, in groups larger than the 
immediate clan, is rare and usually associated with warfare. The need to 
maintain a balanced man/cattle relationship has always led to the raiding 
of neighbouring tribes, but the Nuer have no desire for expansion, 
considering themselves to already occupy the best available grazing land.
In cases where 'strangers',usually Dinka, have moved into Nuer society, 
they have usually been assimilated by marriage and by means of 
genealogical fictions. (10)
The Dinka, the most numerous of the Nilotic peoples of the Sudan, (11) live 
on the vast savannah grasslands between the Nile swamps and the open 
forest of the ironstone plateau. Their country stretches from Bor on the 
Bahr El Jebel to the south, to Abyei across the Bahr El Arab to the north, 
with an offshoot to the east of the White Nile between Malakal and Er Renk. 
Like the Nuer they are pastoralists by choice, but include groups who 
have lost their cattle and are reduced to fishing and cultivation. However 
the majority move seasonally across the land in search of grazing, and 
cultivation is limited to the production of only small amounts of millet, 
tobacco and vegetables. Cattle satisfy most of the needs of their simple 
material culture, not only in economic teims, but also in social and 
spiritual teims, and their acquisition and care are central to Dinka life. 
Again like the Nuer, there is no individual ownership of land, grazing 
rights being held in common. Their expansion has been controlled by the 
Nuer to the east, the climate to the north, and the tsetse fly to the 
south and west.
Lienhardt describes the Dinka as a congeric of independent and autonomous 
tribal groups varying in size from under 3,000 people to the 150,000 of the 
Rek group. (12) A tribal group such as the Rek will then be divided into 
tribes, with sub-tribes as the largest fully corporate communities. Age 
sets operate at the sub-tribal level, and sub-tribe members gather to 
camp together in search of grazing and water. Further segmentation depends 
on the size of the sub-tribe, segmentation seeming to be a response to 
ecological factors and the need to maintain man/cattle/land groups of an 
optimum size. The oral history of the Dinka records a constant tradition 
of social group growth, tension, division and movement. Dinka society
-  87 -
is further divided into two categories, one having a religious function, 
and the other a political function, and producing a system of dual leadership. 
Any tribal group, and in fact the Dinka people as a whole, is not unified, 
and while the Dinka do not think of themselves as a nation, they are often 
accused of ethnocentrism and arrogance, dividing the world into Dinka and 
non-Dinka. Unity among the tribes is very much a response to ecological 
factors. Sub-tribes^, in frequent conflict during the wet season, will more 
easily co-operate during the dry season when pastures and water are scarce. 
With no real caste or class system, they can only assimilate strangers by 
assigning them to clans and so eventually making them Dinka. With a 
material culture slightly more complex than that of the Nuer, they have 
produced scxne specialized groups such as the Manangar iron workers. Few 
Dinka are aware of the exact size and the many divisions of the Dinka, 
knowing only that 'their land is vast and their people innumerable.' (13) 
However some groups are widely known throughout Dink aland and are ascribed 
certain characteristics. A Rek informant told the writer that the Twic
were comnercialists, the Malwal were warriors, the Bor were scallywags and,
of course, that the Rek were aristocrats.
Between them the Dinka and the Nuer occupy a very large part of the 
best land, and have most of the cattle wealth, perhaps the regions most
important resource, so it is important to note the relationship between the
two groups. Their traditions of contact are traditions of conflict over 
grazing and the raiding of cattle. With their rather greater ability for 
collective action, the Nuer seem usually to have fared best in these 
encounters, leaving a distrust of Nuer among the Dinka which continues to 
the present day at all levels. Although their cultures have a great deal 
in conmon, and in fact they acknowledge a common ancestor, their common 
pre-occupation with cattle has made them essentially conpetitors rather 
than allies.
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A second group of Nilotic people crossed the Bahr El Jebel and moved 
down into East Africa, absorbing Cushite customs en route, and were the 
forefathers of the Masai, the Nandi, the Jie and the Karamajong. A 
third group, the Lwo, moved from the Bahr El Ghazal and splintered into 
several smaller units. The Bor moved to the ironstone plateau south of 
Wau; those now known as the Anuak travelled to the upper Sobat River, some 
of then later moving south to become the Pari, the Pajook and the Acholi.
The Jur settled finally around Wau, while those who subsequently became the 
Shilluk moved north to the White Nile.
The Shilluk settled on the west bank of the White Nile in an area centred 
on Fashoda, and on the east bank near the junction with the Sobat River.
They are now primarily sedentary cultivators, keeping only a few cattle. 
Their pattern of settlement is one of contiguous villages along the banks 
of the Nile, and perhaps the subsequent ease of ccmmunication resulted in 
the development of the political system, for although the Shilluk do exhibit 
the same tendency towards social fission as the other Nilotics, they have 
developed a much more centralised system with a single divine king. The 
authority of the king is primarily ritual rather than administrative.
With a country lying outside the protection of the sudd they have been 
conpelled to cone to terms with their neighbours and from necessity may have 
grown the centralised leadership. Like most of the Nilotics, they have 
procejiures for the assimilation of 1 strangers', the children of a tetranger' 
father tracing decent through their local mother, and so joining a Shilluk 
lineage. (14) Secure from the Nile floods, the Shilluk have often produced 
a surplus of grain, and so established trading links with the Dinka and 
Nuer who overcame their disdain for the cultivator in times of need.
To the south of the Dinka, along both banks of the Bahr El Jebel, settled 
another Nilotic speaking people, the Bari. (15) They are now mainly 
sedentary cultivators, but from their oral traditions would seem to have 
been pastoralists in the recent past. Like most Nilotics, the Bari are 
splintered into small groups with no single spiritual or temporal leader 
and no administrative hierarchy. Men in positions of influence are either 
clan heads or ritual experts such as rainmakers, their influence depending 
on their achievements, and most decisions are made by local councils of 
elders. It has been suggested that small groups at seme time splintered
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from the main Bari group, moving to the east and he coning the Latuka, the 
Dongotoro, the Lokoya and the Lango, and to the plains around Lake Rudolf 
where, now as the Topotha and the Turkana, they move between Sudan and 
Kenya. Others moved south and west and became the Fajulie, the Kakwa, 
the Nyangbara and the Kuku,(16) They have much the same economic, political 
and social systems as the Bari, valuing cattle, and keeping them where the 
absence of tsetse permits.
To the north of the Bari are the Mandari who appear to be an intermediate 
group between the Bari and the Dinka, being both pastoralists and talented 
cultivators growing a wide variety of crops. Ihey have cone to an accomo­
dation with the Aliab Dinka, ’who marry Mandari girls and so afford the 
Mandari access to Aliab cattle and pastures. Hie social diversity of the 
Mandari is ascribed by Buxton to their readiness to allow tetrangers' to 
settle and to be absorbed by marriage into the Mandari clientage system. (17)
From this brief examination of the Nilotic speaking peoples, we can see 
that a large part of the land area of the Southern Sudan is occupied by 
peoples having a great deal in common; speaking similar languages, having 
similar values, sharing a deep interest and concern with cattle, living in 
essentially egalitarian societies, placing great importance on family ties, 
and having developed procedures for trade, intermarriage and the control 
of severe inter-group conflict. However, despite these links,they have shown 
little tendency to combine or to recognize any central political leadership. 
Rather their oral traditions constantly refer to the division of groups and 
their subsequent re-settlement at a distance. Early European writers 
interpreted this fragmentation as an inherent social instability, but it is 
perhaps mere useful to view it as an intelligent regulation of the man/ 
cattle/land relationship, exacerbated by the divisive environmental factors 
of flooded rivers and a waterless plain. Similarly, the conflict between 
these peoples, instead of being considered as '...chaos and tribal 
anarchy 1 (18), can be more usefully viewed as ecological adjustment. For 
example, the ravages of rinderpest among the cattle of the Nuer led to the 
raiding of Dinka herds to redress the balance. (19) Although the Nilotics 
are by far the most numerous of the Eastern Sudanic language group, there are 
others to be found in the Southern Sudan. The Murle, the Logarim and the
-  90 -
Didinga live in the hills and marshes to the east of the Bahr El Jebel; 
they are predominantly pastoralists and indeed the Murle at one time had 
the highest man/cattle ratio in the Southern Sudan.(20) The Njangulgule 
and the Shatt live to the west of the Dinka in the Bahr El Ghazal and are
now cultivators, probably having lost their cattle or been pushed out of the
main grassland area.
The second language group, in terms of numbers in the Southern Sudan, is
the Adamawa-Eastem group, a sub-family of the vast Niger-Kordofanian
group, most of whose members are found outside the Sudan, but the eastwards
movements of the group have left small groups scattered throughout the
Bahr El Ghazal: the Beroge, the Banda, the Golo, the Ndogo, the Bviri and
the Indri, and a large and important group, the Azande, on the Sudan side
of the Nile/Zaire divide. The Azande moved into the Southern Sudan
sometime in the sixteenth century as a group of small tribes. By the
eighteenth century the Avungara, an aristocratic, military dynasty, had
subjugated these small groups and created the Azande empire. Unlike other
peoples of the Southern Sudan, the Avungara imposed an administrative
system on the pattern of scattered groups. This administrative system
depended on the availability of land, either unsettled or occupied by small
weak tribes. The sons of Avungara kings, rather than remain subjects,
moved into new lands and established their own kingdoms with local provincial
officials to settle disputes and collect taxes. The conscription of young
men into standing armies ensured the swift assimilation of conquered
8
peoples and inposed a moral and intellectual homogenity across Zandeland, 
Azande society is therefore rigidly stratified and membership of the ruling 
Avungara clan can only be obtained by birth.
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Within the areas controlled by the various Avungara chiefs, their subjects 
lived in isolation in the forest, and except during the British period 
there was no obligation for them to remain in any one area: a man might 
live in an area supervised by someone who in fact had no authority over 
him. Homesteads were often miles apart and between the territories of 
chiefs there were often wide areas of uninhabited forest. (21) The 
family is still the most important basic unit, living in scattered home­
steads and practising a system of shifting cultivation supplemented by 
hunting, fishing and gathering,.
However, as Gray has noted, (22) the expansion of the Azande sprang from 
rivalry within the ruling group, a rivalry which without constant 
available room for expansion was essentially destructive, easily 
exploited and prevented the Azande from presenting a united front to the 
outside world. However, before the coming of the European, the Azande 
did expand their empire, moving down the river valleys of the Nile/Zaire 
divide into the Bahr El Ghazal, and pushing before them a group of small 
tribes, who were eventually to form a kind of human shatter belt between the 
Azande and the Dinka. Most of these unfortunate people seen to have 
belonged to the Central Sudanic language group, and to have come from 
an area to the south of Lake Chad, (23) many probably being absorbed by 
the Azande. Their descendants now stretch in a broken line along the 
rim of the ironstone plateau from the Madi in northern Uganda, through 
the Kaliko, Moru, Bongp and many smaller groups to the Kreish in the 
far west. By the nineteenth century they had been smashed into splint­
ered communities of settled cultivators, although according to Beaton 
many of these peoples had once owned extensive herds. (24)
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In the Northern Sudan, Holt identifies four indigenous non-Arab 
peoples. (25) The Nubians originally inhabited a narrow strip of 
riverain land between the first and the third Nile cataracts. They 
had developed a settled life in towns and villages, with a preference 
for urban life and a high degree of artistic production. They had been 
subjected to a degree of Egyptian influence, same were literate and 
several languages were in use at an early date. They were divided into 
three small kingdoms and until at least AD 1372 were known to be 
Christians, (26) Exactly how far to the south the influence of Nubia 
was experienced is still a matter of sane conjecture, but Hass an suggests 
that there was contact with 'negroid tribes' pushing north from Kordofan 
and the Gezira.(27) These movementSj associated with the Egyptian demand 
for slaves,probably resulted in a fair degree of interaction along the 
southern borders of the Nubian kingdoms, and Trimingham describes the 
Nubians as a hybrid type of mixed Caucasian-Negroid stock speaking a 
Negro language. Greenberg places the Nubian language in the Eastern 
Sudanic sub-family of the Nilo-Saharan language group. Much of the 
original homeland of the Nubians was flooded at the creation of Lake 
Nubia, and a large number were moved to a new irrigation scheme at Haifa 
El Gedida on the River Atbara, Many Nubians have retained their own 
language j but their preference for urban life has brought many to 
Khartoum and other large towns to dominate government and administration.
The Beja were originally solely pastoralists living in the Red Sea Hills 
and on the plains of Eastern Sudan, from the present Egyptian border down 
to the Ethiopian marches. Early ethnographers noticed a physical 
resemblance to the pre-dynastic Egyptian peoples (28) while other 
writers (29) have notecjfnodifications attributed to negroid blood, while 
their original system of matrilineai/descent and associated customs have 
suggested links with the cattle owning peoples of East Africa. There 
has been seme intermarriage with Arab immigrants, but the Beja 
language, which Greenberg classifies as Cushitic, has survived, especially 
among the dominant Beja group, the Kadendowa. The majority of Beja remain 
camel ncmads but some have settled on the agricultural developments on 
the Gash and the Tbkar deltas.
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The origins of the Nuba peoples of southern Kordofan have been the subject 
of much controversy. They are not a homogenous group, but rather the remants 
of several African tribes who appear at some time to have taken refuge in 
the isolated hills of southern Kordofan that are now known as the Nuba 
Mountains. They speak a variety of languages which Greenberg divides 
into five different groups/and places in the Kordofanian sub-family. They 
are principally agriculturalists with emphasis also placed on hunting and 
gathering. Some conmunities own cattle and pigs. Seligman believed that 
the cultural practises of some groups may have indicated a dependence on
cattle at some earlier date. (30) Among the Nuba both patrilineal and
matrilineal forms of descent are found (31) and the young men are organised 
into age sets. Their political organization appears to be based on small 
autonomous units under the guidance of local ritual leaders. In recent years 
they have been increasingly influenced by their arabized neighbours and to
some extent by the Shilluk. (32)
The last of Holt’s indigenous groups are the Fur. Again these are a sedentary 
group of cultivators living in the mountain massif of Jebel Marra in the 
far west of Darfur. 0 ’Fahey describes them as a negroid people with an 
oral tradition that suggests links with some of the tribes of the western 
Bahr El Ghazal, but Greenberg lists their language under its own sub-family 
in the Nilo-Saharan language group, rather than in the Central Sudanic sub­
family of the Kreish and the Bongo. The early history of the area is very 
oonfused, but there is some evidence to suggest the existence of dynasties 
and petty states. (33)
In his identification of indigenous non-arab peoples in northern Sudan, 
TTimingham, unlike Holt, mentions some other groups in the west.(34) The 
Masalit and the Dajo he describes as sedentary cultivators, also the Berti, 
the Baiqo and the Mima. The latter he describes as immigrants but does not 
specify the date of their arrival; all are members of the Nilo-Saharan 
language group, as are the nomadic or semi-nomadic Zaghawa and Mi dob.
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In the Funj area of Eastern Sudan, between the Blue and White Niles, 
Trimingham describes other negroid peoples that he ascribes to no definite 
ethnic unit, (35) While the surrounding Arabised people refer to them 
as hamaj or aborigines, they refer to themselves in terms of the isolated 
hills that they occupy. They speak a variety of languages which Greenberg 
classifies under three sub-families in the Nilo-Saharan language group.
The Ingassana and the Bunin are classed as Eastern Sudanic, while the Koma, 
Gumuz, Uduk, Ganza and Gule care into the Goman sub-family. The Berta are 
classed separately. The mountainous territory occupied by these people 
is a watershed between the tributaries of the Blue Nile and the eastern 
tributaries of the White Nile and it would seem likely that the hills 
have provided a refuge for another human shatter belt - perhaps the 
original inhabitants of the area that came under pressure from the Arabised 
tribes to the north, the Nilotics to the west and the Galla to the south. 
Today the people are sedentary cultivators coming under increasing Arab 
pressure, and increasingly adopting Arabic and Islam.
The area of the Sudan once occupied by the non-Arab peoples has not been 
conclusively established and must await a good deal more archaeological and 
anthropological research. It has long been believed that the Shilluk, for 
example, laid the foundations of the Funj Enpire and once lived as far north 
as Aba Island (37) but there is little hard evidence. Similarly, nost of 
the anthropological study of non-Arab groups has been concentrated on their 
individual characteristics, rather than on a conparison of groups, and 
most of the work was undertaken at a time when communities had been subjected 
to the influences of colonial administration or modem government, and were 
consequently experiencing a period of change. However some broad, although 
tentative generalizatices might be hazarded. It would appear that a large 
majority of these people had recently been pastoralists and would be now 
from choice, if ecological conditions permitted. With the exception of the 
Azande and, to a lesser extent, the Shilluk, they all lived under essentially 
decentralized political systems with some kind of ritual leadership. They 
all ascribe importance to family relationships and family coirmitment.
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Arab Inrnigration
Arab influence was first felt in the Northern Sudan in the seventh century, 
when Nubia was penetrated by small Arab groups who had previously migrated 
from Arabia to Upper Egypt. (38) Holt divides these people into two 
groups: the mainly sedentary Ja'ali who intermixed with the Nubians, and
the largely nomadic Juhayna,(39)
The Ja'ali claim as a cannon ancestor an Arab named Ibrahim Ja'ali, 
a supposed descendent of al-Abbas, an uncle of the prophet Mohammad. They 
moved gradually along the main Nile and came to dominate much of the riverain 
land north of the sixth cataract at Sabaloka. From this core area Ja'ali 
individuals moved out into the rest of the Sudan, mainly as traders or 
holy men and intermarried with the indigenous peoples. Holt notes the 
example of Taqali, a small Muslim enclave in the Nuba Mountains founded by a 
Ja'ali holy man. (40) Trimingham notes that among the Beni Amir Beja, the 
Ja'aliyin inposed themselves as an aristocratic caste, (41) as did the 
Kayra clan amongst the Fur, (42)
Many of these Ja'aliyin seem to have gathered around themselves what Holt 
describes as 'accretions of heterogenous fragments' which were to become 
’synthetic tribes' . (43) The process by which the Ja'ali rose to ascendancy 
over the indigenous population was greatly facilitated by the prevailing 
system of matrilineal descent. As a result of the wanderings of these 
traders and holy men, a considerable nuriber of sedentary and riverain peoples 
of the Northern Sudan came to claim Arab descent and more specifically 
Abbasi descent although, as Trimingham has noted, they 'have cnly the minutest 
proportion of Arab blood.' (44) The claims to a specific descent are, 
according to Cunnison, the result of 'an ever-increasing accumulation of 
error ' in the keeping of genealogical records, that bear little relation 
to any kind of historical reality. He considers it unlikely that any real 
connexion exists between a tribe and its claimed ancestors, except perhaps 
for a small proportion of the tribe, and thinks it to be more helpful to 
consider tribal genealogies not as accurate oral records, but as ideologies. 
(45) Among peoples claiming Ja'ali ancestry are the Jimi'ab, the Jama'ab 
and the Jamu'iyya, who settled along the Nile,the Bidayriyya of Kordofan, 
the Shaqiyya, the Manasir, the Rubatab, the Mirafab and the Ja'aliyyin 
proper.(46)
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The Juhayna group includes almost all tribes claiming Arab descent but not 
asserting a Ja’ali origin. Following the achievements of this successful 
group, numerous unrelated peoples have claimed Juhayna descent, as others 
have claimed Ja'ali descent; however, according to Trimingham the Juhayna 
have a more legitimate claim to Arab blood. (47) The group includes most 
of the camel nomads of Kordofan, the Kababish, the Dar Hamid and the Hamar, 
those of the Butana and the Gezira, the Shukriyya and the Rufa'a, and the 
cattle-owning Baggara of southern Kordofan and southern Darfur. (48)
The Juhayna travelled to the Sudan from Egypt in search of good pastures 
and freedom of movement and by the fourteenth century are believed to have 
penetrated as far as Lake Chad. (49) As they travelled they adapted their 
way of life to the changing environment. While seme, such as the Kabbabish, 
remained solely dependent on their animals, others such as the Dar Hamid 
developed a dual system, with sections of the group living a sedentary life. 
The environment demanded adaptability; the Baggara, probably originally 
camel nomads, on moving into the wetter lands of southern Kordofan, abandoned 
the camel in favour of the more suitable cow. Political upheavals disrupted 
economic life, for exanple former pastoral groups were to lo se their herds 
during the Mahdiyya. (50) However the greater self-sufficiency among nomads 
lessened their contact with the indigenous peoples and in general there was 
less admixture than among sedentary groups.(51) The successful establishment 
of many of the Juhayna in the Sudan encouraged the inrnigration of other Arab 
groups from Arabia by the more direct route across the Red Sea, with the 
Rashaida and the Zubaydiyya arriving as recently as the nineteenth century.
Gradually both the Ja'ali and Juhayna groups were racially assimilated into 
the indigenous population. (52) The actual number of Arab immigrants is not 
known, but it has been suggested that it has been exaggerated because of the 
cultural ascendancy subsequently attained. (53) Hass an suggests that by the 
sixteenth century, while a culturally arabized stock was emerging, 'the term 
Arab-was progressively being enptied of nearly all its ethnic significance.' 
While the Arab immigrants had modified but little the social and economic life 
of the indigenous people, they had profoundly affected the cultural and 
religious life. Indigenous peoples had been absorbed into the Arab tribal 
structure, Arabic was becoming a lingua franca, and Islam was spreading south.
(54)
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The interaction between the two races was essentially assymetrical both 
culturally and biologically. Arab culture and the Arabic language may 
have been modified locally but in general Arabic was a conquering language. 
In Islam miscegenation was permitted between Arab men and non-Arab women, 
but not vice versa. The son of an Arab father was recognized as legitimate 
and as an Arab regardless of the status and race of the mother, so that 
both cultural and biological contact between Arab and African produced, and 
could only produce, Arab expansion rather than true interaction.
The Spread of Islam
Initially the processes of Arabization and Islamization proceeded 
simultaneously, either by the influence of individual traders or by tribal 
migration, but it was Islam at its simplest. The nomads were themselves 
imperfectly islamized and certainly illiterate, but the declaration of 
the Shahada or act of faith was all that was required to create a nominal 
Muslim. However by the end of the sixteenth century the first of a 
succession of Islamic scholars had arrived in the Sudan bringing a proper 
understanding of Islam. During the seventeenth century various Islamic 
scholars, mainly originating from Cairo, established Islamic schools over 
much of the riverain Sudan, building mosques, producing jurists and judges, 
who in turn moved south to carry their learning to the front line of Arab 
expansion. Perhaps the most important influence of these Egyptian scholars 
was the founding of the Maliki school of Islamic law in the Sudan.
The second half of the sixteenth century saw the introduction of the 
sufi tariqas or religious orders that led to ’the creation of distinctive 
factors of Sudanese Muslim culture' (55) and emanated direct fran the 
Hijaz, rather than via Egypt. The importance of the sufi tariqas was that 
they brought an ordered, if unorthodox form of Islam, but one that was 
also more popular and less exacting, and so more suitable for dissemination 
in a vast and backward country. The mystical aspect of sufism obviously 
appealed to a population that had, and in fact continued,,to attach 
importance to magical rites. Sufism allowed for the accommodation in Islam 
of many local practices and superstitions, and their position as links
between man and God gave the sufi leaders a political importance that they 
retain to this day. The accommodating nature of the Islam of the sufis 
together with the rather vague genealogies of the Arab tribal structure, 
permitted the easy assimilation of people into the new cultural society 
that was being created. A further influence on the growth of Islam in 
Sudan was to came from theMahgrib, reinforcing the establishment of the 
Maliki law among the peoples of Darfur. By the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, these three external stimuli had laid the foundations of the 
Islamic faith and the Arab culture over the more accessible areas of the 
Northern Sudan. However it must be remembered that it remains to this 
day an incomplete coverage. Dor example peoples such as the Nubians, 
the Beja and the Nuba steadfastly retained their own languages; among 
the majority of the northern Sudanese, who claim Arab blood and membership 
of Islam, a great deal of local custom and superstition continued into the 
twentieth century.
Sudanese Identity
From what seemed initially to be a very confusing picture, three important 
factors emerge
(i) With the possible exception of some of the Beja-speaking 
peoples of the east, and recent Arab immigrants such as the 
Rashaida, the majority of Sudanese have a very significant 
percentage of negro blood, either through their original 
ethnic inheritance, intermarriage or slave ownership.
(ii) Following the Arab inrnigration waves dating from the seventh
century to as recently as the nineteenth century, the 
indigenous population of Northern Sudan has experienced to
a varying, but generally limited, degree an admixture of
Arab blood.
(iii) Since the widespread adoption of Islam, not only as a
religion but also as a unified social system, a greater 
number of Northern Sudanese have laid claim to Arab ancestry.
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So it seems evident that the conflict in the Sudan is not one in which the 
racial realities play a great part; what is important is the individuals 
sense of identity. To the majority of Northern Sudanese the acceptable 
identity is to be a follower of Islam and an Arab, and such claims are 
made by people regardlesss of race,colour, knowledge of Arabic or 
understanding of Islam. James has explained the process of changing identity 
in the southern Funj where people with no possible claim in reality 
associate themselves with the ’acceptable identity’. (56) Of course it is 
easier for sane than for others. A man from the Funj may dress as an Arab, 
move to Cmdurman, adopt Islam and be absorbed into the community with 
relative ease, but for a Nuer, perhaps well over six feet tall who has 
been gavred in adolesence, the same opportunity is not available; his 
racial and therefore his social mobility is restricted. (57) Faced with the 
racial realities, some Sudanese writers, such as Muddathir 'Abdl A1 Rahim, 
have made the observation that '... the great majority of the population 
rightly feel that they are Arab and African at the same time, to an equal 
degree, and without any sense of tension or contradiction.1 (58) In the 
experience of the writer, this is not the case. The majority of Northern 
Sudanese either deny or belittle their African heritage, place importance 
on the lightness of skin colour and look towards the Middle East as 
the focus of their lives. As Lewis has noted, (59) the efforts made 
to deny an African heritage are considerable. For example a very dark- 
skinned Northerner is described as ardha or green, black being totally 
unacceptable and reserved to describe non-Arabs, carrying as it does other 
derogatory inferences unassociated with colour. However, despite the 
spurious nature of many of the claims, the Northern Sudanese do posses a 
unifying cultural bond which enables individuals to identify with a larger 
unit than the immediate family and the iirmediate location. Despite the 
broad similarities shared by the Southern Sudanese, there is no such sense 
of common identity, but there is a definite sense of being non-Arab and 
non-Muslim.
Conclusion
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Each group tends to see the other in terms of a stereotype, lb the 
Northerner the Southerner is an object of disdain, culturally and 
socially his inferior, an untutored savage being outside the Dar Al Islam,(60) 
of limited capability, and even to many an educated Northerner, an abid or 
slave. However he is also to be feared. To the Southerner, the Northerner 
is essentially cruel and exploitative, not really to be trusted, disinterested 
in the South and disdainful of its culture. In the next chapter we shall 
examine two further important factors: firstly how this mutual hostility 
was engendered and , secondly, to what extent it was fostered and entrenched 
by the policies of the British Administration.
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CHAPTER IV
COLONIAL EXPERIENCE AND THE ENTHENQMENT OF HOSTILITY 
Traditional Cbntacts
Very little has been written about the pre-colonial contact between the 
arabised population and the other indigenous peoples. There has been rather 
a general tendancy to imagine the Southern Sudan as being completely isolated 
behind the sudd from all Northern influences.(1) However, this can never 
have been the case, and contact and interaction must have occmjed in the far 
west where no physical barriers to movement existed and the open forest of 
the ironstone plateau must have facilitated movement. 0 TFahey mentions the 
trade route from North Africa to Darfur and its continuation into the Ubanghi- 
Shari Basin. A Ja'ali immigrant, A1 Manna Ismail, is recorded as having 
settled at Hof rat En Nahas in the eighteenth century, and it seems that early
t*
contact occurred between the arabised population and the people of the 
western Bahr El Ghazal, (2) Holt mentions the slave troops of the Kayra 
Sultanate in Darfur, and similar slave armies in the Funj, with Sennar 
exporting about 1,800 slaves every year. These slaves were captured during 
raids on the weaker tribes of the western Bahr El Ghazal and the southern 
Funj and it seems that both military and domestic slavery were widespread 
in the Northern Sudan. Certainly slaves were present in sufficient numbers 
to warrant them taxable by the Turco-Egyptian regime in 1821. (3)
In the centre of the country the barrier between the North and the South was 
human rather than physical. Until the eighteenth century the Dinka occupied 
areas well to the north of the Bahr El Arab in Kordofan and the Shilluk 
controlled the White Nile as far north as Aba Island, in 1684 destroying 
a number of Muslim schools on the White Nile north of A1 Kawwa.(4) It would 
seem likely that the Arab immigrant groups avoided contact with the Nilotics 
and continued their western movement, rather than directly confront these 
militarily accomplished peoples. Trade was limited and contact seems to 
have been restricted to occasional conflict over grazing, but with relatively 
long periods of peaceful coexistence. Deng has outlined such a relationship 
between the Ngok Dinka and the Hnmr, but has also stressed the degree to which 
the Dinka retained their own culture although in contact with arabised 
groups. (5)
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Both being fiercely patrilineal peoples, they tended to completely absorb 
'strangers' rather than produce any intermediate group.(6) This uneasy 
balance in the centre, and gradual influence in the east and west, continued 
until outside influences provided one side with firearms and a reason to 
use them.
The Turco-Egyptian Period
The Turco-Egyptian invasion of the Sudan in 1820-21 was to upset this balance. 
Firstly, it was the avowed intent of the new regime to use the Sudan as a 
slave reservoir to bolster the army in Egypt. 'You are aware that the end 
of all our effort and this expense is to procure negroes. Please show zeal 
in carrying out our wishes in this capital matter 1 (7) The second important
factor was the iniquitous taxation imposed upon the riverain northern 
Sudanese. As coin was rarely used, taxes could be paid in slaves, and so, 
directly and indirectly, the invaders created a huge increase in demand and 
slave raiding became both a public and a private concern, with black male 
slaves becoming, for a time, a generally accepted currency. New impetus 
was given to slave trading in the traditional areas such as the southern 
Funj, and especially in the west where northern Sudanese jellaba (8) operating 
from zeribas (9) near Hof rat En Nahas and Telquana were already penetrating 
farther and farther into the Bahr El Ghazal. The area was to provide between 
twelve and fifteen thousand slaves per annum at the height of the trade. (10)
Not only did the newcomers bring a new dimension to the slave trade, but they 
also provided the means to open new areas to exploitation. Before 1820 
firearms were rarely used in the Sudan (11), but by 1827 their use against 
the Dinka opened the way from Er Roseries to the Sobat, and in 1830 undermined 
the ascendancy of the Shilluk on the White Nile. These two early expeditions 
raised together only seven hundred slaves (12) but they marked the beginning 
of large-scale organized slave raiding in the Sudan, and by 1838 it was (13) 
estimated that ten to twelve thousand slaves were annually exported to Egypt. 
In the wake of the government raiders came northern Sudanese operators, having 
been provided with both the means and the market. Artillery fire had finally 
pierced the first bulwark of the Southern Sudan - the Nilotic peoples.
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Although, with the possible exception of the Shilluk, they were not to suffer 
as much as many, being able to withdraw to the swamps, the way was now open 
for an attack on the already weakened and disrupted peoples farther to the 
south. The second bulwark, the sudd, was to be pierced by Captain Selim 
in 1839 on the orders of the Egyptian Government, and by 1841 he had 
succeeded in reaching Gondokoro.(14) European merchants and missionaries 
were the first to settle on the Bahr El Jebel, and although the climate 
initially defeated the missionaries, a number of European merchants organised 
regular expeditions, trading cloth, beads and wire for ivory, until by 1863 
an annual total of one hundred and twenty boats were travelling between 
Gondokoro and Khartoum. (15)
Although initial contacts with the Bor Dinka and the Bari were friendly, the 
difficulties of pursuing the ivory trade were soon to result in what Collins 
has described as 'a spiral of violence' . (16) Once the supply of ivory close 
to the river was exhausted, the traders had to relinquish the technological 
superiority afforded them by their boats, and once on land they were completely 
dependent on the co-operation of the Africans. As ivory supplies diminished 
the Bari demanded a higher 'price' and, when it was not forthcoming, refused 
to co-operate. Added to this was the scornful attitude and hostile behaviour 
towards the native inhabitants of the Egyptian officials and Northern 
Sudanese soldiers, mingled with the impatience of the Europeans. By 1849 
the original friendly co-operation had been replaced by fear among the local 
inhabitants and the use of force amongst the traders. The efforts of the 
traders were hampered by the lack of any centralized authority among the 
Bari with which to deal, or with whose co-operation to exploit the hinterland. 
Thus direct expeditions into the interior were mounted to establish permanent, 
fortified stations or zeribas, manned by large numbers of armed Northern 
Sudanese servants.(17)
While the prime reason for the expansion inland remained the acquisition of 
ivory, the Northern Sudanese and the Egyptian officials soon became involved 
in slave trading, to which the Europeans acquiesced, the slaves being a product 
of their violent exploitation of traditional hostility. As the supply of 
ivory decreased and a growing number of employees became necessary, the 
viability of the trade could only be assured by indirectly paying these 
employees in slaves, or permitting them to engage in the trade under the 
protection of the stations.
Some Europeans were directly involved in the trade and their slaves were 
sent north, together with those of their retainers to Kaka on the White Nile, 
at the rate of two thousand per annum by 1860.(18)
Gradually the traders pushed westwards towards the Yei River: from Shambe 
inland to Rumbek and, after the opening of the Bahr El Ghazal in 1855, down 
as far as the Luo and the Bongo. It was the snail agricultural groups, already 
subject to the expansion of the Dinka and the Azande, who were to suffer the 
most, and their lands along the edge of the ironstone plateau were 
'...occupied at intervals of five to six leagues with settlonents of 
Khartoomers in their palisaded zeribas.. .from the River Rhol north-westwards 
to the River Lol there stretched a series of more than eighty of these 
stations.' (19) Expansion to the north was made difficult by the almost 
universal hostility of the Dinka and Nuer and, using the zeribas as secure 
bases, the traders moved towards the south and the Azande. Initially they 
were prepared to seek the co-operation of the more powerful and centralized 
Azande, superimposing the zeriba system upon the traditional organization, but 
only until they discovered that again they could make use of dynastic rivalry 
and discriminate violence. The security of the zeriba system attracted 
increasing numbers of gellaba who exchanged goods with the traders' employees 
for a few slaves, or acted as agents for wealthy slave traders in Darfur and 
Kordofan. The more capable were to form a new ruling class in the 1860’s, 
with the most 'successful', A1 Zubair Rabma Mansur, as their leader, (20) 
Gradually the Europeans were driven out by decreasing profits, taxation and 
disease and their zeribas taken over by Copts, Syrians, Egyptians and Northern 
Sudanese. The power of the new class of slave trader was not confined to 
the Bahr El Ghazal. A Dongolawi, Mohammd Kheir, established control of Kaka 
and by 1860 was raiding the Dinka and the Shilluk. (21) In one pitched battle 
with the Shilluk in 1861 he took five hundred captives and some twelve 
thousand cattle. (22) On the Bahr El Jebel the trade continued but not to 
the extent reported by Baker, whose exaggeration contributed to an over­
estimate of the White Nile trade and a subsequent tendency to underestimate 
the overland trade via Kordofan and Darfur. In addition to what we might 
teim the private sector, the government, in the form of the Governor-General, 
frequently conducted 'recruiting raids' to maintain the aimy at twenty-seven 
thousand men.(23)
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Following the missionaries, European merchants, slave traders and the 
jellaba3 came yet a further 'invasion1 - that of Egyptian exploration and 
administration. Initially, administration was confined to the White Nile, 
where both the Dinka and the Shilluk were to suffer from both its inefficiency 
and its repression. In 1868 the chief administrator at Fashoda ordered the 
Shilluk and the Dinka to pay an annual tribute of about £15,000 (24), and their 
failure to do so resulted in extensive government raiding of both men and 
cattle. The operations of the river police against the slave trade were 
rendered ineffective by the corruptability of officials, the fact that the 
Bahr El Jebel was not a major slave route, and that what little trade had used 
the route could easily be diverted to avoid the attentions of the police 
force. Although the importation of slaves into Egypt was banned in 1854, 
the most valuable slaves - women and eunuchs - were still smuggled into 
Egypt and Turkey, and the preventive measures taken at Zanzibar increased 
the demand for Sudanese slaves in Arabia. Merchants from Jeddah established 
their agents in Northern Sudan and dealt with the jellaba and other traders.
By 1876 about thirty thousand slaves were being shipped across the Red Sea 
every year.(25)
While the extensive slave trade in the Southern Sudan was operated with the 
connivance of some of the local leaders, whether willingly or as the lesser 
of two evils, the majority of the people remained hostile to all intruders, 
and to all ’ administration'. Not only were the dual tasks of expansion and 
administration (specifically the cessation of the slave trade) in some senses 
contradictory, but Egypt's representatives throughout the Sudan were 
constantly denied the means to fully accomplish either task. There was 
insufficient logistical support for the expansion of Egyptian influence to 
the South, and only thoroughly corrupt or ineffective Egyptian and Northern 
Sudanese officials with which to attempt administration. In attempting to push 
south frotn Gondokoro, the various expeditions found themselves having 
constantly to resort to violent methods, so increasing hostility rather than 
pacifying the countryside. In attempting to end the slave trade, they found 
themselves in constant conflict with their own officials and with Northern 
tribal leaders on whan Egypt's rather tenuous system of indirect rule depended.
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Thus rather than extending influence and tightening up administration, 
the various European officials employed by Cairo, such as Baker, Gordon,
Gessi and Emin, found themselves intensifying hostility and fomenting 
rebellion. Egypt's iniquitous exploitation of all Sudanese had made the slave 
trade inevitable and essential. It had become the very basis of commercial 
life, and to call for its abandonment without replacing it with some 
alternative commercial activity was both unreasonable and unwise. The ravages 
of the Egyptians in the Northern Sudan, coupled with other factors such as 
famine, produced ideal conditions for the rise of a Mahdi. (26) In the Southern 
Sudan interference in the slave trade produced widespread opposition to the 
administration, culminating in open hostility, and although Gessi and, to a 
lesser extent, Gordon controlled the overt trade in slaves, as soon as the 
government was attacked in the North, both the traders and the local 
inhabitants of the South joined the rebellion.
The Mahdiyya
The Mahdists were the followers of Mohairmad Ahmed al Mahdi, who rose against 
the Egyptian administration in the early 1880's. As Hodgkin has explained, 
an essential part of Mahdist theory was to regard armed revolutionary struggle 
or jihad as a method of establishing a perfected social order, that is, a 
perfected Islamic state. Of the aspects of the general theory given by 
Hodgkin, the most significant in terms of this study is the idea that the 
Mahdi had a responsibility to conduct jihad, particularly against nominal and 
backsliding Muslims who rejected his mission, and so to ensure the universal 
triumph of Islam. (27) The movement in the Sudan was therefore essentially 
expansionist, and the forces which invaded the Southern Sudan came not only 
to expel the Egyptians but also to claim the area for Islam,
The Mahdist invasion of the Southern Sudan has been described as a series 
of '... extended raids which upset the traditional pattern of tribal life and 
left nothing behind but anarchy and fear.’ (28) Certainly they were yet 
another twist in the spiral of violence. Like many before them, the 
Mahdists were too few in number to rule with anything other than the sword.
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Merely to maintain their position they had to undertake raid after raid, 
their methods becoming increasingly violent and indiscriminate. In 1896 
over a thousand slaves were sent from their station at Rejaf to the market 
in Qmdurman. (29) The necessity of the use of force largely discredited 
their religious message. Although it initially appeared that the Mahdists 
had the support of Southern tribes such as the Dinka and the Nuer, their 
rebellion subsequently proved to be more a reaction against Egyptian rule 
and the terror of the slave raiders than a support of the Mahdi. Having 
helped to dislodge the Egyptians, their aim was to achieve independence - 
not merely to exchange one repressive administration for another. The Mahdist 
forces conquered the Bahr El Ghazal in 1884-85 and in 1888 attacked the 
remaining Egyptian stations on the Bahr El Jebel, becoming involved in a 
struggle for control with the Belgians and the forces of the Congo Free State, 
until finally defeated in 1897 at the battle of Rejaf. (30) By Septenfoer 
1898 the Mahdiyya was at an end.
All three waves of invaders, the slave traders, the Egyptian administration, 
and the Mahdists, based their relationship with the people of the Southern 
Sudan on the use of force and widespread violence. Not only did they, 
directly or indirectly, send many thousands of people into slavery, but 
they disrupted traditional organization and society to the extent of almost 
annihilating several small groups. Gordon estimated that during only the 
four years from 1875-1879 some eighty to one hundred thousand slaves were 
exported from the Bahr El Ghazal. (31)
In the propoganda war which accompanied the civil war in the 1960's, several 
Northern Sudanese writers, politicians and academics have attempted to 
minimize the effects of the slave trade, and the part played by Northern 
Sudanese; but while making every effort to be objective, it is hard to see 
how their opinions can be substantiated. In 1965, the then Prime Minister, 
Sayed Sir Khatim El Khalifa, claimed that the cultural differences in the 
Sudan would not have led to corresponding differences 1,.. had it not been 
for the evil colonial policies which were inflicted upon the country by 
the British administration during half a century and had it not been for the
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grotesquely unjust campaign which enormously exaggerated the role of our 
ancestors both Northerners and Southerners in the slave trade...' He goes on 
to talk of 1.. .hypocritical European missionaries...' and the 1.. .perversion 
of education...1 ■ and the '.., deliberate distortion of the picture of historical 
relations between the peoples of Northern and Southern Sudan.' (32) Ali, 
writing in 1972, blamed the Anti-Glavery Society and administrators such as 
Gordon for interrupting the forced cultural assimilation of the South by the 
North. (33) The same writer again blames Gordon for initiating the secession 
movement, 'Gordon was the initiator of what is now called the "Southern 
Problem". He worked.. .towards separating what are now the southern provinces 
from the northern provinces by adopting the policy of dispersing and harrying 
the northern elements and factors from many parts of the south.' (34)
Although he had earlier accused Gordon of failing in his duty to suppress the 
slave trade, a trade which the writer seems to suggest hardly existed at all, 
'by the standards of western slavery, most slaves, if not all, in the Sudan 
who were categorised by British writers as slaves were not slaves at 
all.' (35)
Beshir, writing in 1967, places most of the blame on the European traders and 
states that 'the ’myth' of the rapacious Arab slave trader has been used to 
embitter relations between the North and the South' . (36) He goes on to 
recount that during the Mahdiyya 'private slave trading was prohibited by 
the Khalifa.' (37) while omitting to mention that it in fact became a ■ 
government monopoly. However he later recounts the continuation of slave 
trading among Northern Sudanese of the Funj until 1928. (38) As late as 
1973 essentially similar views constituted official Khartoum policy. 'Waves 
of invaders, usually led by treasure-seeking European adventurers or backed 
by big capital investors, overran the country, robbed it of their strong men 
and women, and left behind only bitterness and hatred of the outsider.
Whatever degree of Northern participation there was in this became distorted 
and exaggerated by the fact that they were neighbours who symbolized the 
outsider who was hidden far beyond the reach, even the comprehension, of the 
Southerner, This was exacerbated by the fact that the South had too hostile 
a natural environment for the Arabs to settle and integrate with the people 
on the basis of mutual respect as they had done in the North. As the South 
witnessed aggression, it intensified its hostile reaction. A chain of cause 
and effect provided little opportunity for the Northerner to demonstrate 
alternative bases for interaction.' (39)
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Each invasion suffered by the Southern Sudan was actively supported by 
Northern Sudanese in considerable numbers, if not actually originated by 
them. Neither European traders nor Egyptians were ever present in the 
South in sufficient numbers to 'achieve' what they did without many 
Northern Sudanese employees. In addition, each wave of invaders attracted 
in its wake thousands of jellaba and other northern traders and settlers. (40)
Environmental Destruction
While great stress has been placed on the social destruction of nineteenth 
century Southern Sudan, less attention has been paid to the economic 
disruption and widespread environmental destruction. All invaders coming 
frar the North had an impossibly long line of supply and all were, either 
willingly or unwillingly, forced to live off the land, usually at the expense 
of the local inhabitants. The ravages of the invaders in search of grain 
caused widespread famine in some areas, but what is perhaps more interesting 
and very much more fundamental in its long term effects, was their extensive 
cattle raiding. The confiscation of cattle was necessary to the ivory 
traders, not only for their own survival, but also as a means of exchange, 
especially among the Nilotics who prized them highly, and had soon become 
resistant to the appeal of beads and certainly had no use for cloth. The 
Syrian trader, Habib, took two thousand head of cattle in a single raid on 
the Bor Dinka, in order to trade them for ivory. (41) In 1864, Debono 
collected an emmense store of ivory purchased with plundered cattle. (42)
In 1864 Balter had noticed the great change among the Acholi where ivory 
traders had plundered four thousand head of cattle, (43) and in 1872 was 
forced against his better judgement to resort to cattle raiding against 
the Bari to support his forces at Gondokoro; and in 1873 relieved thorn of 
two thousand five hundred head with which to pay for porters. (44)
The slave raiders used the Nilotics desire to recoup their losses as a means 
of mobilizing their forces in inter-tribal hostilities which inevitably 
resulted in opportunities for the capture of slaves. The administration of 
both the Egyptians and the Mdhdists used widespread cattle confiscation as 
a punitive measure against recalcitrant peoples. Even Gessi, who perhaps 
made more effort than most to ccme to terms with the local inhabitants, used 
punitive cattle raids as a means of controlling the Atuot Dinka. (45)
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In 1877 hundreds of cattle were taken from the Kalika, a Madi sub-tribe, 
and when Emin visited then in 1882 they had lost every one. Junker describes 
how in some districts the raising of cattle had almost disappeared. (46)
Even among the stronger Dinka tribes, cattle losses were severe. Among the 
Agar the bride-price was reduced from 50-60 cows to only 8-1CK (47)
A comparison of livestock records of 1948 with the nineteenth century history 
of the area shows a marked correlation between extensive cattle raiding and 
subsequent tsetse infestation. The peoples recorded as having lost nearly 
all their cattle and suffering from the destruction of the environment by 
tsetse by Beaton in 1948 (48) (the Madi, southern Bari, Acholi, Kalika, Moru, 
and Nyangwara) were all recorded by Gray as having suffered extensive cattle 
raids. (49) Tsetse forced the Dinka to abandon dry season grazing areas to 
the east of the River Gel which had been usable before the Turco-Egyptian 
period, and one is tempted to equate the Jur River tsetse area with the 
much used traders corridor from Meshra Er Reg to the zeriba belt.
It would appear that the removal of cattle resulted in the widespread 
destruction of the environment and areas which had once maintained vast 
herds of cattle were within a short period rendered unusable. (50) Only by 
remembering the social value placed on cattle can we begin to realize the 
significance of this loss.
When one considers both the human and the environmental damage one begins to 
appreciate the degree of devastation wrought by the invaders of the 
nineteenth century on the Southern Sudan. 'The Dongalawi ... captured our 
people and sold them. They would go, attack any village, and capture people 
... .They did not bring order. Nor did they unite the country .. .He would 
attack and destroy an area and when he conquered than he would take the 
people and add than to his army as slaves. And he would use them to attack 
the next tribe .... Many sections disappeared. Many Dinkas went into the
wilderness and disappeared ....In some sections only thirty or forty remained.
A section with fifty people was considered a large one ,. .It was a destruction 
in which, if you saw a man, you considered yourself dead... .Any man at all, 
even a black man, if you saw him, you were dead if you had no greater strength 
of your own. And he would take your things ... .Great leaders were left 
without anything.' (51) To this day the Dinka refer to the period as
'... .the time when the world was spoilt.' (52)
- Ill -
However the fear and resentment of the Southern Sudanese for the arabised 
northerner may have subsequently been modified by colonial policies, it was 
in the slave trade, the Egyptian and Mahdist invasions, and the extensive 
environmental devastation, that it had its genesis.
British Administration: Pacification and Compart men t al izat ion
In considering the British administrative policies (53) it is important to 
remember the widespread destruction of the whole of the Sudan and especially 
the Southern Sudan, during the Turkiyya and the Mahdiyya, as it fundamentally 
conditioned both the policies and the response of the local inhabitants, (54) 
The British, with the usual European desire for peace and order, saw around 
than only disruption and chaos. '...I have seen many unwholesome spots; but for 
God-forsaken, dry sucked, fly-blown wilderness, conmend me to the Upper Nile.
A desolation of desolations, an infernal region, a howling waste of weed, 
mosquitoes, flies and fever, backed by a groaning waste of thorns and stones - 
waterless and waterlogged. I have passed through it, and now have no fear 
for the hereafter.' (55) Early British administration in the Southern Sudan, 
therefore had two basic aims: to keep the peace within the south by ordering, 
separating and compartmentalizing, in an effort to eliminate conflicts they 
failed to understand; and to keep the peace between the North and the South, 
again by ordering and separating.
By 1920 the Southern Sudan was divided into three provinces, Upper Nile,
Bahr El Ghazal and Mongalla, but pacification of the area was to take some 
considerable time. Among the peoples who had suffered the most during the 
previous century there was an early, if unenthusiastic, acceptance of British 
administration, but among the more fiercely independent there was a period 
of considerable resistance. In 1912 the Anuak killed forty-seven soldiers 
including five officers; in 1919 the Aliab Dinka in Bahr El Ghazal killed the 
Governor Chauncey Stigand; in 1927 the Nuer killed their District Commissioner, 
Mr. Vere Ferguson, and as recently as 1941, the District Commissioner of Tonj 
was severely wounded. Until 1933 the Bari '...still entertained the happy 
belief that the foreigner who was building Juba would disappear just as his 
predecessor who built Gondokoro, Rejaf and Mongalla had left Bariland.1 (56)
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Conflict between the local inhabitants and the administration was readily 
understood and dealt with, but conflict between different tribal groups 
was often misunderstood. It was inevitable after a century of disruption 
that inter-tribal conflict should characterize efforts to regain the 
original man/land/cattle environmental balance. The efforts to prevent 
this inevitable conflict resulted in a misunderstanding of the aims of 
the administration and,with the failure to achieve a balance, the potential 
conflict was merely refrigerated. The administration, in trying to make 
some order from the prevailing chaos,endeavoured to do so by building the 
confidence of the people, and regretted that punitive expeditions, so 
redolent of earlier invaders, had to be employed. There was,however, 
little alternative, given the chronic shortage of finance and manpower.
The original British policy for the governing of such a vast country with 
insufficient men was one of indirect rule. While this met with some success 
in Northern Sudan, it was not to prove a practical possibility in the South. 
The administration wanted to utilize the authority of local leaders, but for 
humanitarian reasons also wished to selectively control those practices which 
were considered abuses, and by so doing they undermined the very authority 
they wished to employ. 'Thus, the administrative demands of the conquerors 
not only undermined traditional prerogatives but reduced the chiefs to servants
of the government Those who refused to co-operate were broken. Those
who abused their position were sacked Their successors were chosen by
the government to carry out the government's will  Consequently their
influence and prestige decreased.' (57) Among the Nilotic peoples, the 
administration failed to realize that the traditional political system did 
not allow for the vesting of such powers in one individual, and Collins 
recounts the case of a Dinka who was forced to leave his village because the 
people refused to obey him, and he no longer wished to be held responsible 
for their behaviour. (58)
Although the declared policy was one of indirect rule, in practice 
administration became increasingly direct. The response of the Southern 
Sudanese to all invaders - whether slave raiders, Egyptians, Mahdists or 
British or, in recent years, Northern Sudanese has been one of continuing 
resistance whether passive or active, the mode depending very much on the 
traditions of individual groups. Faced with this resistance, the limited 
aims of the early administrators were to maintain peace, build roads and 
collect taxes where possible. As peace was gradually established, the
-  113 -
authority of chiefs gradually declined; without the necessity for cen­
tralized leadership there was a return to the traditional political 
fragmentation, especially among the Nilotic peoples.
By 1920 the administration was beginning to realize that by undermining 
what remained of traditional political organisation during the period of 
pacification, they had made indirect rule an impossibility, and so in the 
early 1920's they embarked upon the task of re-establishing or re-discovering 
the traditional authorities, despite the fact that they had little under­
standing of the manner in which traditional society functioned. ’I take it 
that it is now clearly realized that the policy of the Government is to 
get the administration of affairs which are purely native back on to a 
tribal basis and that the function of the Government is to supervise, guide 
and mould tribal organization, rather than destroy such systems of customary 
law, discipline and culture as the natives already possess.' (59)
The first step was the delegation of judicial powers to the local authorities 
in the form of chiefs courts. This however did little to re-assert the 
prestige of the chiefs, especially as they were now even more liable to 
dismissal for failure to interpret local custom in terms of European values, 
or merely for lacking the necessary bureaucratic skills. 'Our most difficult 
task at the present moment is to find suitable chiefs with sufficient tribal 
authority to control those under than and at the same time being capable of 
appreciating the Government's methods to such an extent as to be able to 
act as the teachers of the people.' (60) What was in fact to develop was a 
double standard. Deng has noted that among the Dinka, no shame was attatched 
to conviction or punishment meted out by a court which was to some degree 
under the control of the government, unless the offence was shameful by 
traditional criteria. (61) In fact, among all the Nilotic peoples, the 
government had failed to realize that the individuals in power during the 
period of resistance were a response to an emergency situation, and were 
not the traditional dispensers of justice. A letter from the Governor of 
Upper Nile Province to the Civil Secretary in 1927 concerning the diff­
iculties of administering the Nuer, illustrates this point. 'Cattle cases 
are only heard by the cattle chief, land cases by the land chief and so on,
 Unfortunately, when we first started administering tlisprovince, this
ancient system was not known and it has only recently been realized. In our 
ignorance we presumed that a chief was a dispenser of justice in every case 
and was generally paramount in the tribe. Undoubtedly in many instances a
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kujur or witchdoctor had usurped this paramount right and the old system 
had fallen into disuse. Through lade of knowledge and inexperience we 
failed to grasp this point, and jumping over this stage, we appointed chiefs 
to whom we looked as the responsible head.' (62)
Despite these fundamental inconsistencies, chiefs courts proliferated 
throughout the Southern Sudan, and the government congratulated itself on 
laying the foundations for native administration, although the enthusiasm 
shown by many local people was perhaps more a reflection of their intense 
love of litigation, rather than any real desire to co-operate with the 
government.
In order to define the authority of the courts, the colonial administration 
embarked upon a process of compartmentalization, that is the allotting of 
peoples to certain defined territorial areas, and within those areas to 
certain local authorities. If we refer bads to the last chapter, we can see 
that this policy completely disregarded the traditional spatial organization, 
essentially characterised by a high degree of freedom of movement and a low 
degree of political affiliation, It restricted not only personal freedom 
but, especially among the Nilotic peoples, it prevented the employment of 
the traditional sub-division of groups as a means of environmental adjustment. 
A spatial organization which had originally been one of dynamic interaction, 
became one of static co-existence; the genealogical map was replaced by the 
straight line. 'At the end of time the English will come to you, whose 
soldiers are called police: they will measure the land even to the blades 
of the sedge grass.' (63)
As Larken, District Comnissioner among the Zande from 1911 to 1932, has 
recalled, local chiefs were actually made to tour the boundaries of their 
territories in an effort to define the extent of their influence. '.... I fixed
arbitary ones (boundaries) of my own I made each chief, and his headmen
walk round them with me, if they were physically capable of doing so - a job 
they detested, being used to the lazy life of chiefs - and at the finish gave 
each a "map" of his country, showing its newly demarcated limits, and a 
list of his boundary streams. These they carefully treasured in a hollow 
bamboo, plugged with a maize cob.' (64) The division of the land reflected
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the dimunition of the power of rebellion, and Reining notes that five powerful
chiefdoms in Zandeland were divided into as many as twenty-eight petty
chief dons. (65) In the 1920's Zande chiefs complained that while their
power might in theory extend to the boundaries danarcated by the District
Comnissioner, the people who formed their guide to the extent of their
influence were moving away from the district and away from their jurisdiction.
e
Again Larken recalls that 'Young men began to show a regrettable tend ncy to
leave their homes for Wau or even Khartoum Experience abundantly and
clearly showed that no Zande was ever a better man for a course of comnunal 
living, and most definitely a worse tribesman .... all manner of criminal
instincts being latent in his character town life brought than out in him,
which his simple tribal life did not ...,' He was convinced that should the 
process of social change '....be hurried or forced in any way, the ruination 
of a potentially excellent tribe, and chaos in its area, will most certainly 
ensue.' (66) By 1922 the Zande were forbidden to move frcm one chief dam to 
another, which removed one of the traditional constraints on the power of the 
chiefs. (67) In 1908 there was fierce conflict between the Dinka and the 
Nuer of the Zeraf Valley, primarily the result of cattle plague. The response 
of the government was to cancel all cases between the Dinka and the Nuer prior 
to April 1908 and to draw a line between them. (68) This drawing of lines 
was to have environmental as well as political effects. Attempts to reduce 
wet season conflicts among the Dinka by segregation prevented the traditional 
dry season co-operation and subsequently resulted in overgrazing in some 
areas.(69) Gradually this European approach to spatial organization supplanted 
the traditional African approach.
Having organized and compartmentalized the population of the Southern Sudan 
into self-contained tribal units, it became essential, if the method of 
administration was to succeed, to protect those units from outside interference. 
Not only was each tribe and sub-tribe to be separated as much as possible from 
each other; they were also to be protected from alien influences other than 
British. Perhaps in no other area of colonial Africa was British rule 
quite so paternal.
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However there could be no tribal revitalization if there was also contact 
with Muslim N orthern Sudanese, and although not at the time part of official 
policy, the removal of such influences had already begun as early as 1910.
In that year Sir Reginald Wingate, Governor General of the Sudan, approved 
the foimation of a locally recruited force, which by 1917 permitted the
a.
withdrawl of Northern Sudanese troops from the South. The recruitment of 
the Equatorial Battalion not only provided a useful counterweight against 
the still suspect Muslim armed forces, but it also resulted in the removal 
of the actively prosleytizing Muslims in their ranks. To understand the 
attitude of British administrators to the propagation of Islam, it is 
important to recall that memories of the dedication of the followers of the 
Mahdi were very fresh in their minds. R.C.R.Owen, the Governor of Ivtongalla 
Province, who in fact suggested the raising of the Equatorial Battalion 
also suggested to Wingate the formation of '.. a large Christian population 
which would eventually link up with Uganda and form a substantial buffer or 
check to the spread of a faith, such as the Muslim, which may at any time 
break out into a wave of fanaticism.' (70)
Although part of this fear of Islam was based on a concern with the security 
situation, there was also.^ a general dislike of the religion and its 
perpetrators^, among British administrators. Extracts from the memoirs of 
Larkin provide an insight into the prevailing attitude. 'Anything that 
savoured of the north was discouraged, and the return to Wau of resident 
Arabs was welcomed. Tie writer has been called "fanatically opposed' to the 
infiltration of Arab culture into the country, and with truth: his object 
being to maintain tribalization until it should have become clear that the 
Azande had advanced far enough for the substitution of some other social 
system, without being harmed thereby.' (71) Describing Tambura in 1911 he 
recalls 'Some Arab settlers had their homes close by, and a definite
northern atmosphere hung about the place..... ivory, that was oonfiseable
could have been disposed of to them and they could have been a source
of supply of cheap wives for the Wau boys..... their wives also probably
made a lot of spirit I believe the main reason for their presence
was to be first in the field when the Government withdrew, for it was 
thought locally that this would happen..... .About 1914 orders came from 
the Governor that they must accept Tambura as their overlord, and be bound 
by Zande law, if they wished to remain. Some of them thereupon withdrew 
to Wau.' (72)
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Christianity and Missionary Education
The growing isolation of the Southern Sudan was also reflected in the 
policies regarding education and language which had their beginnings 
in decisions as to the religious future of the territory. Representatives 
of various missionary societies had followed hard on the heels of the 
British administration, only to find that the administration was to debar 
their activities in the Northern Sudan, in order not to offend the Muslim 
population, and instead direct their attention to the Upper Nile.(73)
A system of 'spheres of influence' was formulated and outlined in the 
'Regulations and Conditions under which Missionary Work is Permitted in 
the Sudan' 1905. The Church Missionary Society was to have a monopoly of 
the Bahr El Jebel Valley and over much of Upper Nile Province and eastern 
Bahr El Ghazal Province; the Presbyterian American Mission was granted 
territory from the Bahr El Zeraf to the River Sobat, with the Verona Fathers 
Catholic Mission having most of the western Bahr El Ghs;al Province. None 
was allowed north of the tenth parallel. In the early years most effort 
seems to have been expended on domestic quarrels and inter-society rivalry 
and,with the possible exception of the modest gains of the Americans, little 
was achieved. During their first five years at Malek, the Christian Missionary 
Society failed to make a single convert, enroll a single student or even 
gain the sympathy of the local Dinka, seemingly being more concerned at the 
territorial gains of the Catholics rather than the 'saving of souls'.
While the individual societies were suspicious of each other, they were 
doubly suspicious of the role of Northern Sudanese in spreading Islam, and 
it must be remembered that a large part of their motive in being on the Upper 
Nile was as much to save it from Islam as to gain.it for Christianity, They 
also equated the use of Arabic with the spread of Islam, and their fears 
certainly contributed to the subsequent decision by the government to 
discourage Arabic, and attempt to make English a lingua franoa.
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Tie initial attitude of the administration had been to see the missionaries 
as just another problem, but by 1901 Wingate had realized that if he wished 
to build up a Christian counterweight population in the Southern Sudan he
would have to give the societies greater encouragement. (74) However, from
the first the religious zeal of the government was underlined by administrative 
convenience. The missions were expected to train clerks and artisans to 
staff the bureaucracy, without putting a strain on the government's slender 
finances. ’The object which the Government has In view is educational. It
is for those who voluntarily enter this field of work to adapt the
secular and educational policy of the Government to the needs of their
special religious persuasion.’ (75) The government was happy to leave
education in the hands of the missionaries, and was to realize only 
much later that the limited means of the societies were not alone going to 
produce the literate, English -speaking clerks they wished to utilize in the 
administration. Of the three main societies, the Catholics were perhaps the 
most successful in attracting students, but the low standard of education 
can be imagined, with Italians endeavouring to teach English to Dinka. All 
three included a varying amount of simple technical training in the curriculum, 
often in an attempt to make the establishment self-supporting as much as to 
impart knowledge. These educational opportunities were not much appreciated 
by the Southern Sudanese and administrators had eventually to force local 
chiefs to send their children to school.
By 1922 the government was beginning to realize that if a trained class of 
Southern officials was ever to be produced they would have to play a much 
more direct part in education. However it was still the intention to do 
so through the missionary societies, mainly by closer control of schools 
and a system of grants in aid, and by 1927 a total grant of £E. 3,650 was 
provided. There were two basic types of school: elementary vernacular
schools with a four year course aiming at basic literacy and simple technical 
skills, and intermediate schools at which the language of instruction was 
English, with six year courses of study aimed at producing teachers, clerks 
and minor officials. In 1930 there were thirty-two elementary schools with 
2,024 pupils, and three intermediate schools with 177 pupils and by 1936 the 
elementary schools had increased to 36 with 2,977 pupils and 246 children 
were attending intermediate schools. In addition there were, by 1936, eighteen 
girls-schools with 760 pupils and three trades schools with 100 boys. (76)
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The question of language in the Southern Sudan had always posed a problem.
The administration had been perturbed at the inroads made by pidgin Arabic 
as a lingua francaj especially in the main towns, as this did not accord 
with their plans for 'Africanization'. However, the problem was to find 
an alternative, and the government's efforts to find a solution to the 
problem exposed the contradictions inherent in their administrative policy. 
The Rejaf Language Conference of 1928 had proposed the use of certain group 
languages, Dinka, Bari, Nuer, Shilluk, Latuka and Zande, to be used as 
vernaculars for instruction in elementary schools but, as Collins has noted 
'.. .by no stretch of the imagination could forcing the Azande language or 
English on the Kreish,.. .be called developing the indigenous customs...' (77) 
Moreover such a small percentage of the population came into contact with 
missionary education or the administration that for the 'majority there was 
no real incentive to learn English. To the ordinary tribesman the only 
necessity to learn a second language was to engage in simple trading 
transactions, and for that purpose pidgin Arabic was more than adequate. 
Despite the efforts of the administration to encourage the use of English, 
and other even more extreme suggestions such as the imposition of Swahili, 
pidgin Arabic continued in use, but with official disapproval never developed 
into a really meaningful vehicle for communication. The discouragement of 
Arabic removed an adequate means of communication between the North and the 
South Sudan, and the limited means of the administration prevented the 
development of any single language to facilitate communication within the 
South.
As early as 1918, Sunday had become the official day of rest, and by 1921, 
when it was suggested that English should replace Arabic as the official 
language, the missionaries were beginning to make some slight impression. 
However opinion as to the future was still divided, with seme administrators 
such as Larkin doing all they could to remove all Northern influence, while 
others beset with greater problems condoned it. The more enlightened, such 
as Woodland, Governor of Mongalla, could foresee the inevitable confusion 
and gradually demands were made for the formulation of a definite policy.
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The Southern Policy and Isolation
When the Southern Policy was finally decided it was, as we have seen, to 
render official a process that had already begun. In 1930 MacMichael, the 
Civil Secretary of the Sudan Government, issued the following memorandum:
' The Policy of the Government in the Southern Sudan is to build up a series 
of self-contained racial and tribal units with structure and organization 
based, to whatever extent the requirements of equity and good government 
permit upon indigenous customs, traditional usage and beliefs.' (78)
Tb enable the policy to succeed all Muslim and therefore Northern influences 
were to be gradually removed. The language of administration was to be 
English and all Arabic speaking personnel were to be replaced. Most Northern 
traders were to be encouraged to leave, and their places taken by Syrians and
Greeks, the permits to trade of the jellaba being ' decreased
unobtrusively but progressively.' (79) The British administrators were to 
familiarize themselves with local languages, customs and beliefs, assistance 
in this task being provided by such experts as Tucker and Evans-Pritchard.
For a detailed account of the Southern Policy see Appendix 1.
The implementation of this policy naturally varied from place to place but, 
as might have been expected, the more fanatically anti-Arab administrators 
were to take implement at ion to extreme lengths, especially regarding the 
more trivial aspects. While some administrators set deadlines for the 
abandonment of Arabic names, others appreciated the more farcical elements 
of the policy. The District Commissioner of Raga, in a letter to the
Governor of Bahr El Ghazal in 1932 protested ' it is not consistent
that I should insist on them using their proper tribal names and dropping 
their foreign (Arabic) ones when the Missions are permitted to baptize them 
with another foreign (Italian) name.' (80) There were also other areas of 
confusion. The administrators, who had waged an uphill battle against the 
unabashed nudity of the Nilotics, found themselves having to actively 
discourage a form of dress they had previously promoted. The poor tribesman 
had not only to adopt the seemingly pointless European habit of covering 
the body, but must now also be aware of what was fashionable. The following
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were instructions sent by the District Commissioner to a Greek trader 
in Raga in 1935. 'I notice that in spite of frequent requests to the 
contrary, large quantities of ’Arab1 clothing are still being made and 
sold. Please note that, in future it is forbidden to make or sell such 
clothes. Shirts should be made short with a collar and opening down the 
front in the European fashion and not an open neck as worn by the Baggara
of Darfur you are given till the end of February to dispose of your
present stock. This order applies to all outside agents and owners of 
sewing machines.1 (81)
Not only were all individual Arab influences to be removed from the Southern 
Sudan, but active measures were taken to reinforce the area's isolation 
from the rest of the country. As we have noted earlier, there had long 
been interaction between the peoples of the North and South in the western 
Bahr El Ghazal and as a result arabization had been greater there than in 
any other area. Groups such as the Banda and the Kreish had adopted many 
Arab customs, and others such as the Feroge had been partially absorbed into 
the Arab tribal organization. Throughout the area the majority of chiefs 
were practising Muslims, and it was obvious that here a more fundamental 
policy would be required. The British administration decided to solve the 
problem by creating a 'no-mans-land1 between the North and the South. All 
Arab immigrants, some 3,000 people, were re-settled in Darfur, and the 
indigenous people were re-grouped and re-settled south' of the Raga-Kafia Kingi 
road. The town of Kafia Kingi was abandoned and destroyed and the 
administrative centre of Raga was moved to its present location. The only 
real resistance to the policy came from Isa Ahmad Fertak, chief of the 
Feroge, whose case, complaining of religious and linguistic discrimination, 
became for a time a cause celebre among emergent nationalists in Khartoum. (82)
This isolation of the South was compounded by earlier legislation. The 
Passports and Permits Ordinance. (1922) and the Permits to Trade Order (1925) 
effectively controlled movement within the country. Not only did they 
prevent Northerners influencing the South, but they controlled the movement of 
Southerners to Khartoum and the towns of the North, where they might have 
realized that the economic development and the emergent spirit of nationalism
were passing them by.
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The economic aspects associated with the Southern Policy were also to have 
a profound effect. In essence they allowed a completely unrealistic economic 
situation to prevail in the South. Locally recruited staff -who replaced the 
Northern minor officials had their scales of pay set artificially low.
Newly appointed staff were paid £E 18 to £E 20 per annum, with an annual 
increase of between £E 3 and £E 6, Local market prices were kept low and 
the cost of labour fixed at 1 to 2 piastres per day.(83) The preoccupation 
of the administrators with the maintenance of law and order, had little time 
or money for any economic development, and at a time when Northern Sudan 
was witnessing the building of the Sennar Dam and the beginnings of the 
Gezira Scheme, the South had to be content with a level of development that 
did not really extend beyond the horticultural experiments of a few District 
Commissioners. Where cash crops were tentatively introduced, great pains 
were taken to ensure that the traditional life-style of the people was not 
disturbed. The administration tried to encourage limited production of 
suitable crops to enable people to pay their taxes, but at the same time 
wished to restrict the commercialization of the Southern provinces. The 
Governor of Upper Nile Province, in his report for 1925, was anxious to keep 
prices low. 'To provide means for the present generation to acquire sufficient 
wealth to enable them to obtain all the various luxuries civilization brings, 
would in iny opinion, be disastrous. For this reason I am anxious that the 
price given for cotton should not be too high,' (84)
The cost of administering such a large area, just in terms of road maintenance 
and peace keeping, was very high, taxation revenue was always very low and 
costly to collect, and there was virtually nothing remaining for any kind 
of real development. It must be remembered that during perhaps the most 
crucial period of British administration, 1915-1945, the First and Second 
World Wars and the economic depression of the thirties made any large-scale 
financial support for the area virtually impossible. In addition, a large 
percentage of the money available was spent on the provision of medical 
facilities, and especially on the control of sleeping sickness. (85) In this 
situation it was as much as the administrator could do to maintain the 
status quo. Accordingly, the Southern Sudan began to fall farther and 
farther behind, not only its neighbours to the north, but also those to 
the south in East Africa.
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Part of the rationale of the government in Khartoum towards expenditure in 
the South was the belief that taxation revenue raised in the North should 
in fairness be spent in the North. The main concern of the government was 
that peace should prevail in the South, and the economic and cultural 
isolation resulted in administrative isolation. As early as 1920 it was 
cfeemed unnecesary for the governors of the three Southern Provinces to 
journey to Khartoum for joint meetings; rather they were expected to solve 
their problems among themselves.(86) The result was a distrust of the 
Khartoum establishment among Southern adrministrators, added to which a number 
of officials were recruited from East Africa and had no knowledge of or 
interest in the northern part of the country. The attitudes and values of 
these Southern administrators was initially paternalistic and became more so 
with time, coupled with the belief that the severe constraint on government 
spending made progress at any level virtually impossible. The economic 
and administrative isolation of the South, together with the problems of 
communications and transport, gave rise to a concentration of development 
effort in the North, in both the public and private sectors, that to a great 
extent continues to the present day.
Many Northern Sudanese writers (87) have interpreted the Southern Policy of 
1930 as a device by which the British Government intended to detach the 
southern half of the Sudan, and subsequently to administer it with her East 
African territories. While the idea was inevitably discussed, it never 
formed a part of official British policy. What must be remembered is that 
while the Southern Policy separated the South from the North, it also 
separated the South from all other neighbouring influences. It was effectively 
a policy of isolation, and during the 1930's and 1940(s the Southern Sudan, 
while falling behind the rate of development in the North, was also falling 
behind that of East Africa. Rather than the British Government being blamed 
for pursuing a policy of separation, it should be blamed for a neglect of 
the South and a failure to confront the problem of its political future 
until it was already too late.
Some serious consideration was eventually given to this future as a response 
to political developments in the North. The formation of the Graduate’s 
Congress in 1938 marked the rise of Northern nationalism, and a growing 
concern with the future of the whole Sudan. As we have noted in other African 
states, the denand was that the Sudanese should control the whole of the
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territory as demarcated by the colonial powers. In a memorandum to the 
Civil Secretary in April 1942, the Congress called for 'The issue, on the 
first possible opportunity, by the British and Egyptian Governments of a 
joint declaration granting the Sudan, in its present geographical boundaries, 
the right to self-determination ...1 (88) In addition demands were made 
for the unification of the education syllabuses in the North and the South, 
for the abolition of the Closed Areas Ordinances and the lifting of 
restrictions on trade and movement of Sudanese within the Sudan.(89)
Informed Sudanese opinion was becoming increasingly concerned with the 
future of the South and with a policy which appeared to be an attempt to 
cheat the growing elite of succeeding to control of the whole country.
The response of the administration was to review and to sane extent reverse 
the Southern Policy, and to begin seriously ^consider the political future 
of the South. After years of neglect and stringent wartime economies, the 
most obvious fact was that the South was so appallingly backward as to be 
unable to either stand by itself, or to be a fit partner to share in a 
unified Sudan or an East African federation. Suggestions were made to the 
effect that British administration should continue in the south until the 
necessary development had been attained, but this proposal served merely to 
increase the suspicions of the Khartoum nationalists, who began to believe 
in the existence of a sinister plot, where in fact there had been only 
confusion and indecision. At last the government realized that something 
must be done. ’The eyes of Egypt and the Northern Sudanese are on the South, 
and a Southern Policy (or lack of policy) has been heavily criticised both 
in Cairo and Qmdurman. Parts of the policy will never commend themselves 
to the Northern Sudanese and some criticisms have been hard to awnser. If we 
are to carry Northern Sudanese enlightened opinion with us at all, over our 
Southern Policy, it is imperative that we go faster in both educational and 
material development. We may also have to consider external, e.g. American, 
opinion after the war and the impression which the present state of the 
Southern Sudan would give to a Mandate Commission or a Regional African 
Council.' (90)
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The Southern Policy Revised
A combination of pressures resulted in attempts to formulate a revised 
Southern Policy in 1945, and three alternative futures for the South were 
suggested: integration with the North; integration with East Africa; or a 
division of the South between the North and East Africa. The marked lack 
of enthusiasm displayed by the East African territories helped the Sudan 
Government to reach a decision. Uganda was 1... extremely cool towards any 
prospect of union with this vast and unprof itable land.' (91) The Khartoum 
nationalists with their fears of Ugandan irredentism, or British settlement 
in Zandeland, were in fact fighting hard for something that nobody else 
wanted, that is except the Southern Sudanese, and at this time it had not 
occurred to anyone to ask them their opinion.
With integration with East Africa effectively ruled out, the only alternative 
seemed to be integration with the North, and in 1946 the new Southern Policy 
was finally stated in a memorandum from the Civil Secretary. ’The policy of 
the Sudan Government regarding the Southern Sudan is to act upon the facts 
that the peoples of the Southern Sudan are distinctively African and Negroid, 
but that geography and economics confoine (so far as can be foreseen at the 
present time) to render them inextricably bound for future development to 
the middle-eastern and arabicised Northern Sudan: and therefore to ensure 
that they shall, by educational and economic development, be equipped to 
stand up for themselves in the future as socially and economically the equals 
of their partners of the Northern Sudan in the Sudan of the future.' (92)
An examination of the memorandum stating the new policy, (see Appendix II) 
reveals three important factors. Perhaps most significant in light of 
subsequent developments was that the Government showed their marked distrust 
of the Northern Sudanese and their ability to deal equitably with the South, 
and perhaps this very document encouraged the people of the South to feel 
that they did have something to fear from gpvernment by Northerners. It also
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revealed the extent of the isolation of the Southern Sudan, and the 
government's realization that this had been a mistake; Arabic, instead of 
being discouraged, was to be introduced into the intermediate school 
curriculum; rates of pay were to be standardized; the rules about employment 
of Southerners in the North were to be changed; and the whole policy of 
isolation was to be abandoned and in its place economic integration with the 
North was to be actively pursued. Finally it was as if the government had 
suddenly realized its earlier follies but had realized that it was alreajdy 
too late to make amends. The memorandum closes with the following warning:
. .urgency is the essence of the problem. We no longer have time to aim 
at the ideal: we must aim at doing what is the best for the Southern peoples 
in the present circumstances.’ (93)
The reactions of administrators in the South, while basically favourable, 
further revealed the distressing state of affairs in the area, and their 
fears for the South as part of a unified Sudan. '.. .misgivings are founded 
upon a knowledge of the shortcomings of the Northern Sudanese. That they could 
run Omdurman I believe. That they will soon be fit to govern the Rizeigat 
and the Hadendowa is possible. That they will in the next two decades be 
fit to be entrusted with the Zande and the Dinka is not even thinkable .... 
it is impossible that any parliament or cabal of Northern Sudanese wielding 
power in Khartoum should guide the destinies of Southerners.1 (94) Their 
comments revealed a distrust not only of the North as a whole, but also of 
the return of individual Northerners to the South. "The one legitimate 
objection to Northern officials is that experience has shown them to be 
constitutionally incapable of training Southerners.* However they did admit 
that the Southerner had grounds for legitimate complaint, and suggestions 
ranged from provision of higher wages, better housing, religious freedom 
down to the use of '...the courtesy title of Mr.* (95) What they failed 
to recognise or believe was that urgency was the essence of the problem, and 
their varied suggestions for periods of trusteeship and twenty-year 
development programmes showed a complete disregard, or perhaps ignorance, 
of the speed with which things were moving in the North.
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In 1944 an advisory council was instituted in the Northern Sudan, and by
1946 there was agitation for its transformation into a legislative assembly 
which succeeded with the decision to form such a body in 1947. This progress 
towards self-government highlighted the problem of representation of the 
three Southern provinces, and increased the fears of the Southern 
administrators. Accordingly it was agreed that the matter should be 
discussed and in June 1947 a conference was held in Juba, attended by British 
administrators and Sudanese participants from both North and South. The 
Northern nationalists were of course very anxious that the South be 
represented in the Legislative Council, as to them it seemed an assurance 
that the Sudan would not be separated, but eventually pass to them in its 
entirety. The Southern participants were very much aware of their own 
short comings and doubted that their voices would be either heard or heeded
in Khartoum, and frequently repeated their fears of Northern domination.
Only after considerable pressure did they agree to send representatives to 
the council.
There have been many criticisms levelled at the Juba Conference by Southern 
Sudanese, but they cannot be as readily dismissed as writers such as Beshir 
would maintain. (96) In a memorandum by the Civil Secretary written in May
1947 and stating the teims of reference for the conference, it is evident 
that the Sudan Government had already decided on '... the unification of 
the Sudanese peoples....' . (97) Furthermore, although the Southern 
participants agreed that the North and South should not be separated, they 
did envisage, and in fact strongly demanded, both a period of time to make 
the necessary adjustment, and that sufficient safeguards be embodied in any 
future constitutional legislation to avoid the domination of the south by 
the North. As a result of the conference it was decided to establish 
Province Councils in the south from which representatives would be sent to 
Khartoum; however, exactly what the desired safeguards would be remained very 
vague, much to the displeasure of British administrators in the Southern 
Sudan, who had envisaged the formation of at least some intermediate assembly 
between Khartoum and the South, and in some cases had advocated a definite 
federal constitution, or at least a degree of regional autonomy. According 
to the minutes of the conference, the Southern Sudanese participants appear 
to have placed far too much importance on the ability of the British 
personnel to intervene in Khartoum, and certainly do not seem to have foreseen 
that by 1956 they would have left the Sudan to its own devices. (98)
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By the time the Legislative Assembly Ordinance was passed all mention of 
safeguards had been dropped, there was no specific mention of the position of 
the Southern Sudan and even the proposed Governor General's veto was diluted 
to merely an application clause '...empowering the Governor-General to 
suspend application of any law to any part of the Sudan he might specify .... 
The Ordinance as now drafted therefore contains, apart from the general 
reserve powers of the Governor-General, no specific provision which could be 
called a safeguard to "ensure the healthy and steady development of the
Southern peoples'1 and we do not consider that any is required'. (99) So wrote
the Civil Secretary in February 1948 to the three southern Governors. From 
that time on the three Southern Provinces ceased to have any particular 
position, or to be administered in any way differently from the rest of the 
Sudan. There was no longer any precise Southern Policy. The Legislative 
Asserrbly opened in 1948 with only thirteen nominated members for the South 
out of a total of ninety-five. By 1950 their early experience of the Assembly 
had determined these southern menbers to call for a federal status for the 
South, within a united Sudan.
Early Economic Development
However, although the Sudan Government had failed the Southern people in the
political field, by failing to give then any real say in their political
future, they did attempt to give the policy of unification some chance of 
success by instigating a wideranging, if belated, programme for economic and 
social development.
As early as 1940 the development of the Southern provinces was being discussed, 
notably by DR. J.D.lbthill, Director of Agriculture, whose ideas were to form 
the basis for a proposed investment of £E1 million in the Zande Scheme.
Before outlining the scheme it is instructive to consider the basic rationale 
behind it, and so appreciate the attitude of the government to development 
in the South. The rationale was explained by the District Commissioner for 
Zande District as follows:-
'Stated shortly the problem is this, "How to improve the condition of a 
primitive and backward race living in one of the renotest parts of Central 
Africa and beyond the reach of outside mrkets except for a very few
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high-priced commodities which have in any case a strictly limited and 
fluctuating market in normal times"? . .. .the solution may sound obvious 
and simple - "Jettison the idea of exporting raw materials: import 
machinery and export manufactured goods, markets within the Sudan are 
meant and not overseas. ...By taking the decision they did, the Sudan 
Government performed an act of faith as well as an act of conmonsense. 
Faith in that they are trusting the local cultivator to produce 
sufficient raw material to keep the machinery busy....Oommonsense in 
that without the investment of cash in the scheme there could be no hope 
of further material prosperity for these people.'(100)
Here again is evidence of the extreme paternalism of the Government and 
a reluctance to see the operation of what might be termed a realistic 
economic situation in the South. One is struck by the failure to 
appreciate the possibilities for export to the equally isolated peoples 
of the Congo and French Equatorial Africa, or the territories of East 
Africa. This kind of attitude to the development of the South - that it 
will never be capable of making a real economic contribution - seems to 
have been handed over at independence, and to some extent continues to 
the present day. Perhaps a significant factor is that the scheme was 
initially inplemented by people without a commercial background and, in 
a sense, responsibility for its success was from the beginning placed at 
the feet of the Zande.
The basis of the scheme as envisaged by Tbthill was local self-sufficiency 
with just sufficient surplus to enable the purchase of really unavoidable 
inports. In addition to cottar, already established as a cash crop, oil 
palms, sugar, coffee and jute were to be grown, and the manufactures were 
to include cotton cloth, sacking and soap for the Khartoum market, and 
bricks, timber, iron and charcoal for local consumption. The whole 
scheme was to be operated as a 'partnership' and to be supported by a 
general expansion of education at all levels.
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In the hands of administrators, the scheme was gradually modified, mainly 
in response to the need to make immediate economies, and so gradually it 
was undermined. Existing transport routes were used, rather than the 
shorter ones originally suggested. Of the original cash crops, only cotton 
survived the early committee meetings. The sack industry was never 
discussed. Only antiquated machinery was purchased. Direct compulsion 
in cotton production was employed rather than the payment of attractive 
prices, with punishment for defaulters. Hie average price offered was 40Pt. 
per 100 lbs, and this was only raised in 1948 to 65Pt. to avoid smuggling 
to the Congo. In 1952 cotton producers in the Nuba Mountains of the North 
were paid three thmes as much as the Zande for ootton of a comparable 
standard. The educational expansion was never forthcoming, as neither 
was the participation of the Zande in decision making. As for the 
commercial aspects of the scheme, the draft charter of the Equatoria 
Projects Board, established to run the scheme, indicated that there had been 
no fundamental change in government thinking about the development of the 
Southern Sudan. "The general policy of the Board shall aim at the social 
emergence of the peoples of Equatoria Province, and the purely commercial 
aspects of its undertakings shall be subordinated to that aim.1 (101)
So in a much modified form the scheme went ahead and involved the re­
settlement of some 100,000 people- people who had already been uprooted 
once before to facilitate the control of sleeping sickness. Not until 1950 
were the factories completed and in limited operation. Production oosts 
were high and distribution of saleable goods was inefficient, and not 
helped by the policies of the Board's trading division, wheel allowed only a 
5% wholesale discount and would only supply cotton cloth in bales of 600 yards. 
Sales were un deist an dab ly slow and markets were sought in the North, where 
the cloth was sold more cheaply than in Equatoria. (102) Much the same 
situation developed concerning oooking oil. Dissatisfaction among the 
Zande grew. Not only were they paid low prices for the cotton they were 
forced to produce, but they were also denied access to the finished 
product.
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As dissatisfaction grew, so cotton production fell and by 1954 the 
Government was forced to raise prices and end compulsion, but to little 
avail. The Zande had understandably lost interest and much of the crop 
remained unpicked. A significant factor is that during this period of 
intense dissatisfaction a considerable number of Northern Sudanese were 
being employed in both technical and administrative capacities in Zandeland, 
and were in fact to be the inheritors of this dissatisfaction. The 
Zande considered them to be ' . .haughty and lacking in any desire to 
educate the Azande'. Reinning has noted the amazing paternalism and 
lack of understanding among the European administrators in their running 
of the scheme; a paternalism that was passed on to the Northern Sudanese. 
But while the Zande had no choice but to accept this attitude among 
Europeans, they were not prepared to accept it from Northern Sudanese.(103) 
Although Southern Policy had officially come to an end in 1946,from 
this brief look at the Zande scheme we can see that the same general 
attitudes continued to prevail. The initial stress on the self-sufficiency 
of the area and the refusal to apply a realistic commercial structure can 
be seen as an extension, economically , of the isolation of the previous 
protectionist policy.
Various other attempts at economic development were made in an effort to 
bring the South more in line with the North. Saw mills were established 
at Katire, Gilo and Loka, but the cost of harvesting and transporting 
the timber was high, and by 1954 it was considered uneconomic to sell 
timber from the South, north of Kosti. (104) Efforts were made to 
encourage the people of the Southern Provinces to grow surplus goods for 
sale, but again the prices offered provided no incentive. Rather than 
accept this fact, administrators continued to blame the laziness and 
backwardness of the people for what they saw as a refusal to enter the 
market economy. To the cultivator the price was not attractive and there 
was, in any case, a general shortage of consumer goods on which to spend 
the money, but to the administrator 'The people still suffer from an 
inflated idea of the value of their own products; many regrettably, still 
prefer a beerparty to the sale of a few measures of grain.* (105)
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Part of the problem was the effect on the S outh of the wartime period, 
when a remarkable increase in production in all areas had been accomplished 
under a system of forced labour and compulsory purchase, in order to supply 
the North African front. At the end of the period, the people were left 
with a profound distrust of the benefits of ’increased production1 while the 
government retained an unrealistic expectation of the productive capabilities 
of both the land and the people. Government revenue from the three Southern 
Provinces remained distressingly low. (see Table II) Two large development 
investigations were undertaken. One was the Equatorial Nile Project, a plan 
for the control of the Nile waters, part of which involved the digging of 
the Jonglei Canal to by-pass the sudd swamps, and the other was the multi­
disciplinary research programme undertaken by the Southern Development 
Investigation Team in 1953-54. In 1977 discussions as to the advisability 
of the former still continue and many of the suggestions in the latter are 
still to be implemented. The development programme for 1946-51 indicates
A/V£> /*ce.{&rter f&o<0
that rather than trying to instigate real economic development in the south, A. 
the Government was more concerned with the provision of basic services.
(see Table HI) (106)
Obviously something had to be done about education. One of the main criticisms 
of the old Southern Policy was that it had failed to produce adequate trained 
Southern staff. The 1946 Five Year Development Plan provided the money and 
expenditure rose from £E 18,017 in 1944, only 6.4% of the Sudan total of that 
year, to £E 30,881 in 1946. But although the plan tallied of expansion, what 
was in fact undertaken was more a policy of consolidation. Education 
continued to be effected through the missions, but was supplemented by a few 
government schools and increased supervision. Minimum qualifications for 
teachers were laid down and two primary teachers' training schools at Yambio 
and Bussere were opened. However the overall position was not good. Whereas 
over 64,000 Northern children attended school in 1945, only 15,404 Southern 
children did so, and of these 95% were at the village or elementary level.(107) 
The educational replanning proposed in 1946 did little to counter this 
imbalance and in 1962-63 of the 155,347 elementary places available in the 
Sudan some 77% were in the North. Neither were educational opportunities 
evenly spread throughout the South, Equatoria having the lion's share.
In 1962-63 places available in Upper Nile represented only 0.62% of the 
Sudan total. (108)
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TABLE II RECURRENT BUDGET K)R THE SOUTHERN PROVINCES 1951-1952 
REVENUE
On province budget 260,268
On other budgets 24,923
TOTAL £E 285,191
EXPENDITURE
On province budget 788,802
On other budgets
Health (Est.) 500,000
Education (Est.) 405,000
River Services 242,160
Agriculture 25,000
Public works 35,000
Veterinary 20,000
TOTAL £E 2,015,962
Source: Sudan Government , Natural Resources & Development Potential 
in the Southern Provinces of the Sudan , London , 1955 , p.31.
TABLE H I  DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME IOR THE SOUTHERN PROVINCES 1946-1951
Building grants to missions 82,000
Capital to establish Equatoria Projects Board 1,000,000 
Equatoria oil mill 20,000
Katire & Yei seasoning kilns 13,000
Housing for forestry department staff 11,000
Katire sawmill 11,500
Yanbio experimental farm 28,000
Juba: extension to water supply 17,000
Malakal: extension to water supply 8,000
Wau: new water & electricity supply 40,£00
Malakal: extension to electricity supply 13,000
Juba: extension to electricity supply 2,200
Telegraph lines: Runbek-Yirol-Shanbe 11,000
Telegraph lines: Wau-Tonj 10,000
Malakal dairy 3,000
Nutrition investigation in Equatoria 2,300
Allotments for roads in the southern provinces 68,654
£E 1,340,854
Source: Sudan Government , Natural Resources & Development Potential 
in the Southern Provinces of the Sudan , London , 1955 , p. 31
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Part of the new policy was that education in the South be brought into 
line with that of the North. Accordingly some decision had to be made as to 
the language of instruction. The Ministry of Education proposals took
the matter further, and their report of 1951 states 1 an inmediate
start can be made towards making Arabic the conmon language of the whole 
of the Sudan....' (109) The plan was to teach in Arabic from the elementary 
level, but with the shortage of teachers a start was made by introducing 
it at intermediate level. The result was an increasing nmber of Northern 
staff entering the South, and yet another set-back in the standards of 
attainment possible for Southern children. Despite the new proposals 
for education, an examination of sane syllabuses still reflects the old 
paternal attitudes. The Governor-General's report on the Sudan for 1945 
praises the new government boys school at Tonj '... .in which singing, 
sewing and first-aid form part of the curriculum.... ‘(110) and the 1951 
plans included a proposal for a '. .Dinka leatherwork experiment.' (111)
Compared with the North, the health service in the South had received 
its fair share of finance and personnel, but again they tended to be 
heavily concentrated in Equatoria, in response to what the Government 
had seen as the most pressing problems, the control of sleeping Sickness 
and leprosy, and again the service depended a great deal on the efforts 
of missionaries. Hookworm and bilharzia were widely prevalent. Leprosy 
had reached 7% among the Zande. Kala-azar was coirmon in eastern 
Equatoria and filaria in western Equatoria, Malaria accounted for a high 
infant mortality, as did various alimentary disorders. Smallpox and 
measles caused occasional epidemics, and tuberculosis was a growing 
problem. Venereal diseases and yaws affected many people, but perhaps 
the most conmon and most significant condition was the widespread 
malnutrition, resulting in high child mortality, tropical ulcers and 
general debility. In 1948 the Medical Inspector for Equatoria described 
the province as 1...a medical scientists paradise..' (112) In both fields
of economic development and provision of services, the prevailing attitude 
was that the South was a kind of 1 human zoo1. What change was actually 
initiated was too little too late. And was certainly too little to expect 
the inheriting Northern Sudanese administrators to operate successfully, 
or to provide a secure base for the emergent Southern representatives in 
their forthcoming dealings with the North.
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Towards Independence
Events were moving fast in the North and the nationalists were beginning to 
scent victory, with disastrous results for the South. Firstly nationalists 
were determined to gainful dependence at any cost and therefore to disregard 
the gradualist approach desired by the South, and secondly each of the 
Northern political parties was determined to gain support among Southerners. 
In accordance with the first wish, there was no Southern representation at 
the Anglo-Egyptian talks in Cairo in 1953, which decided on a three-year 
transitional period to independence. Northern politicians gave as grounds 
for this exclusion the non-existence of any Southern political party and as 
a response the Southern Party, later to be renamed the Liberal Party, was 
foimed. It remained the sole political party in the South until the 
dissolution of all political parties in 1958. Obviously the Northern 
nationalists did not want any dissenting voice, or any demand for a gradual 
movement towards independence, and so the Southern demands for special 
safeguards were firmly brushed aside.
When it seemed that self-government was imminent, the two main political 
parties in the North, the National Unionist Party (NUP) and the tfama Party, 
competed for Southern support.(113) Although writers such as Beshir have 
tried to excuse the methods employed by these politicians, (114) it must be 
remembered that this was the first experience of Southerners with the 
Northern politicians who were going to control their destiny, and their 
methods cannot have done much to reassure the South as to its future. In 
the period of preparation for the elections of 1953, the South was 
subjected to propaganda from Egypt and the Northern parties. Northern 
politicians were quite prepared to use the historical relationship between 
North and South to gain support. The NUP reminded Southerners that the 
Unma leadership were the decendants of slave traders, while the Unma 
equated the NUP with the hated jellaha. In recent years Northern Sudanese
have blamed the British and the missionaries for the continuation of what
they see as the slavery 'myth', forgetting that the North was quite
prepared to use it when seemingly convenient. (115)
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While the fact that many votes were openly bought was reprehensible, it 
was the wild promises made by politicians which were to prove disastrous.
They gave the inpress ion that Southern participation in the independent 
administration of the Sudan would be in relation to the South's share of 
the population, and the NUP in fact premised forty-seven senior 
administrative posts for Southerners following the British withdrawl. 
Participation in elections in the South was very uneven, falling as low as 
6% in Bor in Upper Nile, but as high as 70% in Jur River South near Wau.(116) 
The first real experience for most Southerners of the kind of relationship 
they were going to have with the North came in October 1954, with the 
results of the Sudanization Ooimiission. Of a total of 800 posts, only six 
were given to the South, the most senior being Assistant District Commissioner. 
Some writers such as Beshir see this result as being in keeping with the 
standards of the civil service, in which seniority, experience and 
qualifications were the important criteria, while others such as Albino 
recount instances of mal-practice.(117) Perhaps the interpretation of 
qualifications could have been wider; given the prevailing mood of the 
country, Southerners were obviously better 'qualified' in a general sense 
to serve in delicate areas that were the majority of Northerners. However 
the blame for the widespread dissatisfaction in the South can only be laid at 
the feet of the NUP, who had come to power in 1953, inasmuch as in their 
'manifesto' they had explicitly stated 'Our approach to the question of 
Sudanization shall always be just and democratic. Not only shall priority 
be always given to southerners in the south, but also shall the employment 
of the southerners be greatly fostered in the north, especially in the 
higher ranks of the Central Government service.... also membership of the 
different Local Government institutions, development committees etc. etc. 
shall be as far as possible in the hands of competent southerners in the 
Southern Provinces. ' (118)
In an atmosphere of growing concern, the Liberal Party met in Juba and 
unanimously decided to demand federal status for the South. Fornier Southern 
supporters of the NUP left and, together with the Liberal Party, decided 
to form a united Southern bloc. The Government's reaction was a clumsy 
attempt to discredit Southern leaders. Of the two Southern Cabinet members, 
one was dismissed and the other resigned, over criticism of the Government's 
policy in the South. The Liberal Party decided to organize another meeting 
in Juba, but the Prime Minister's reaction was to warn the Southern
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politicians that the Government intended to implement the Self- 
Government statute. ' .. .the Government must use all its force and 
strength to execute the Agreement in letter and in spirit; the 
Government shall not be lenient in this respect, it has its army, its 
police and all its might.1 (119) Several Northern administrators in 
the South began to meddle in local politics and to intimidate local leaders. 
A Southern politician was arrested and his trial was followed by mass 
demonstrations. In th^feame month, July 1955, the Equatoria Projects Board 
dismissed seme three hundred workers, at a time as we have seen of wide­
spread dissatisfaction in Zandeland over the low prices offered for cotton 
and the high price of consumer goods. The dismissals also coincided with 
an increase in the number of Northern officials following Sudanization, 
and to the local people it seemed that their livlihood was to be taken 
from than and given to Northerners. Seventy workers in the spinning and 
weaving sheds then demanded higher wages and threatened to strike if their 
demands were not met. A mass demonstration attended by 1,000 people took 
place in Nzara marketplace, and the Northern Assistant District Oonmissioner 
made the fatal error of ordering the Sudan Defence Force troops to open 
fire on the crowd. Eight people were shot dead, and an unknown nuntoer 
injured, lb make matters worse, two Northern merchants had also fired on 
the crowd. According to the Cbramssion of Enquiry into the Southern Sudan 
Disturbances of 1955, r... the incident itself had a bad effect on the minds 
of the Southerners and was regarded by them as the beginning of a war; and 
if there was sone confidence left in the administration, it had then 
dissappeared completely.'(120) After the demonstration, 70 people were 
arrested, more or less at random.
The culmination of all these factors was the mutiny of the Southern Corps 
in August 1955. Cn 14th August orders were given to the No.2 Company 
Southern Corps at Tbrit that they were to be transfered to Khartoum for 
an indefinite period. They were displeased at the news, and after the 
events of July, not unnaturally fearful. On the 18th August they were 
told '. ..if you kill the 24 Northern Officers here, you must remenber 
that there are twelve thousand Northern troops in Khartoum who will come 
and kill you all. In addition if you mutiny there are five hundred 
Northern troops in Juba who would cone to kill you.' (121) This before 
the start of any trouble.
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When told of the threat of mutiny in Torit, the Officer Gomnanding Southern 
Troops insisted that the company must proceed to Khartoum 1 ... for the
prestige and dignity of the Army ' (122) Again we find the same
arrogance and inflexibility on the part of Northerners. As the Commission 
of Enquiry Report indicated 1.. .The prestige of the army, as well as the 
administration in Equatoria, had been lost already- and the decision 
not to alter previous orders and without having or making alternative plans 
shows a reckless disregard to the life and property of other citizens. *(123)
No 2 Cbnpany duly mutinied on the 18th August, broke into the munitions 
store and attacked Northerners, both military and civilian, in Tbrit. News 
of the mutiny soon spread and Northerners and their property were attacked 
in Kapoeta, Katire, Terekaka, Tali, Yei, Loka, Lainya, Kajo-Kaji, Amadi,
Iba, Mundri, Khor Pul us, Fangak, Akobo, Ganbela, Meridi, Yairbio., Nzara, 
Malakal and Runbek. A total of 336 people were killed, 75 of than 
Southerners, and there was complete disorder for more than two weeks. 
Throughout the disturbances, no attacks were made on the remaining British 
personnel. (124) In the first few days of the mutiny, the mutineers 
showed their misunderstanding of the situation, by repeatedly calling for 
British intervention, not yet realizing that the British could no longer 
assist them, and that they would now have to face the realities of their 
relationship with the North.
The OomnLssion of Enquiry Report listed most of the events leading up to 
the mutiny already listed here, and in addition it mentioned other factors 
as contributing to the loss of confidence. The attitude of Northern 
traders towards the Southern people was generally arrogant and the habit of 
refering to them as abid3 or slaves, was widespread. With the introduction 
of many Northerners to take over from the British, the traders had 
attempted to interfere with the administration, and the administrators had, 
in some cases, shown favouritism towards their fellow Northerners, and 
failed to maintain the exemplary conduct required. In addition many 
Northern administrators had already tried to change the established 
practices of the people.(125)
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Gradually order was restored, but many of the mutineers had disappeared 
into the bush, and would later emerge as the nucleus of a guerrilla force. 
The Southern representatives in Khartoum were powerless to alter the 
situation and in fact in December 1955 they backed the resolution for the 
declaration of the independence of the Sudan on 1st January, 1956 on the 
understanding that the independence government would give Southern demands 
for federation ' full consideration1. By July 1956 the Government was in 
the hands of the Umma Party - People's Democratic Party - Liberal Party 
coalition and one of its first acts was to set up a forty-six man 
Constitutional Committee, to prepare a draft constitution. The three 
Southern members of the committee carried no weight, and Mahgoub, the new 
Prime Minister, declared that the Government had ’.. .given the Southern 
claim for federation a very serious consideration, and found that it could 
not work in this country.'(126)
So after only one year of independence, it seemed that the worst fears of 
the South were being fulfilled. They had found representation in Khartoum 
to be hopelessly ineffective and Northern administration in the South to 
be increasingly repressive. In a very short time the North had alienated 
both the Southern intelligentsia and the Southern people, and both were 
provided with a reason to oppose and fear the North and Northerners. The 
Northerners for their part had been amazingly high-handed and irresponsible, 
in a period that called for tact above all else. Although Beshir apportions 
the blame to the British, the missionaries and the Southern politicians, 
the fact remains that the period 1950-1956 provided the Southerners with 
their first experience of how Northerners would act towards them, and it is 
hard to find evidence of their actions having been other than dishonest, 
arrogant and contemptuous. (127)
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Conclusion
The effects of the short period of British administration on the Southern 
Sudan, and on the prospects for the development of a post-independence 
integrated state, can be summarized quite simply. Certainly the British 
had pacified the South, but at the same time they had compartmentalized 
it and reinforced its traditional divisions. They had put an end to the 
devastation of the South by forces frcm the North, but at the same time 
they had produced a state of isolation far greater than that attributed 
to purely physical factors. They had conserved, and indeed often 
re-established, traditional society, but they had also simultaneously 
superimposed a veneer of European culture in teims of religion, education 
and language. They had debarred all outside influences which they 
considered to be harmful, but they had also debarred innovation and 
therefore the development of receptivity to innovation. They had maintained 
a completely artificial economy and employed a protective policy to 
camouflage an unwillingness or inability to invest. They had accepted full 
responsibility for administration and stultified the development of the 
simplest foims of modem political expression or competence.
By this policy of isolation, and an overwhelming desire to protect the 
South, they had entrenched the hostility the Southerners felt towards the 
North. Instead of permitting contact between the two cannunities under a 
system of control, which might have permitted the development of under­
standing, they had separated them and permitted the resentment to grow and 
eventually acquire the potency of a legend. In the original Southern Policy 
they insulted the North and patronized the South, with the result that the 
North was determined to regain control of the South and that the patronizing 
attitude to Southerners was legitimized. In misjudging the political 
climate of the whole of the Middle East, they placed the South in an 
impossible position and the preparation for independence was a shabby attempt 
to make the best of a bad situation.
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If we refer back to our original criteria in the development of secession 
movements, we see that by the achievement of independence in 1956 the first 
five criteria had been fulfilled. The loyalty of the Southerners was only 
to the South, if in fact for the majority it extended beyond the immediate 
social group. As in Biafra and Eritrea, there was an initial willingness 
to participate in a larger unit, but this was very soon felt to be a 
mistake and was followed almost immediately after independence by an 
unwillingness to extend loyalty to the new nation state.
There was a history of resentment towards the North that had been entrenched 
and reinforced by the British administration, and was now exhibited as a 
fear of domination. There was a sense of deprivation throughout the 
Southern economy, from demands for higher wages to demands for the large-scale 
development that had occurred in the North, There was a lack of social 
infrastructure, both in terms of quantity and quality, which made it 
impossible for Southerners to conpete in a united Sudan; inappropriate 
education had led to a shortage of qualified manpower and to inadequate 
representation at the national level. And, as we have seen, there were 
the very potent factors of race, language and religion to motivate the 
people.
In the next chapter we shall see how the policies of the military 
government of Abboud exacerbated an already dangerous situation and 
resulted in demands for secession and a threat to the territorial 
integrity of the Sudan.
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CHAPTER V 
THE THREAT TO TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY 
Early Policies for Nation Building
The military regime of President Abboud, which came to power in. 1958, 
was essentially authoritarian, and was accordingly convinced that the 
problem of the Southern Sudan could be solved, firstly by a programme 
of arabization and political repression, and secondly by military might.
As part of the programme of arabization and Islamization, both seen as 
necessary pre-requisites for national unity, a number of Koranic schools 
were established in the South and Islamic teachers appointed. Six 
intermediate Islamic institutes were opened in Juba, Kadok, Wau, Meridi,
Yei and Raga, and Friday became the official day of rest. Northern 
administrators and military personnel were expected to further the spread 
of Islam, and again the Southern people had to be prepared to change their 
names if they were effectively to deal with the administration. The use 
of Arabic as the medium of instruction throughout the education system 
meant that many Southern sub-grade school teachers were to lose their jobs.
Many schools were closed because of a subsequent shortage of staff and 
several schools were bodily transferred and re-sited in the North.
In addition to encouraging the spread of Islam, measures were taken to 
disrupt the Christian Church in the South. In 1961 all religious gatherings 
for prayer, except those taking place in a recognized church, as opposed 
to a school hall, were banned, and an increasing number of missionaries 
were not allowed to return to the South after home leave. In 1964 the 
Ministry of the Interior announced the expulsion of all Christian 
missionaries from the Southern Sudan, with the accusation that they had 
insisted on breaking the law, despite the super-human patience of the 
government. 'We have been observing for a long time and with unfailing patience 
the activities of these foreigners in those areas. Sometimes we forgive and
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other times we feel ourselves compelled to warn, but unfortunately they 
mistook our tolerance for weakness, our forgiveness for hesitation and 
our leniency for cowardice. We have waited and waited; but there was no 
hope that they would resort to reason .... it has beccme very obvious that 
their disruptive activities might threaten the integrity and stability 
of the country. It is sad to say that these people were not grateful and 
did not appreciate the generous treatment and the good opportunities made 
available to them by this country.' (1) The announcement went on to say 
that every citizen has the right to religious freedom and that the 
government would enable Southerners to take over from the missionaries; 
however, with few native clergy the Christian Church in the South was hard 
hit and, in addition to losing spiritual guidance, was also to lose the 
other educational and health services the missionaries had provided. 
According to the Memorandum of the Southern Front presented to the OAU 
in 1966, parental permissions for the baptisn of all under eighteen years 
had to be signed in the presence of government representatives, all too 
often unwilling or .unavailable. (2) However in 1961 the Department of 
Religious Affairs proposed to spend £S100,000 on the building of mosques 
in the South. (3) Demonstrations in protest at these measures, whether 
by children or adults, were met by harsh punishment or imprisonment. 
Christian missionaries were allowed to continue educational work in the 
North.
The process of arabization was not accompanied by any real economic 
development, and even those schemes that had been promised for the South
T
were transferred to sites in the North. The plans for sugar production at 
Mbngalla were abandoned in favour of similar schemes at Guneid and Kashm 
El Girba. The Malakal fish canning plant was forgotten in favour of one 
at Jebel Aulia, just outside Khartoum, and plans for a paper factory at 
Malakal and a meat canning plant in Bahr El Ghazal came to nothing. In 
fairness it must be remonbered that areas in the far west and in eastern 
Sudan suffered the same neglect. To the central government the Gezira model 
of large-scale production under irrigation was seen as the successful 
model, as to some extent it still is now. Expenditure on development and
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services was concentrated in the core area around Khartoum, and in addition
the politically unpopular resettlement of the Nubians to allow for the
building of the Aswan High Dam necessitated increased expenditure on the
resettlement areas of Kashm El Girba and New Haifa. However these factors
did nothing to allay the fears of Southerners, who saw these chances of
development and employment slip frcm their grasp, at a time when Northerners
were gaining an increasing hold in local administration. Many Southern
A
junior government personnel were transfered to work in the North, were they 
could be better supervised, and recruitment of Southerners into all 
government departments was severely curtailed. The prevailing attitude was 
that, after the mutiny, no Southerner could be trusted. There was an almost 
complete cessation of recruitment of Southerners into the arm/, the police 
and the prison services. More than 75% of the police for the Southern 
provinces were recruited in Blue Nile, Kordofan and Darfur, and in the ten 
years from 1959-1969 only ten Southerners were recruited into the army. (4) 
Provincial Councils were introduced to provide a medium for discussion 
in the South, but the accompanying Executive Councils were completely 
controlled by Northern administrators and residents.(5)
Demands for Secession
To many people in the North the suspension of parliamentary government 
enabled firm measures to be taken in the South, which the previous political 
climate would not have allowed, and they readily endorsed the aim of the 
Abboud government to seek a military solution. However the problem proved 
to be more difficult than they imagined and the army's repressive measures, 
instead of controlling the situation, tended to confirm the worst fears of 
the Southerners, and to intensify the mutual distrust. The policy of 
repression allied to that of arabization created an ideal climate for the 
escalation of the conflict. As we have noted earlier, although the racial, 
ethnic, linguistic and religious factors are not necessarily central to the 
problem of secession, they are very potent factors in the process of 
motivating the people. Without the use of force it seems likely that the 
arabization of the South would gradually have been canpleted, over a long 
period of time. However the policy of arabization allied to the use of force, 
determined the Southern people to reject, not only the control and govern­
ment of the Northerners but also their language, religion and culture.
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As a result a high degree of cohesion and motivation to fight against 
Khartoum was based on the attribute of being non-Arab. Here we must 
mention that numbers of Southern Muslims, while embracing Islam, were just 
as fervent in their distrust of Khartoum as were their Animist brothers, 
and if one examines the oral literature of the Southern people at this time 
it is evident that the resentment of the Southerners for the Northerner is 
based more on the treatment of one by another, rather than on a passionate 
hatred of Islam. (6) Unlike the Northerner, the Southerner shows a much 
greater degree of religious tolerance, as indeed he must if he is to live 
happily within his own group, which consists of Animists of various kinds, 
Christians and Muslims. His prime objection was not to the existence 
of Islam in the South, but to the government which sought to force Islam 
upon him. It is also important to note here a very basic difference 
between the North and the South. In the North politics were unavoidably 
linked with religion, whereas in the South religion had played very little 
part in political activity.
The whole of the Sudan was, of course, to suffer from the restrictions on
political freedom, but in the South, as Bechtold has noted, the policies
of the Abboud regime '... had the effect of coalescing hitherto disunited
factions into a relatively common front.'(7) Southern politicians,
liberals and intellectuals, faced with the threat of Imprisonment, began
leaving the Sudan in considerable numbers in the early sixties and in 1962
combined to form the Sudan African Closed Districts National Union, later
simplified to the Sudan African National Union (SANU). The inmediate alms
of the movement were to publicize the situation in the Sudan by petitions
to the United Nations and articles in the press, to raise funds, and to
organize guerrilla attacks within the South. It was from this group that
the first call for secession of the Southern Sudan was heard. They had
£
listened in vain to the premises of succesive governments, while the real 
situation in the South grew steadily worse. Their suggestions for a 
system of power sharing, consideration of their particular problems, or 
federation, had been constantly brushed aside since the Juba Conference.
They had seen the futility of Southern representation in Khartoum, where 
Southern politicians became mere adjuncts to the main Northern political 
parties, and determined that their goal would be nothing short of separation 
and their means would if necessary be violent.
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Accordingly the scattered guerrilla forces became the Anya Nya In 1963, 
and plans were made for a series of attacks in September of that year.
Police and army posts were attacked in Equatoria and Upper Nile, and in 
January 1964 an offensive was mounted against Wau, the capital of Bahr 
El Ghazal. Initially there was little coordination of the Anya Nya forces, 
who tended to be split into small groups supporting a local leader and 
owing allegiance to no particular political party. Their inability to 
cooperate across tribal lines was the greatest obstacle to military success, 
but of course the nature of the terrain contributed to conmunication 
difficulties. The Anya Nya cannot be said to have had any overriding 
political philosophy apart from a general hatred of the North, and in fact 
they developed an increasing disdain for Southern politicians of all
t
persuasions. In this way a fundamental division of Southern leaders occut’ed.
The exiled politicians disdained those who chose to work from within; those
in Khartoum considered those in exile to be hopelessly out of touch with
the situation, and those who remained in the South to fight with the
-i-i
guerrillas distrusted all policians. This division over war-time credibility 
has continued into the period of peace. To estimate the number of Anya Nya 
fighting at any one time is difficult, with governments determined to 
represent them as a small bunch of ill-trained bandits. However, at the 
end of the conflict in 1972, a total of 15,842 presented themselves as (8) 
ex-Anya Nya for consideration for absorption into the People ’ s Aimed forces.
In some areas the Anya Nya were actively supported by the local people, and 
a rudimentary foim of administration with an educational system existed, 
while in others the people lived as much in fear of the guerrillas as of 
the central government forces. The pattern of war was one of intermittent 
guerrilla attacks resulting in somewhat indiscriminate retaliation. As one 
would expect, there were countless accounts of atrocities having been 
ccnmitted by both sides, such is the nature of civil war; however, at this 
stage it is neither possible nor particularly helpful to try and 
substantiate such accounts. If one examines the propaganda issued by each 
side during the struggle one finds the expected extreme positions: the 
central government maintaining that an irresponsible band of rebels was 
terrorizing the countryside, while the Southern politicians accused the 
Sudan Government of genocide. (9) The population of the Southern Sudan was
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to suffer a great deal. Not only were many people killed in the actual 
hostilities, but many others were to die of starvation or disease 
following the complete breakdown of the economy and the public health system.
Guerrilla Warfare and Geographical Considerations
During the 1960's the guerrilla struggle intensified and it will be useful 
at this stage to consider the war in terms of the sixth of our original 
criteria for the development of secession movements - the strictly 
geographical considerations. The single most important factor was the 
sheer size of the Sudan, nearly a million square miles with thousands of 
miles of border. To defend such a vast area would put a considerable strain 
on any military force. In addition to the problem of sheer size there was 
the problem of comnunications. Khartoum is more than a thousand miles 
from Juba, and while one might cover the distance by air in about one hour, 
the supply route via rail and river could easily take from fifteen to 
twenty days through inhospitable territory inpossible to police. Having 
completed the journey to Juba, it was still some 194 miles to Kapoeta, 323 
to Yambio and 500 miles to Wau. Even after the extension of the railway 
system to Wau it might still be a journey of several days from Khartoum 
and the single track was overloaded and very vulnerable to guerrilla attack. 
Having arrived at Wau, it was still sane 190 miles to Runbek and over 200 
miles to Raga,
Once the government forces had left the relatively advanced modes of 
transport such as air, rail and river, they were very much at the mercy of 
the guerrillas. It must be remembered that the road system left by the 
British administration was only rudimentary and had received little 
attention since 1955. There were no metalled roads in the Southern Sudan 
and the graded surfaces soon broke up under the strain of heavy military 
vehicles. Neither were there many bridges. Those across minor streams 
soon collapsed or were destroyed, and in the 1960's the only bridge across 
the Nile south of that at Jebel Aulia, just outside Khartoum, was the
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antequated bridge at Kosti, nine hundred miles north of Juba. At Wau, 
Malakal and Juba transportation across the Jur, the White Nile and the Bahr 
El Jebel was by snail inefficient ferry boat. River transport had not 
been effectively modernized since the 19301 s and struggled against the 
hazards of silting, sharp meanders and the water hyacinth.
All modes of transport were affected by the seasons. In the rainy season 
the railway track was often washed away, many landing strips were unusable 
and flying was generally hazardous, and the old river boats;; had to struggle 
against the high-water current. However the roads were affected most.
In Equatoria scxne roads were all-season, but in seme areas of Bahr El 
Ghazal and Upper Nile all motor movement came to a virtual halt for up 
to six months. Even with the capability to forego the use of roads, the 
terrain was difficult with large areas of flooding; coordination of movement 
was problematic with bad communications and a lack of accurate maps. With 
this system of comnunications the Central Government had to transport men, 
equipment, food and fuel. The physical difficulties alone were sufficient 
to keep an army of approximately eighteen thousand men quite literally 
'bogged down' in the Southern Sudan. (10) In addition to bad communications 
and inappropriate technology, the Central Government were faced with other 
difficulties. To the majority of their forces, raised in the deserts of 
the North, the terrain was strange and hostile. With little real training 
in the difficult art of counter-insurgency, they were faced with the task 
of distinguishing guerrilla fighters from innocent civilians. Perhaps 
understandably, their morale was low, discipline left a lot to be desired, 
and they resorted to more and more repressive measures, where what was 
needed was supreme tact. Unable to effectively police the areas on the 
ground, they resorted to increasingly indiscriminate air attack.
However, for the Anya Nya, the terrain presented all the advantages of 
the classic guerrilla situation. It was peripheral to the state core, 
at the end of a long and difficult line of supply for the government. They 
had an intimate knowledge of what was their hone ground, and its appalling 
communication system was appropriate to the level of technology at their 
disposal. As well as local knowledge, they also had local support in terms
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of cover, food and family; and the inaccessiblity of the swamps of Upper 
Nile or the forests of the Imatong Mountains provided excellent locations 
for tenporary Anya Nya camps. Their position was surrounded by five states 
who tacitly spported their cause for most of the seventeen-year war, 
providing a heme for civilian refugees, safe havens for training camps and 
moral support. The line of supply from Kenya and Uganda was relatively 
easy, and in Nairobi and Kampala the guerrillas had access to modem 
methods of communication, social services, markets and media, far in 
advance of what was available in Khartoum.
Away from the main towns, the Central Government forces were extremely 
vulnerable. It was relatively easy for the Anya Nya to destroy bridges 
and mine roads. Initially the guerrillas captured arms from besieged 
Government forces, but later were able to purchase or confiscate arms 
from forces fleeing the Orientale Rebellion in the Congo in 1963. With an 
increase in publicity and outside involvement, arms and training became 
available and by the late 1960 's the Anya Nya could claim to control much 
of the rural areas, Although it is unlikely that the Anya Nya could ever 
have claimed an outright victory, the purely geographical factors meant 
that the war became, and continued to be, one which neither side could win.
At this point it is useful to turn from the attitudes of politicians, 
intelligentsia and guerrillas, to those of the ordinary people of the South. 
The reaction of the majority was absolutely clear: they rejected 
government by Khartoum. As their forefathers had retreated from the 
slave raiders, the Mahdists^ and to a certain extent from the British, so 
they retreated from government administration. An estimated two-thirds 
of a million people left their homes and villages, many of than moving 
farther into the bush, away from the roads and the government forces.
Others congregated in the main urban areas, in search of food and in a vain 
effort to avoid being caught in the cross-fire of the conflict. But many 
'seceded1 from the Sudan and the conflict and sought refuge in neighbouring 
countries. What had begun as a trickle after the 1955 mutiny grew into a 
flood and by 1972 an estimated third of a million people were living 
outside the Sudan. (11) The majority fled to Uganda, Zaire, Ethiopia and 
others to Kenya and the Central African Republic, In some areas they 
were accommodated in special refugee camps under the management of the
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United Nations High Corrmission for Refugees (UNHCR); in others they 
moved to join their relatives on the other side of the borders. Conditions 
in the countryside and in the refugee camps were generally bad with 
widespread shortages of food, medical supplies and educational facilities.
As a result of these population movements the economy of the Southern 
Sudan was almost totally disrupted. Not only were the majority of modern 
establishments closed, but the traditional agricultural economy was severely 
hit. Where crops were produced they were often destroyed by army forces, 
and the killing or confiscation of cattle was conmonplace. The existence of 
such a large number of refugees necessarily involved a variety of inter­
national organizations and the Red Cross, World Health Organization, church 
organizations and charitable bodies such as Gxfam worked among the refugees.
The Return to Democracy and Constitutional Debate
By September 1964 the Abboud government was begin ing to recognize the 
magnitude of the problem in the South and accordingly established a 
Oonmission of Enquiry to investigate the situation. The very establishment 
of the Oonmission was seen as an admission of the government's failure 
by the Northern intelligentsia, civil servants, trade unionists and religious 
brotherhoods who were fast becoming disenchanted with the military regime. 
Debate at the University of Khartoum grew into mass demonstrations in many 
urban centres and a general strike paralysed all commercial activity. On 29th 
October 1964 Abboud was forced to capitulate to the strikers and civilian 
leaders and the military regime came to an end. However the fall of the 
military regime was the result of this disenchantment of the Northern elite. 
The situation in the South was the means and not the cause and, as we shall 
see, although the following regimes made some concessions to Southern demand^ 
their attitudes remained basically intransient.
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The Transitional Government, empowered to rule until elections could be 
held, immediately recognised the need to re-establish some measure of 
confidence in the South, and the Cabinet, under the leadership of Sir 
El Khatim El Khalifa, included two Southern ministers. In addition 
the Transitional Government promised rapid 'Southernization' of adminis­
tration in the South, the release of political prisioners, and negotiation 
with the exiled politicians. In accordance with this policy a Round Table 
Conference opened in Khartoum on 16th March, 1965. It is not within the 
scope of this thesis to examine the workings of the Conference in detail, 
but rather to describe the main indicators which had an effect upon 
subsequent events.
What was most evident, even then, was the growing division among Southern 
politicians and how tenuous were their claims to represent Southern opinion. 
SANU had long been divided into two rival groups, one wing being prepared 
to work within the Sudan from 1965, to cooperate with the Central 
Government, and prepared to accept some kind of regional autonomy or 
federal solution. The other SANU wing, operating from outside the Sudan, 
showed continued hostility to successive Central Governments, and worked 
actively towards independence for the South. The Southern Front was 
founded in 1965 by civil servants and students within the Sudan, many of 
them living in Khartoum. Although the Southern Front worked within the 
country, its cooperation with Central Governments was limited and its 
demands for self-determination for the South were seen as being in the 
final analysis the same as those of SANU outside, in that a plebiscite 
in the South would almost certainly have resulted in a call for complete 
separation. The Sudan Unity Party was formed in 1964 by a former Southern 
minister in the Abboud regime. It stood for a united Sudan and was noted 
for its extreme conservative views. Other veteran Southern politicians 
either attempted to form their own parties or act as individuals by allying 
themselves with Northern parties; but none could be said to have had much 
credibility and certainly none had much active support in the Southern 
Sudan.
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Division continued to characterize the Southern politicians, especially 
among those outside the country, and the years between 1965 and 1970 
saw the formation of the Azania Liberation Front, the Nile Republic 
Provisional Government, the Anyidi Revolutionary Government, the Sue 
River Republic and the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement. The pro­
liferation of parties and governments seemed more to reflect the need 
for everyone to have an official position, rather than a number of 
differing policies and viewpoints. SANU (inside) and the Southern Front 
could claim most support In the Sudan, but both were characterised by 
severe organizational shortcomings; they did however contribute the 
majority of the Southern delegates to the Round Table Conference. Together 
they proposed that the people of the South be given the opportunity to 
chose between federation, unity with the North, or separation.
The plebiscite was to be held under independent supervision and various 
security conditions complied with, to make an impartial outcome possible.(12) 
With the rejection of the plebiscite, the Southern Front and Sanu (inside) 
proposed as a substitute formula the complete Southernization of the 
administration, the control by the South of its finance, foreign affairs, 
armed forces and internal security and the establishment of a system of 
ccmnon services with a council of ministers in which there would be a 
fifty percent Southern representation. (13)
Compared with the division among the Southerners, the Northern politicians 
were unanimous in at least one respect: with an eye to the forthcoming 
elections, none of them was prepared to even discuss the idea of separation. 
In much the same kind of atmosphere that had prevailed at the time of the 
Cotran Commission in 1956, the Northerners were mainly concerned 
with apportioning blame. They blamed the British, the missionaries and, 
most conveniently, the military regime of Abboud, but were not quite so 
forthcoming with solutions to the problem
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In a proposal to the conference the six Northern parties insisted on 
the sovereign entity of the country, and while recognising the need 
for some degree of decentralization, could see ' .no place in the Sudan 
for a federal system of government. ' (14) The reasons put forward for 
the rejection of federation were economic, financial, the fear of 
regional inequalities, and the danger of separatism and civil war. They 
proposed a form of regional government under which an executive council 
would handle the day-to-day affairs. At the centre, parliamentary seats 
would be available to the South irjfcroportion to the pojnilation, with 
three Southern ministers and, where possible, a degree of 'Southernization' 
of local government. Commissions would be established to examine the 
problems of economic development and public service. It was not surprising 
that the Southern delegates should reject the proposals. They had, after 
all, been promised as much on various other occasions, never to see the 
proposals implemented. In addition, the Northern delegates saw as an 
urgent measure for the implement at ion of the proposals the cessation of 
violence, something which none of the participants of the Conference could 
control. The Northern parties would not countenance the removal of the 
army from the South, and neither of the Southern parties had any real 
control of the Anya Nya.
After two weeks, the Conference ended with few concrete achievements.
The resolution signed by all participants did admittedly deal with 
some of the everyday problems, such as the Southernization of the admin - 
instration, education and religious freedom, but it failed to find a 
solution to the major problem, the future constitutional and administrative 
framework of the Sudan. True there was a tacit agreement to reject the 
two extreme positions - the maintenance of the status quo and complete 
separation - but as the champions of separation (SANU outside) 
had not been represented, it was in the short term at least a somewhat 
meaningless agreement, as was the undertaking to '... .end hostilities in 
two months time. ' (15) Perhaps tie main achievement was that public opinion 
in the North began to see the problem in its true perspective, as a complex 
constitutional issue, rather than as simply the control of a few 
rebellious factions.
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A twelve man committee was set up to consider these constitutional 
issues within a framework that would ..protect the special interest 
of the South as well as the general interest of the Sudan.1 (16) The 
committee was immediately faced with much the same problems as had 
confronted the conference. The Southern Front members objected to the 
presence of the SANU (Inside) members in that they did not consider thorn 
representative of Southern opinion. However when a delegate from 
SANU (Outside) arrived from Kampala the Northern members would not 
recognize him as long as SANU (Outside) continued with a policy of 
separation. The Sudan Unity Party applied for representation but was 
also rejected. It was to take almost two months for the committee to 
be constituted.
In discussion of the state of security in the South, the representatives 
of the People's Democratic Party and the Communist Party accused the 
Southern parties of being responsible for the continued violence and 
suggested that the committee condemn the activities of the Anya Nya.
When this suggestion was rejected they withdrew their members. Both 
Northern and Southern members condemned the violence but could not agree 
on where the responsibility lay, and were in any case virtually powerless 
to control it. The coalition government of Mahjoub, which had came to 
power in June 1965, refused to implement the resolutions of the Conference 
until peace was restored, while the Southern parties saw the implementation 
of the resolutions as the only basis for the restoration of law and order.
The deliberations on a constitutional framework were also beset with 
problems. Schemes suggested by the Southern Front and the Islamic Charter 
Front were rejected as demands for the two unacceptable extremes of 
separation or the maintenance of the status quoA but eventually agreement 
was reached on a scheme for the redistribution of power. National defence, 
external affairs, currency, communications, foreign trade, nationality, 
customs and inter-regional trade were to remain the concern of the Central 
Government. Security, education, public health, antiquities and labour were 
to be managed concurrently between the Centre and the Region, and certain 
day-to-day affairs, such as local government, information, tourism, road 
maintenance and urban planning, agricultural development according to 
national plans, cultural development, commerce and local industry were 
to be in the sole power of the Region.
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The Regional government m s  to consist of an elected assembly and an 
executive council to be headed by an individual appointed through a joint 
process involving Centre and Region. However the Central Parliament 
would reserve the right to overule the Regional assembly in the national 
interest or to dissolve it in times of emergency.
There m s  however sane disagreement as to exactly what area would 
constitute the 'Region', The Northern parties wished to decentralize 
government to the existing provinces, creating from them nine regions.
While the Southern parties were prepared to accept the creation of East,
West and North regions in the North, they insisted that the South should 
remain a single unit composed of three Southern provinces, and that the 
delimitation of the region should carry sufficient political weight to 
ensure the effectiveness of the guarantees for the protection of autonomy. 
Under the Northern scheme, a divided South would be devoid of influence 
at the Centre.
Although neither the Round Table Conference nor the deliberations of the 
Twelve Man Committee could be termed a success, they were both to prove 
very useful exercises. Firstly, many of the delegates gained some 
negotiating experience, especially the Southerners, and secondly both sides 
came to realize that despite the continued existence of seemingly 
insurmountable differences, there m s  in fact a good deal on which they 
could agree. Unfortunately events outside the committee rocm made either 
the adoption of the agreed principles or their implementation extremely 
unlikely.
The period from 1965 to 1969 was one of great confusion in Sudanese 
politics. Government was shared by a series of coalitions, none of which 
m s  able to hold power for very long. With a state of emergency operating 
over a large part of the country, elections were hardly representative. The 
degree of political fragmentation that had developed is best illustrated by 
the 1968 election in which no fewer than twenty-six parties fielded cand­
idates, in addition to those classified as independent or non-identified.
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Of these twenty-six as many as thirteen gained one or more seats, and 
for the first time parties in the North started to reflect purely 
regional interests, with the emergence of the Beja Congress, the Western 
Sudan Union and the Nuba Mountains Federation. (17) Southern politicians 
in the Khartoum Parliament tried a variety of alliances in order to affect 
government policy on the South, but with little success. Parliament was 
almost completely pre-occupied with its own internecine strife, and policies 
towards the South remained much the same - constitutional discussion in 
Khartoum accompanied by increased military repression in the South. In 1965 
Prime Minister Mahjoub had declared that the government would end the 
policy '... .of appeasement and leniency in dealing with the outlaws and 
those who support them. It will order complete disbandment of arms, and 
end completely the fanatic bands that play with security. It will order 
the army to follow the criminals, return the state to law and order, and 
punish the mutineers.' (18) Increased army action provided even greater 
motivation for the guerrilla forces, and the conflict accordingly escalated. 
Not only were no firm proposals for change coming from Khartoum, but 
suggestions were being made about constitutional reform that served only 
to increase their fear and apprehension.
In 1967 the National Constitution Commission was established and although 
it was an all-party commission great pressure was exerted by the more 
traditional elements for the adoption of an Islamic Constitution with the 
Sudan as a unitary state based on Islam, speaking Arabic, and subject to 
Sharia or traditional Islamic law. The only means of protest available 
to Southern representatives on the commission was the negative gesture of 
withdrawal. However the Northern parties could not agree on a suitable 
foimat and the matter was shelved.
The party infighting during the period 1964-1969 had had disastrous effects 
upon the whole country. There had been almost total neglect of major 
national problems. The balance of trade had steadily decreased with 
reserves falling from £S61 million in 1964 to £S14 million by May 1969, 
with foreign debts reaching an all-time high at £S91 million. Despite
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an increase in the bureaucracy of more than 50% there was widespread 
unemployment, and the ordinary man suffered terribly from the rate of 
inflation. While the situation in the capital was bad, that in the 
rural areas had become critical, and there was widespread shortage of 
essential commodities. The situation in the South had worsened and 
merely maintaining the status quo was eating further and further into 
the reserves. The annual cost of the war in 1966 was estimated at about 
£S20 million. (19) Among the most disappointed and disillusioned 
were the relatively left-wing and progressive politicians who had 
welcomed the October Revolution so warmly, and it came as no real surprise 
that they should combine with a group of young army officers and take 
over power in May 1969.
International Considerations
In common with other African states faced with a threat to territorial 
integrity, the Sudan maintained that the conflict in the Southern Sudan 
was essentially an internal affair, but with such a large number of 
refugees involved the problem was soon to develop an international 
aspect. In chapter one, the last of our original criteria for the 
formation of secession movements was stated to be the expectation of 
international support and subsequent economic survival in the world on 
independence. In the case of the Southern Sudan, however, this 
support did not really materialize. The following reasons can be 
suggested. In the 1960's the Southern Sudan was not considered as being 
of any real strategic importance, and also presented no prospect of economic 
gain to any possible participant. The leadership in the Southern Sudan, 
if such it could be termed, was so hopelessly splintered as to discourage 
outside involvement. It also lacked any concrete ideological basis with 
which to attract support and, most important, looked unlikely to gain 
a meaningful victory.
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Accordingly there were present none of the factors likely to precipitate 
international involvement, especially at a time when both the United 
States and Russia and the former colonial powers had had their fingers 
badly burned in Katanga and Biafra, and were in any case concentrating 
their attention on South East Asia and the Middle East. Compared with 
our other African exanples - Katanga, Biafra and Eritrea - international 
involvement was minimal, and the Southern politicians were correct in 
terming the conflict 'Africa’s forgotten war.’ Rather than becoming 
the centre of potential confrontation, the conflict was peripheral to the 
arguments of others, as a result there was little consistent meaningful 
support, but rather a degree of meddling by other countries, largely for 
their own ends.
Among non-African states, only Israel provided military support to the 
South, a small number of Southern Sudanese receiving training in Israel, 
However Israel was more concerned to keep fifteen thousand Northern 
Sudanese troops involved in the Southern Sudan - troops which could 
alternatively have been diverted to the Egyptian front.
Among African states there was, understandably, a desire not to become 
involved. As we saw in chapter one in the case of Eritrea, by the late 
1960’s African states had accepted the Western concept of the
organization of space, with general support for the respect of sovereignty, 
and a strict policy of non-intervention. They associated secession, not 
only with the threat to their own territorial integrity, but with potential 
metropolitan reassertion or international involvement beyond their control. 
The re tively low military capability of African states is also a factor
A
to be remembered.
Although some of Sudan's neighbours covertly assisted the Southern Sudanese, 
it was not so much from a belief in the justice of their cause, but rather 
as part of their own disagreements with Khartoum. During the 1960’s 
Sudan's relations with Ethiopia had been consistently strained, firstly
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over the disputed border, the location of which Ethiopia refused to accept, 
and secondly over the civil war in Eritrea. Ethiopia accused the Sudan of 
harbouring rebels in the Eritrean refugee camps in Eastern Sudan, and of 
allowing the smuggling of arms through the Sudan to Eritrean forces. To 
counter this situation, Ethiopia supported exiled Southern politicians 
in Addis Ababa and allowed than to work among Sudanese refugees in the 
Gantoela district. Similarly the Chad Government, faced with insurrection 
in the north, accused the Sudan in 1966 of assisting Arab rebels and 
allowing than to operate from Darfur. (20) The obvious counter to 
Khartoum's involvement in their affairs was to tacitly support the 
Southern cause. Uganda, Kenya and the Central African Republic, while 
agreeing with the Sudan not to encourage subversion, were certainly not 
in a position to control it, and were faced with the not inconsiderable 
problan of thousands of Sudanese refugees under their care. And in the 
case of Uganda and Kenya, their own position vis-a-vis ethnic minorities 
and disaffected areas was and still remains delicate in the extreme.
While there was little active top-level international involvement in the 
civil war,then, what we might term ’second-level involvement’ was certainly 
present. This second level consisted of the various international agencies 
and charitable bodies working in the fields of health, education, and 
religion among the refugees. However, they too had needed to reassess their 
position following criticism during the Nigerian civil war, and as a result 
had become very much more circumspect. Neither was there the same kind of 
militancy in the Christian Church to provide active support of the kind 
that the Eritreans were able to attract from the world of Islam. In general 
the rest of the world remained disinterested; there was little or nothing 
to be gained from involvement. Although Southern politicians toured 
the Western World in hopes of finding friends and funds, the response 
was negligible. Eew people were really even aware of the existence of 
the Sudan, never mind its most remote coiner.
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The implications of the international position of the Northern Sudan 
were, of course, of great significance, with its strong identification 
with Islam and Arab ism, its membership of the Arab League and flirtations 
with the idea of federation with Egypt, Libya and Syria. Although Khartoum 
regimes claimed to be good Africans, their prime loyalty was always to 
the Arab world, amd while they could expect moral and military support 
from Libya, Egypt and latterly the USSR, they were protected against 
outside interference by African states’ lack of capability and policies 
of non-intervention.
In chapter one we decided that a secession movement must conceive of 
economic survival once it gains independence, and although from a European 
perspective the future of an independent Southern Sudan could certainly 
not have looked promising in the 1960’s, we must rather endeavour to see 
the prospect from an African point of view. To the Southern politicians 
demanding secession, the economic situation on independence could not 
possibly be as bad as it was during the years of neglect and destruction. 
They were aware of the difficulties afforded by their geographical position, 
but confident of the co-operation of East Africa. They were also aware 
of the tremendous agricultural potential of the area, and of course could 
point to the continued survival of the very much more disadvantaged land­
locked states such as Chad, Upper Volta and Niger. As Albino has noted, 
an independent Southern Sudan would undoubtedly be poor, but at least it 
would have been able to control its own resources and plan accordingly. (21) 
The quality of life was considered more important than the purely material 
aspects.
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Conclusion
We have seen how our seven original criteria affected the situation in
the Southern Sudan: how a history of bitterness and resentment developed;
how, together with profound economic and social deprivation, it was
reinforced and entrenched by colonial policies. With the failure of
parliamentary rule and constitutional negotiation and their substitution
by policies of assimilation and repression, we have seen how racial, ethnic,
linguistic and religious factors became powerful motivations. We have also
seen how purely geographical factors facilitated a guerrilla warfare
response to increased repression, and how with only a minimum of international
support and very modest material aspirations the people decided that they
could no longer tolerate being part of a united country and transferred
SoeJ<*.n„
their loyalty to a future independent Southern^ In the next chapter
we shall examine the eventual solution of the problem.
-  163 -
CHAPTER VI
THE MAY REVOLUTION AND THE REOOGSflTICN OF DIVERSITY 
Revolution and the Beginnings of Accommodation
The military coup d'etat of May 1969 brought to power new elements in
Sudanese life. The young officers concerned did not reflect the old
political factions and traditional ideas, and they realized that to govern
the country they would have to work with civilian elements. They chose to
work with the left-wing intelligentsia and, for perhaps the first time, the
e
government began to include competent, professional individuals, rather than 
merely the old party politicians. Many of the young intellectuals and 
academics brought into the government decision-making process had been involved 
in the policies of the short-lived Transitional Government of 1964; the May 
Revolution was announced as a continuation of the October Revolution and the 
aims for which it had stood. Although our immediate concern here is the 
response of the new military regime of Nimeiri to the problem of the South, 
the new ideas introduced for the Sudan as a whole are important for any 
understanding of how the new regime was eventually able to find a solution 
to the civil war.
As we have seen, the previous fourteen years of political confusion in the 
Sudan had had an extremely adverse effect on the whole country. The party 
political wrangling had severely hit the economy and what little development 
effort there was had been concentrated in the Khartoum area, with much of 
the countryside having remained unchanged since the turn of the century.
Not only was there a concentration of expenditure in Khartoum, but also 
a concentration of political and executive power in the capital, with 
growing dissatisfaction in the peripheral areas of the North as well as in 
the South. The most important new approach of the Nimeiri regime was to suggest 
the decentralization of power to the provinces, and to aim at a much greater 
degree of involvement of the Sudanese people at all levels, by the forming 
of a single political movement. Obviously a regime which was prepared to
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consider decentralization of power throughout the whole Sudan was better 
equipped to appreciate the problem of the South as a constitutional 
problem of the just distribution of power rather than as a protracted 
bloody revolt. By its avowed intention to establish a mass political 
movement, the regime also recognised that the old political system 
had served only to entrench factionalism and regionalism, and must be 
replaced if decentralization was to succeed.
From the beginning the regime prided itself on its ability to face the 
realities of the situation in the Sudan and accordingly immediately 
turned its attention to the situation in the Southern Sudan; on 9th 
June, 1969, the new government announced its policy. The June Declaration 
recognised the difference between the North and the South and affirmed 
that the unity of the country had to be built on those objective 
realities: 'The Southern people have the right to develop their cultures
and traditions within a united Sudan.' (1) and accordingly the 
Revolutionary Obuncil resolved to ',,..recognise the right of the 
Southern people to Regional Autonomy within a united Sudan.' (2) As a 
basis for progress towards eventual regional autonomy the following 
policy was proposed. There would be a continuation and further extension 
of the amnesty law that had come into force in 1967. Economic, social and 
cultural development for the South would be initiated through a special 
economic planning board and a special budget prepared with the appointment 
of a Minister for Southern Affairs. In addition,training of Southern 
personnel would enable their greater involvement in administration of 
the South. There were,however, two additional factors, which the people 
of the South were soon to interpret as conditions for the implementation 
of the policy. Firstly, the Declaration called for '....the building of 
a broad socialist-oriented democratic movement in the South... .(as) an 
essential pre-requisite for the practical and healthy application of 
Regional Autonomy.' Secondly, it called for peace and security in 
the South and put the responsibility for its maintenance firmly on the 
people of the South, (3) The new regime was welcomed by many people in 
the South, but others were sceptical about the worth of its promises. 
Similar promises had been made by earlier regimes, but never fulfilled.
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However admirable in theory, in practice the proposals for both the 
Sudan as a whole and the South were to prove difficult to implement.
The broad based political movement could not be created overnight, and 
the regime was to encounter opposition from the right wing and from the 
extreme left. Neither did the economic situation allow for the 
implementation of development programmes. The budget of 1970 allotted 
only £S 4 million for the South, an insignificant amount in view of 
the widespread devastation. (4) Administrative refoims, including transfer 
of personnel to the South, minimum terms of service in the South, selection 
of 'trustworthy' Southern personnel for the technical ministries, and the 
establishment of a co-ordination council to supervise implementation, had 
all been proposed, but never functioned. (5) The Ministry for Southern 
Affairs did not have its own budget, and the Minister came to be seen 
as something of a rubber stamp for government policies. Again it seemed 
that Southern politicians were working with the government, but again had 
no real power to influence events. Neither did the security situation 
improve. The government had placed responsibility on the people of the 
South, while neither the people nor the Southern politicians within the 
country had any real control over the Anya Nya, While small numbers of 
refugees were stded to have returned, the exiled politicians had little 
confidence in the amnesty, and pointed to the fact that for all the 
promises of the government it had not withdrawn its troops and war still 
raged in the Southern Sudan. The government continued to imprisjon the 
veteran Southern politician, Clement M'Boro, and in 1970 Abdalla Deng, the 
paramount chief of the Ngok Dinka.,was reported as having been killed 
with five close relatives by security forces.(6)
In some areas of the new policy progress was made. By early 1970 over 
six hundred Southern policemen had been recruited, seventeen Southern 
officer cadets had entered the Military Colleges and Southerners had been 
taken -into the lower echelons of government, namely the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. A Department of Christian Affairs had been established and 
Sunday had been restored as the day of rest in the South. The 
ineffectiveness of these measures tends,however,to support our original
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contention that racial, ethnic, linguistic and religious factors are not 
the basis of the wish to secede but rather motivations to involve people 
in a protracted struggle. Hie government may have considered that it had 
made important concessions, but the real conflict was over the sharing of 
effective power, and in that respect, as far as many Southerners were 
concerned, nothing had changed, and they saw the concessions as 'Lavish 
statements with no substance. ’ (7)
Despite the attraction of some areas of government policy, other areas
caused grave concern in the South. The initial close involvement of the
Communist Party in government was anathema to the majority of Southerners,
and the establishment of a socialist movement as a pre-condition for
regional autonomy began to appear as only another attempt by Khartoum
to inpose an alien system upon the South. Further doubt on the government's
credibility was cast by the selection of Joseph Garang, a committed
communist, as the first Minister for Southern Affairs. Not only did S o w e  
6 ©oCJv-evvi
^people view his appointment with suspicion, but he had no real 
channel of communication or empathy with the exiled politicians or the 
Anya Nya, so making negotiation Impossible. He had long been dedicated 
to the concept of a united Sudan and saw the solution to the problem 
to be an alliance of the working class throughout the Sudan. (8) As 
early as 1961 during the Abboud regime he was speaking out against 
secession and in 1970 declared 'The separation movement, as you all know, 
collapsed and failed because it was ill-conceived...' (9) Again it seemed 
that the Khartoum government was malting the same mistake: of working with 
Southerners who could not influence events in the South.
In addition to aspects of domestic policy, Nimeiri's foreign policy was 
also a cause for concern in the South. As we have noted earlier, the 
Sudan has always identified strongly with the Arab World, and in 1969 
feelings over the Arab/Israeli conflict and a deep admiration for the 
policies of Nasser brought Nimeiri closer and closer to her Arab 
neighbours and to Pan-Arab socialism. In 1970 Sudan became involved in 
discussions over a proposed federation with Libya, Egypt and Syria.
Southern politicians immediately saw this proposal as threatening their 
future within a united Sudan, and as a devaluation of the promised regional 
autonomy. Again they found the Sudan government entering discussions that
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would deeply affect the whole constitutional future of the Sudan, 
without Southern consultation or representation, and indeed the least 
that can be said is that Nimeiri exhibited a certain lack of tact.
He is reported in A1 Ahram as having said in Cairo in November 1970, 
'Indeed the three countries Libya, Egypt and Sudan could possibly 
struggle in Africa to defend Arab civilization in Africa which is being 
encircled and hampered by imperialism in an attempt to stop its influx 
into the heart of Africa 1 (10) and to have implied that the people of 
the Southern Sudan had no culture of their own.(11) It is difficult to 
understand the rationale behind such statements, guaranteed to intensify 
ill-feeling, other than that they do perhaps represent the Arabs' sub­
conscious attitudes towards the South.
In the Northern Sudan there was little support for the idea of federation, 
while in the South it was widely opposed for the following reasons.(12) 
According to the preliminary charter of the proposed federation, Islam 
would become the state religion and basis of law, and Arabia the official 
language. It was felt that Arab problems and concerns would become 
paramount, the South would be relegated to a secondary position, and in 
an Arab oorrmunity of over sixty million be forever denied any effective 
political influence. There were fears that Egypt's surplus labour and 
professional talent would be directed to the Southern Sudan to eventually 
create a settler problem, and to further delay the participation of 
Southerners in the economy and the administration. And lastly, it was 
feared that the proposed union would mean increased military intervention, 
not only by Egypt and Libya, but also by their masters, the Soviet Union. 
Since an agreement with the Soviet Union in 1969, the war in the South 
had intensified, with Soviet pilots flying bombing missions, and by 1971 
the number of Soviet officers and advisors in the Sudan had risen to more 
than a thousand. (13) During the first two years of the Nimeiri regime, 
the Sudanese army grew from 30,000 to about 50,000 men in 1970, and by 
the end of that year Sudan had received nearly 180 tanks, 25 MiG fighter 
aircraft, 6 Antonov bombers, and 10 helicopters from the Soviet Union.(14)
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Egypt's military involvement had also increased significantly. In 1969, 
in response to Israel's ability to strike at her Red Sea installations, 
Egypt had transferred part of her airforce to Wadi Seidna, just north of 
Khartoum, and had also been granted naval facilities at Port Sudan. In 
return Egyptian pilots were employed against the Anya Nya in the South.
To the majority of Southerners the proposed federation seemed to herald 
a further period of political subjugation and an increased vise of force, 
and still the promised regional autonomy remained undefined and as far 
away as ever.
Towards Negotiation
Throughout 1971 relations between the military regime and the Conmunist 
Party became increasingly strained. Most Ccmnunist members were dismissed 
from the government and the tension culminated in the abortive Coirmunist 
coup d'etat of July 1971. The leaders of the attempted coup d ’etat, during 
their three days of control, had criticised the Nimeiri government for its 
failure to solve the problem of the South, and on his return to power 
Nimeiri decided on a fresh initiative. Following the execution of Joseph 
Garang, a new Minister for Southern Affairs was appointed. Abel Alier proved 
to be able to command significant support in the South, possessed a degree 
of respect in the North and, unlike Garang, opened channels of conrainication 
with emigre politicians and the Anya Nya. He also began the process of 
defining the proposed regional autonomy, in terms broadly acceptable to 
both sides.
There were two important lessons which Khartoum had learned by 1971 that 
were of major importance to her ability to solve the problem. Firstly, 
the possibility of a complete military victory in the South was remote.
Not only was the war severely hampering the economic development of the 
country, but the increased dependence on arms supplies and foreign military 
personnel compromised Sudan's freedom of action, and made her vulnerable 
to foreign interference. Secondly, the government had to be as good
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as its word and recognize the realities of the situation. This meant 
recognizing the Anya Nya and the exiled politicians as parties to the 
dispute and exhibiting a willingness to negotiate with them, rather 
than with those who might be more maleable, but neither represented 
nor could control the situation. 1 ... .the Anya Nya are part of the 
problem and in prescribing a solution for the problem, we would like 
to associate them firstly as Southern Sudanese, and secondly, as people, 
who have left the country for a cause. This is a Sudanese problem and 
we must involve everyone who has contributed either negatively or 
positively to it. '(15)
It would appear that most governments faced with similar situations 
have to go through a similar process. They talk first of disgruntled 
minorities, bandits, isolated terrorists and claim to have suppressed 
them, but eventually have to recognize the existence of organized 
opposition movements and accord them rights as well as responsibilities, 
if they wish to negotiate peace.
The years 1971-1972 also saw certain re-adjustments in the Khartoum 
government, with the replacement of hard-line Pan-Arabists such as 
Khalid Hass an Abbas and Mameun Awad Abu Zeid who were not convinced 
of the worth of negotiation, and the inclusion of the more conciliatory 
Abdel Rahman Abdullah in local government and Dr. Mansour Khalid in 
foreign affairs.
While the government in Khartoum was becoming increasingly prepared 
to recognize the realities, the situation in the South was also under­
going changes for the better. There had, in a certain sense, been a 
military coup d'etat among those actively concerned in the struggle.
In July 1970, Colonel Joseph Lagu, Eastern coirmander of the Anya Nya, 
united the scattered forces under his conmand and declared the Anya Nya 
as the sole authority in the Southern Sudan. In establishing the 
Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) he apportioned political 
power within the Sudan to his military comnanders, but was also 
prepared to use the talents of those politicians who were prepared to 
work within his organization, such as Mading De Garang in London, and 
Dr. Lawrence Wol Wol in Paris. (16) So, for the first time, the Khartoum
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government could attempt to negotiate with a unified movement, rather 
than trying to consider the views and aspirations of a number of indi­
vidual personalities.
The military success of the Anya Nya during 1971 paradoxically contributed 
to creating an atmosphere for negotiation, and with the disclosures, 
however inaccurate, of a foreign mercenary put on trial in 1971, the 
North became increasingly aware of the capability of the Anya Nya and 
the degree of foreign involvement. For perhaps the first time
the South was able to deal from a position of some strength, even if more 
apparent than real. In chapter one we noted that the demand for secession 
may be an extreme position from which a movement will gladly withdraw if 
some meaningful concessions are made, and in the situation in the Southern 
Sudan this would seem to have been the case. The Southern movement had 
to demand separation, and had to constitute a real threat to the integrity 
of the country, before the central government would respond favourably 
to its demand for a sharing of power.
The unification of the Southern movement and the increased effectiveness 
of its fighting force (17) allowed Lagu to respond to Khartoum's 
negotiation initiatives and accordingly to modify his demands. From a 
position of demanding complete secession, Lagu was offering to negotiate 
a peaceful solution by August 1971 (18) and the SSLM was declaring 'We 
are fighting for freedom; freedom to unite with the North; freedom to 
federate with the North; freedom to reject the North; freedom for the 
people of the South Sudan to determine their own future without interference 
from the Arabs or any other people.1 (19) By January 1972, while still 
retaining complete separation as an option, Lagu was also stating his 
preparedness to consider a future within a unitary Sudan, on condition 
that such unity was not imposed by Khartoum, but negotiated with the 
Anya Nya and the SSLM. (20) A statement by Lagu in 1972 tends to confirm 
our original contention of the call for secession as an extreme bargaining 
position, rather than a concrete aim. 'I never was a separatist. I never 
believed in the secession of the South from the North; I still hold that 
belief. My only aim was to obtain recognition for Southerners. It was 
rry opinion that such an aim could be achieved through the application of 
force, but I never intended to use force to achieve separation. I had 
resorted to force because I concluded that the successive Khartoum Govern­
ments were not willing to concede the point .'(21)
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In the knowledge that the principle of negotiation was acceptable to the 
SSLM, the government and the constituent committee of the recently formed 
Sudan Socialist Union (SSU), in consultation with Southern leaders, 
prepared a memorandum outlining a possible legal expression of the 
proposed regional autonomy, so that when negotiations did begin they 
would centre on something definite, rather than founder, as so often in 
the past, on the rights and wrongs of the situation.
During the same period the Khartoum government began an intense campaign 
to improve its relations with other African countries. Perhaps most 
important was a new detente with Ethiopia. Negotiations in early 1971 
were followed by a visit to Addis Ababa by Nimeiri in November 1971, and 
although much of the agreement was expressed in terms of trade relations 
and cultural exchange, the important factors were preparatory talks for 
a settlement of the boundary issue, and an agreement by Sudan to terminate 
its support for Eritrean separatists in exchange for a similar concession 
by Addis Ababa to withdraw support for Southern exiles. (22) Relations 
with Luanda had been undermined by Khartoum government forces carrying the 
conflict across the border into Uganda in pusuit of Anya Nya, but by 
January 1972 a Khartoum representative was in Kampala for discussions.
Uganda agreed to try to prevent subversion among Southern refugees, and 
detente was established to the extent that President Amin offered Uganda 
as a venue for peace negotiation between North and South. His severing of 
all links with Israel in April 1972 set the seal on a new relationship with 
the Sudan. Agreements reached with the Central African Republic and 
Zaire resulted in refugee carps being moved back from the border in an 
attempt to stop subversion. In all these cases the inclusion of Southerners 
in the Sudanese missions contributed to their success.
As we noted earlier, the existence of such a large number of refugees 
involved international agencies, charitable bodies and religious bodies, 
and it was the church organizations which were to play a major part in 
facilitating negotiations. During the 1960's the situation was closely 
followed by the World Council of Churches and the All Africa Conference of 
Churches and, following a visit by their representatives to the Sudan in 
1971, they became convinced that a peaceful settlonent could be negotiated. 
These organizations, together with the Movement for Colonial Freedom in 
London, facilitated preliminary secret meetings, at which it came to be
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realized that there did exist a basis for agreenent, and at which 
concessions could be made without the negotiators feeling that they 
prejudiced their individual political positions. While the degree 
of secrecy was later to be criticised in some quarters, it undoubtedly 
enabled positive discussion to begin without the need for unproductive 
political rhetoric. Knowing little of these preliminary meetings, the 
majority of the Sudanese people were not optimistic that a settlonent 
would be reached when negotiations began in Addis Ababa in February 1972.
The Addis Ababa Agreement
Although individual personalities have not so far figured largely in our 
appraisal of the problem, a brief look at those personalities involved 
in the Addis Ababa negotiations will assist an understanding of their 
ability to succeed. We have already noted the contribution of Abel Alier 
as an intermediary between the SSLM and Khartoum, and the success of the 
talks was as much a result of his calm negotiating technique as of his 
professional legal skills, The other Khartoum representatives were also 
selected as much for their professional capabilities as for their belief 
in the possibility of a peaceful settlement. Dr. Mansour Khalid, the 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs, had already contributed a great deal 
to the success of the preliminary negotiations by helping to re-establish 
good relations with neighbouring countries, and had a breadth of experience 
that enabled him to formulate for the Sudan a realistic position between 
the Arab and the African Worlds. Dr. Jaafar Mohammed Ali Bakheit made an 
absolutely essential contribution to the negotiations as a prime architect 
of the Sudan's policy of decentralization, and we shall see in the following 
chapter how his legislation for the reform of local government enabled 
the Khartoum government to bring a fresh approach to the problem of power 
sharing. Abdel Rahman Abdulla, a career administrator, was then Minister 
of Public Service and Administrative Refoim and therefore able to 
appreciate the day-to-day difficulties that would arise in the implementation 
of policies, and had been involved with the secretariat of the Round Table 
Conference and the Twelve Man Carmittee. Two military representatives
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were included to deal with the complicated cease-fire arrangements and 
replanning of the Sudanese forces, which were to occupy a large proportion 
of the negotiations, Colonel Kamal Abasher, and Brigadier Mirghani 
Suleiman Khalil who was to be a member of the Joint Military Oonmission, 
and the final Khartoum representative was the First Vice-President of the 
Sudan, Maj. General Mohammed El Baghir Ahmed, Minister of the Interior, and 
one-time colleague of Joseph Lagu in the Southern Command.
The SSLM delegation was led by Ezboni Mondiri, a veteran Southern politician, 
but also someone who had some experience of working with Khartoum, He had 
been a central government minister in the Transitional Government of 1964, 
and had suggested a constitutional solution to the problem as early as 
1958. Both Mading De Garang, delegation spokesman and SSLM representative 
in London, and Dr. Lawrence Wol Wol, delegation secretary and SSLM 
representative in Paris, had played significant parts in the preliminary 
negotiations, as to some extent had Job Adier De Jok, SSLM representative 
in Ethiopia and Angelo Voga Morjan, SSLM representative in East Africa.
The Rev. Paul Puot had been Minister of Education in the shortlived 
Anyidi Revolutionary Council and Oliver Albino had held a variety of 
positions in a variety of Southern organizations. Col. Frederick Brian 
Maggot was the special military representative from the Anya Nya. The 
observers underline the involvement of the churches; Leopold J. Niili,
World Council of Churches, Kwodo E. Ankrah, World Council of Churches,
Burgess Carr, All Africa Conference of Churches and also moderator,
Samuel Athi Bwogo, Sudan Council of Churches, with Nabiyelul Kifle as the 
representative of the host, His Imperial Majesty, the Emperor of Ethiopia.
By 26th February an agreement had been reached under which a political,
legal and administrative framework had been outlined 1 within which
regional aspirations can be fulfilled and national interests mid sovereignty 
best preserved.' (23) This became law as the Southern Provinces Regional 
Self-Government Act on 3rd March, 1972.
Hie law was issued as an organic law which could not be ammended except 
by a three-quarters majority of the People's National Assembly, and confirmed 
by a two-thirds majority in a referendum held in the South. It defined 
the Southern Provinces as the provinces of Bahr El Ghazal, Equatoria and 
Upper Nile as their boundaries stood on 1st January, 1956, and any other 
areas that were culturally and geographically a part of the Southern 
complex as might be decided by a referendum. (24) The South would in future 
be known as the Southern Region, and although Arabic would continue to be 
the official language, English would be the principal language in the 
Southern Region without prejudice to the use of other languages that might 
prove practical.
The central government would reserve the right of legislative and executive 
power over matters considered to be of a national nature, and they were 
mostly those one might reasonably expect: defence, external affairs, currency, 
air and inter-regional transport, communications and telecommunications, 
customs and most foreign trade, nationality and immigration, economic, 
social and educational planning and public audit.
Regional legislation in the Southern Region would be excercised by a People's 
Regional Assembly (PRA), its sixty members to be elected by citizens of the 
Southern Region by direct secret ballot, although initially the President 
could appoint additional members under certain circumstances. The assembly 
was to decide its own rules for procedure and elect its own spealter, and 
in general terms its function was to legislate for the preservation of 
public order, internal security, efficient administration and cultural, 
economic and social development, (25) but in most cases in accordance with 
national plans and programmes. The assembly would be able to request the 
President to postpone the coming into force of a law which they might 
consider to be against the interests of the people of the Southern Region, 
or to ask the President to withdraw from the national assembly any bill for 
similar reasons. In both cases final discretion would be left to the 
President. Similarly, President Nimeiri would be able to veto any PRA
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legislation he considered contrary to the National Constitution. The PRA 
would be expected to strive to consolidate the unity of the Sudan, and to 
respect the spirit of the National Constitution.
Executive power would be vested in a High Executive Council (HEC) which would 
act on behalf of the President in specifying the duties of the various 
departments in the Southern Region, as long as in matters relating to 
central ministries it acted with the approval of the President. Its president 
would be appointed and relieved of office by President Nimeiri, and would 
recommend to Nimeiri those to be appointed to or relieved of office as 
mentoers. The president of the HEC and the other mentoers would be responsible 
to the PRA and President Nimeiri for the efficient administration of the 
Southern Region. Mentoers of the HEC might also be mentoers of the PRA.
The PRA would be able, by a three-quarters majority, to request President 
Nimeiri to relieve from office either the president of the HEC or any other 
mentoer, to which request President Nimeiri would acceed. The HEC would be 
able to initiate legislation for the formation of a regional public service 
to specify terms and conditions of service and any other legislation.
The relationship between the HEC and the central ministries would be 
regulated by President Nimeiri. Juba was to be the regional capital.
Sources of revenue for the Southern Region would be direct and indirect 
taxation, contributions from People's Local Government Councils, revenue 
from development projects in the region, funds from the National Treasury 
for established services, funds voted by the National Assentoly, a Special 
Development Budget for the Southern Region as envisaged in the June 
Declaration, a variety of taxes, duties and rates on commodities produced 
or consumed in the Southern Region, projects initiated and personnel 
employed. In addition to national and local duties and taxes, the PRA 
would be able to levy regional duties and taxes. (26)
Tb enable the agreement to be implemented as soon as possible and so avoid 
mutual suspicions, certain interim administrative measures were proposed. 
President Nimeiri, the leadership of the SSLM and the SSU in the Southern 
Region would appoint the president and the mentoers of the HEC so that a 
regional civil service could be immediately established. The members of 
the HEC would hold the following portfolios: finance and economic planning,
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education, information culture and tourism, communications and transport, 
agriculture, animal production and fisheries, public health, regional 
administration, housing, public works and utilities, natural resources 
and rural development, public service and labour, and minerals, industry, 
trade and supply. The mandate of the interim HEC would extend for only 
eighteen months, after which elections would be held for the PRA. The 
SSLM would supply a list of qualified personnel outside the Sudan so as 
to facilitate their appointment to both regional and central institutions, 
and financial provision would be made for them.
The agreement also included fundamental rights and freedoms. All citizens 
would be guaranteed freedom of movement in and out of the Southern Region, 
unless it was considered a threat to public health or order. All citizens 
in the Southern Region would be guaranteed equal opportunity in education, 
enployment, commerce and the practice of any profession, and such rights 
would not be prejudiced on the basis of race, tribe, religion, place of 
birth or sex. Every person would enjoy freedom of religion and conscience^ 
freedom to use their own language and develop their own culture and to 
educate their children as they wished. They should have equal pay for 
equal work and not be subject to compulsory labour. In addition there 
were the usual legal rights to be expected in any modem state. (27)
An amnesty was proclaimed that covered acts of mutiny, rebellion or sedition 
in the Southern Region since ISth August, 1955, and promised the discharge 
of all those inprisoned on such charges within fifteen days of the date of 
ratification of the treaty. The amnesty would also cover those still outside 
the Sudan, armed returnees and ex-Anya Nya. Repatriation conmissions 
would be established inside and outside the country, composed of regional, 
central government and TJSIHCR representatives, and where necessary, 
Sudanese ambassadors and host country representatives. There would also 
be a Special Conmission for Relief and Resettlement. It would give 
priority to displaced people within the Sudan, but also aid returnees and 
provide assistance to Southern students abroad and in providing primary
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education within the Sudan. Much of their work would be devoted to the 
provision of adequate reception centres, shelter, food and medical treatment 
as well as transport to permanent resettlement areas or places of origin.
An essential part of the agreement was the provision of cease-fire 
arrangements. It was originally decided that the cease-fire should become 
effective from the date of the ratification of the agreement on 12 th March, 
1972, but it was in fact implemented earlier on 6th March, 1972.
Basically it called upon forces on both sides to remain in their present 
positions and to avoid any possible confrontation. A Cease-Fire Commission 
was established with representatives from the central government, the SSIM, 
the governments of neighbouring African states, the Red Cross, the World 
Council of Churches, the All Africa Conference of Churches and the tNHCR.
Finally there were agreements to deal with the military situation, both 
in 1972 and in the future. In the long term Southern citizens would 
constitute a sizeable proportion of the People's Armed Forces corresponding 
to the population of the Southern Region, and the use of such forces in 
the Southern Region would be controlled by President Nimeiri on the 
advice of the president of the HEC. In the short term, to cover the first 
five years of the agreement, the People's Armed Forces in the Southern: 
Region would consist of a national force known as the Southern Command, 
which would be made up of 12,000 men, of whom 6,000 would be citizens 
of the Southern Region. Although the actual wording of the temporary 
arrangements does not specify that these 6,000 would be recruited from 
the Anya Nya, a letter from Lagu to the people of the Southern Region calls
on the Anya Nya to remain in their positions until 1 arrangements for
their recruitment into the national army, ' had been made.(28) Recruitment 
and integration would be determined by a Joint Military Commission, with 
initial separate deployment of troops to ensure smooth integration in an 
atmosphere of peace and confidence. Three senior officers from each side 
would serve on the commission.
-  178 -
The Sudan Government proceeded to implement the agreement as soon as 
possible . Abel Alier was appointed
president of the HEC with the following Southerners holding the 
various portfolios in 1972. Hilary Logali - finance and economic 
planning; Luigi Adwok - education; Dr. Toby Maduot - health; Samuel 
Aru Bol - regional administration. These four men had worked closely 
with the Nimeiri regime in the search for a solution and had previously 
been mentoers of the Southern Front or SANTJ Inside. The veteran political 
group, who had worked for so long outside the country, were represented 
by Joseph Oduhu - housing and public utilities; Ezboni Mondiri - 
caimunications and transport: Elia Lupe - public service and administrative 
reform; Michael Tawil - co-operation and rural development, and the 
younger generation by Mading De Garang - information and culture; Michael 
Wal Duany - presidential affairs and Gamma Hassan - agriculture. Their 
selection also represented most areas of the South and more than eight 
tribal groups. These members of the HEC came to be known as Regional 
Ministers. In establishing their various ministries, perhaps the 
greatest difficulty was a shortage of trained personnel. Many Northerners 
returned to the North, and many posts were left vacant. Southerners 
were also appointed as province commissioners in the South, local 
government officers, police commissioners, and to the various commissions 
established by the agreement. Clement M'Boro, the veteran Southern Front 
politician, became chairman of both the Commission for Repatriation and 
that for Resettlement, Relief and Rehabilitation, and Peter Gatkuoth 
became the director-general of the Special Fund. At the centre, Dr. 
Lawrence Wol Wol became Minister of Planning, and Bona Malwal Madut Ring 
and Samuel Lupai became State Ministers for information and local 
government respectively. Southerners were also appointed to the SSU 
Political Bureau; namely Abel Alier, Hilary Logali, Dr. Toby Maduot,
Luigi Adwok and Joseph Oduhu. (29)
Elections for the PRA were held in late 1973, despite some fears that 
old animosities would be revived. The sixty available seats were divided 
between thirty territorial constituencies, nine regional constituencies,
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eighteen popular organization constituencies, and three armed forces 
nominations. The assembly commenced operations rather belatedly in 
December 1973, and among its first actions were the election of 
Lubari Ramba as its first speaker, and the confirmation of Abel Alier's 
position as president of the HEC. There was a reshuffle of Regional 
Ministers, and some concern that of the four new Ministers, three 
were Dinka, so giving this group half of the twelve appointments.
However by the beginning of 1974 the membership of the HEC had grown 
markedly younger and markedly more professionally qualified.
According to the agreement, the Cbnmission for Repatriation and the 
Commission for Resettlement, Relief and Rehabilitation were established, 
started work in May 1972, and from the beginning worked closely together. 
By the end of December 1972 a total of 170,000 people had passed through 
the official repatriation machinery and a large number had returned 
independently. A further 850,000 had returned to their homes, although 
a further estimated 100,000 were still displaced in the bush. An 
estimated 51,000 remained in neighbouring states. (30)
On the 3rd April, 1972 the Joint Military Commission was established, 
consisting of senior officers from each side- a general staff to aid 
implementation and a medical team. Following the surrender of all arms, 
the commission toured the three provinces in order to interview the 
Anya Nya and select the 6,000 men to be absorbed into the People's 
Armed Forces and to suggest the employment of others in the police, 
prison or civil services. A condition of assimilation was recommendation 
by Anya Nya district headquarters, in addition to the expected conditions, 
such as health, age, academic standard, military training and length of 
service. It was to be expected that the main obstacle to immediate 
integration would be lack of confidence, and to facilitate the process 
the two forces were brought into rather tentative contact, sharing a 
commander, living in adjacent accommodation and sharing recreational 
facilities. A new military administration was established and a training 
programme initiated. After training, inter-unit transfers would begin, 
firstly within the provinces and later between provinces.(31)
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The commission interviewed 15,842 soldiers presented as ex-Anya Nya 
during the six month operation. The force had comprised a headquarters 
staff and three brigades, one in each province. The largest and best 
aimed force was in Equatoria and,like that of Balir El Ghazal, was well 
organized. In Upper Nile, forces were more dislocated and had a marked 
tribal basis. Most units were armed with automatic weapons of Chinese 
or Belgian manufacture - light machine guns, bren guns, etc. There were 
also some anti-aircraft weapons, mortars, bazoukas, anti-tank weapons 
and mines. There had been wireless contact between command and most areas 
in Equatoria, as well as with headquarters in Upper Nile and Bahr El 
Ghazal, but little transport except in border areas. There was no single 
unifoim. The conmission considered discipline to be very good with a 
satisfactory standard of infantry drill and tactics. Forces had been 
provided with basic three months training, commando training of six 
months and,in the case of two hundred officers, infantry training in 
Israel. (32)
Of the 15,842 interviewed, 200 were absorbed into the People' Armed Forces 
as officers, 867 as NOQs, 5,012 as private soldiers, 1,860 were recommended 
for the police and prisons service, 5,489 were recomnended for the civil 
service and 2,414 were found to be medically unfit. (33) Absorbtion of 
those termed Anya Nya into the police and prison service subsequently 
increased to 3,579 in 1973 (34) and by the end of 1972 an estimated (35)
14,000 'ex-Anya Nya1 had been absorbed into other government departments.
A sum of £S 500,000 had been allocated to meet the wages bill for the 
absorbed forces but was never to reach the Southern Region (36), a 
problem which characterised the early implementation period. Of the 
£S 1,410,412 approved in the first 1972/73 Special Development Budget, 
only £S 560,000 was actually remitted.
Certain other areas of the agreement were not immediately implemented, 
one of which was the precise definition of the exact area to constitute 
the Southern Region. As we noted earlier, the agreement described the 
Southern Region as the three Southern Provinces as their boundaries stood 
on 1st January, 1956 and any other areas that were culturally and 
geographically a part of the Southern complex, as might be decided by a 
referendum. However a referendum has never taken place to determine 
either the future of the Dinka areas of Southern Kordofan or to clarify 
the position of the copper reserves at Hofrat En Nahas, which lie in
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Bahr El Ghazal on maps published by the Sudan Survey Department in 
1955, but in Southern Darfur in those published in 1976. The question 
of rights to the copper reserves and to the widely rumoured oil reserves of 
the border areas will doubtless not arise as the agreement specifically 
safeguards the interests of the central government in such an event. 
However there was some dissatisfaction among the Ngok Dinka of Southern 
Kordofan, many of whom had been involved in the struggle, and thought of 
themselves essentially as Southerners, to find themselves excluded from 
the benefits of power sharing. The agreement also referred specifically 
to three Southern provinces. In 1976 these three provinces were sub­
divided into six units, and in the next chapter we shall consider the 
significance of this as part of an examination of the realities of 
power sharing.
Neither were Southerners absolutely unanimous in welcoming the agreement. 
Some, such as Gordon Muortat Mayen, a veteran Southern Front politician 
and Minister of Works in the 1965 Transitional Government, were quick 
to denounce it as a sell-out to the North. Mayen has remained in exile 
since 1972. Others felt that the North, and especially the President, 
had retained all effective power, and that the Regional Government 
would be left with all the work. They felt that their opinion was 
confirmed by the selection for key posts of so many of those Southern 
politicians who had worked with Khartoum, rather than actively talcing part 
in the struggle. They felt that the Southern delegation to the Addis 
Ababa talks had been naive, and certainly they did not have a great deal 
of experience in constitutional matters, and have admitted as much. (37) 
Together with the pessimists, there were those whose optimism new no 
bounds, and who were to be those most deeply dissappointed when the 
realities of the situation became apparent in the first few years after 
the agreement.
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At this point it is useful to summarize the reasons why the proposals 
which had been largely agreed upon at the Round Table Conference of 
1965 were to take so long to become law. From the Northern point of 
view, the Southern Problem was seen, not in its true perspective, but 
rather as an adjunct to Northern party politics. There was an unwillingness 
to see the demands of the South as having any legitimacy and a refusal to 
believe in the Anya Nya as an organized body or to countenance negotiation 
with 'terrorists' . And there was a continuing belief in the eventual 
efficacy of a military solution. In the South the greatest drawback was 
the profound division of Southern leadership and the lade of a single 
overall political philosophy. In addition, the foreign involvement and 
assistance provided allowed both sides to persevere in the attempt to 
find a military solution.
Conclusion
While much of the detail of the Addis Ababa Agreement remained to be 
formulated in practical experience, one factor was beyond doubt. The 
degree of control by the centre, especially of defense, foreign affairs 
and nationality, placed the Southerners firmLy as Sudanese, expected to 
shew ultimate loyalty to the Sudan. In the next chapter we shall look at the 
practical experience of the first five years of regional autonomy and 
examine the socio-economic situation in the Southern Region, the realities 
of power sharing and the prospects for continued peace.
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CHAPTER VII 
THE FIRST FIVE YEARS OF REGIONAL AUTONOMY
TheSbcio-Economlc Situation: Population and Manpower
The seventeen years of civil war, the displacement of a large part of 
the population and the subsequent virtual cessation of all economic 
activity, had produced an abnormal situation. As we have seen, much 
of 1972 was devoted to resettlement, and it was not until 1973 that 
a beginning was made on the rehabilitation of the area, and the true 
extent of the devastation assessed.
The effects of the civil war on the demography of the Southern Region 
was considerable. The 1955-56 census had shown a population for the 
area of 2.7 million and, with a natural growth rate of 3.3% for the 
Sudan as a whole, it was believed that by the beginning of the seventies, 
the population would be between 4 and 5 million. (1) However the preliminary 
results of the 1973 census gave a total population for the Southern Region 
of only 2.8 million (2) only 20% of the total Sudanese population living 
in approximately 30% of the total land area. Population densities for 
the Region were therefore low, even by African standards. There were less 
than 5 persons per square kilometpjf, with densities ranging from 6.1 per 
square kilometer in Bahr El Ghazal to 3.2 per square kilometer in Upper 
Nile. Highest densities were recorded in the Gogrial area (20 per square 
kilometer) along the Bahr El Arab and along the Nile. In parts of Upper 
Nile Province, tavards the Ethiopian border, densities fell as low as 
2 persons per square kilometer, with similarly low levels recorded in 
western Bahr El Ghazal.
There had been a steady movement of the population towards the towns. Many 
returning refugees remained in the urban areas, having become accustomed 
to urban life while in exile, and others had lost their homes and cattle 
during the war. However by 1973 only 5% of the population lived in 
settlements of over 20,000 people - in Juba (57,000), Wau (53,000) and 
Malakal (37,000). If semi-urban settlements are included (i.e. those of 
over 4,000 people) the 'urbanization' rate rises to 10% overall, with 
the highest level in Equatoria (18.7%) followed by Bahr El Ghazal (9.0%) 
and Upper Nile (4.8%)
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TABLE IV:AREA AND POPULATION: CENSUS FIGURES 1973. PRELIMINARY RESULTS
All Sudan
Area Sa. Kms. 
2,173,000
Jo
100.0
PoDulation
14,172,000
1
100.0
Bahr El Ghazal 214,000 9.8 1,320,000 9.3
Equatoria 198,000 9.1 725,000 5.1
Upper Nile 236,000 10.9 763,000 5.4
TOTAL SOUTHERN REGION 648,000 29.8% 2,808,000 19.8%
TABLE V: URBANIZATION IN THE SOUTHERN REGION: CENSUS FIGURES 1973
Population
Wau 53,402
Runbek 18,101
Aweil 17,835
Yirol 13,329
Raga 8,874
Tonj 8,470
Juba 56,723
Anzara 17,230
Torit 14,745
Yei 11,696
Maridi 9,618
Tantoura 8,719
Yantoio 7,024
Kapoeta 5,325
Source Yubu 4,222
Malakal 37,147
TOTAL SOUTHERN REGION 292,460
viaoiHia
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In common with the rest of the Sudan the population of the Southern 
Region was found to be markedly young, 44% of the people being under 
15 years, 53% in the working age group 15-64, and only 2% over 65 years. 
Ihe youngest population was found in Bahr El Ghazal where almost half 
were under 15 years, and the oldest in Equatoria where the figure was 
under 40%. The considerable differences at council level (for example,
52% below 15 years in Gogrial and only 27% in Yarribio) were the result 
of differences in the birth and migration rates.
R>r the population of the Southern Region as a whole, males were in a
46.000 majority; however the distribution varied considerably throughout 
the region, both spatially and by age group. Below 15 and above 35 years, 
males were in a definite predominance; but between these two ages they 
were very much in the minority, with 91,000 fewer men that women. This 
was most marked in Equatoria, where the province as a whole showed an 
excess of women. This lack of men in the active age group tended to 
exacerbate the problem of a predominantly young population with large 
nurrbers of children to be supported. Ihe 200,000 adult males and possible
100.000 adult females that appeared to be missing from the expected 
pattern would probably have produced at least double their nurrbers of 
offspring, and their absence may have helped to explain a census result 
well below that expected.
The 1973 census showed an increase in migratory movement, with the 
Southern Region showing a net migratory gain. Nearly 70,000 people 
from the South were recorded in other areas of the country while nearly
100.000 had moved to the Southern Region frcm the North. Ihe most 
attractive area for out-migrants was the Khartoum conurbation, accounting 
for 36%, the remainder moving to the adjoining Northern provinces and 
the major agricultural scheme areas. In-migration showed it highest 
rate into Upper Nile 65%, with Equatoria accounting for 20% and Bahr El 
Ghazal 15%. Many of these in-migrants were probably the children of 
Southern parents b o m  outside the area, and arriving in the South for 
the first time.
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International migration across the borders with neighbouring states 
is very difficult to assess. During the period of the civil war, 
an estimated 200,000 Southern Sudanese lived outside the country, 
of whom approximately 140,000 were believed to have returned by 
October 1973. Movement back into the country has continued, although 
not all are believed to have returned. A considerable number of people 
of Zairean nationality have moved into the Southern Region, mainly into 
Equatoria.
Dor the period 1955/6-1973/4 the three Southern provinces showed a 
net annual increase of only 0.6%. In Bahr El Ghazal the rate was 1.7%, 
but in Equatoria and Upper Nile the numbers recorded in 1973 were 
smaller than in 1955/6, Such a decrease in population can only be 
explained, apart from under-ennuraeration, by a net out-migration, higher 
death rates and lower birth rates. With the prevailing peaceful 
conditions a sharp rise in natural increase was to be expected. In an 
unpublished note, the Department of Statistics estimated a 2.5% natural 
increase rate for the Southern Region in 1973, and estimated a population 
of 3,894,000 by 1984, and 6,067,000 by 2002.
In the 1973 census, almost half of the population of the Southern Region 
above 15 years were recorded as economically active. Apart from school 
children, the old, infirm and retired, most of those listed as not 
economically active were women, the result of a somewhat arbitrary 
definition. In a largely subsistence economy it was likely that women 
were as fully occupied in economic activities as were men. Of a population 
of 2.8 million the census listed only 850,000 people as being economically 
active, of whom approximately 127,000 were unemployed, and a further
5,000 were looking for work for the first time. This unemployment rate 
of 15% of the labour force was high by African standards. Activity rates 
were highest in Bahr El Ghazal (males 95%, females 25%) and lowest in 
Equatoria (males 87%, females 9%). Unemployment among women was 
practically non-existent. Among men over 15 years unemployment rates 
ranged from below 10% in Equatoria to above 20% in Bahr El Ghazal; however 
size of settlement was a more important factor with unemployment being 
shown as primarily a rural problem. For example, the rate for Juba 
was less than 6%.
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In 1973 unemployment in the Southern Region was a serious problem;
127,000 people were classed as unemployed and a further 5,000 were 
looking for work for the first time. This rate of 15% compares 
unfavourably with the rate for the whole of the Sudan of 6.5%, and 
for the Northern provinces of about 4.0%. The problem was most severe 
among the younger age group, over 30.0% of the 15-19 age group being 
classified as unemployed. In the 20-24 age group the rate was 23.0%, 
falling to 15.0% for those between 25 and 29 years. Rates decreased 
slowly with age to only 4.0% among people over 55 years. The rural 
nature of the problem was the result of a higher rate of natural Increase 
coupled with the virtual cessation of economic growth in the rural areas. 
A contributory factor to the high unemployment level was the inclusion 
of numbers of returnees who had been employed in the modem sector in 
their country of exile and were unwilling to consider a return to 
subsistence agriculture on their homecoming.
DISTRIBUTION OF ACTIVE POPULATION BY ECONOMIC SECTOR 1973 . TABLE VI
S.Region % Sudan %
Agriculture, hunting, forestry, & fishing 73.4 66.0
Mining & quarrying 0,0 0.1
Manufacturing 0.9 3.4
Electricity, gas & water 0.2 0.9
Construction 1.1 1.8
Wholesale & retail trade, restaurants & hotels 1.8 4,8
Transport 0,6 3.4
Finance, insurance & real estate 0.0 0.1
Conmunity, social & personal services 9.9 11.1
Activities not adequately defined 12.2 6.3
TOTAL* 100.0% 100.0%
*Due to rounding the percentages do not always add up exactly
The above figures indicate the dependence on agriculture in the Southern 
Region and the lade of opportunities in transport, trade and manufacturing. 
The disparaties would be even more apparent if the rates for the South 
were compared with those for the Northern provinces, rather than with 
the national average. However, figures for the Northern provinces alone 
were not available at the time of writing.
-  189 -
Over the Southern Region as a whole, the 1973 census showed 73% of 
people as being occupied in the primary sector. This was probably 
an under-estimate, with a figure of 80% being more likely. In the 
secondary sector there has been an increase since 1955 fran 1.3% to 2.2%.
This is more a result of the considerable number of construction projects 
under way since the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972, than any appreciable 
increase in manufacturing industry. The increase in those employed in 
the tertiary sector, from 4% to above 12%, reflected the mushrooming 
of civil service and government employment since the attainment of 
regional self-gpvemment, and the absorption of 14,000 ex-Anya Nya into 
various government departments. The tertiary sector was inflated by 
large numbers of educated unemployed, for whan suitable jobs had not 
been found.
Of those economically active in the Southern Region, 60% were in the 
self-employed category, 20% were employees, and 15% said they were 
unemployed. A further 4% were unpaid family workers, and of the 
remainder 0.4% claimed to be employers. Employment in the modem 
sector accounted for approximately 198,000 people - almost all males 
in the 20 - 40 year age group. The numbers involved in paid employment 
in Bahr El Ghazal being less than half those in Equatoria and Upper Nile, 
despite a much larger total population. Over the Region as a whole, about 
25% were employed in the modem sector not less than two-thirds of these 
workers were employed by the Government.
Three occupational groups appeared to be most important - service workers, 
agricultural workers and those in product ion/transport /labouring accounting 
for 75% of the modern sector population. In Upper Nile agriculture was 
most important (40%) while in Bahr El Ghazal the service element was the 
most important single category (34%). In Equatoria the spectrum was much 
wider. The most important group was production/transport/labouring followed 
by service activities. The relatively greater importance of the professional/ 
technical category reflected the concentration of Regional Government 
activities in Juba: a concentration likely to be gradually dispersed with 
the sub-division of the provinces and the increasing responsibilities 
of the local government system.
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The self-employed workers in the modem sector were demographically 
similar to those in the modem sector as a whole; 90% were males and 
75% were below 40 years of age. Over the whole of the Region 47% 
were involved in the retail trade. A further 15% were tailors and 8% 
were occupied in the manufacture of food and drink. These three occupations 
involved 70% of all self-employed,whereas for the modem sector as a whole 
the figure was less than 10%.
The census showed a considerable in-migration in the towns, especially to 
the then three province capitals, 14% of the urban population having 
moved in from places outside the province. Urban in-migration was highest 
in Equatoria and Upper Nile. In Juba more than 25% were bo m  outside the 
province, in Malakal 18.5%, and in Wau 14.6%. These towns,however, 
retain an underlying rural nature, more than a third of the population 
being found in the primary sector in agricultural jobs. The urban areas 
are higly localized centres of paid employment. Of the 200,000 people in 
the modem sector, almost 25% were to be found in the towns.
The demographic factors outlined above reflect not only the more severe 
effects of the civil war, but also the years of economic neglect. Over 
75% of people depended on subsistence agriculture, with only a very small 
proportion involved in manufacturing, construction transport or trade.
For most of those outside the agricultural sector, the government was the 
only employer. Of particular interest for the future development of the 
area was the very low number of people involved in private undertakings, 
or self-employed within the modem sector. The high percentage of self- 
employed within the whole of the economically active population, 60%, 
again reflected the subsistence nature of the economy rather than 
widespread small-scale enterprise. The high rate of rural unemployment, 
although perhaps to some degree a consequence of definition, reflects 
the neglect of the agricultural sector over many years and the recent 
high degree of social upheaval in the rural areas.
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The very low population figures for the three Southern provinces are 
evidently not explained by out-migration, and it is unlikely that 
under-enumeration occurred only in these provinces. While the re­
settlement situation may have caused sane difficulty in 1973, with 
people still returning to their homes, it does not explain the low 
nurrber of adults in the 15 - 35 age group, or the shortage of young 
male adults. It would seem that the war years took a much greater toll 
than was imagined. Not only were lives lost during the actual hostilities, 
but it would seem likely that many died as a result of famine, disease 
and the virtual non-existence of social services in many areas.
Health
A very basic form of health service had been established in the Southern 
Region under British colonial rule, and successful attempts had been made 
to contain the spread of diseases such as malaria, leprosy and especially 
sleeping sickness. During the civil war many of the existing hospitals 
and health centres were destroyed or fell into disuse and mich of the 
disease prevention work came to a standstill. After the peace agreement, 
with thousands of refugees re tinning to the area, the situation became 
critical, and it was to the credit of the repatriation authorities that 
the process was completed without any major epidemic. Of the 27 hospitals 
in the Southern Region, only 10 were operating in 1972, with only 2,474 
available beds. By the end of 1973 the situation had improved, but the 
ratio of doctors to patients in Bahr El Ghazal was one doctor to every 
70,726 people, despite a great deal of assistance from such agencies as 
WHO, UNHCR, UNICEF, LWF and GLRA. Health facilities throughout the Sudan 
are generally inadequate. The 171 hospitals in existence in 1975 provided 
only 104 beds per 100,000 people. There was one health centre, four 
dispensaries and ten dressing stations per 100,000 people. These ratios 
are very low compared with most other countries, especially when the sheer 
size of the country is taken into consideration. Moreover, hospital beds 
are not distributed evenly throughout the country, ratios ranging from 
131/100,000 in Khartoum Province to 56/100,000 in the Western provinces.
The ratio in the Southern Region in 1975 was 111/100,000. Dispensaries 
are more evenly distributed, but of those in the Southern Region in 1975,
50% were not in fact functioning due to a lack of personnel and supplies.(3)
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The ratio of doctors to the population for the Sudan as a whole was 
8/100,000 in 1974. Although this may appear to be low, it compares 
well with the majority of African countries. The distribution of 
doctors is however very uneven with 50.0% of all general doctors and 
specialists being concentrated in the two provinces of Khartoum and 
Gezira. In the Southern Regiorn at the end of 1973, the ratio was 
approximately 2.5/100,000. Gf the Sudanese doctors serving in the 
South the majority were Northerners. There was some difficulty in 
encouraging doctors to work in the South, given the very difficult 
conditions, lack of adequate housing etc. Since the peace agreement, 
a number of expatriate doctors have been provided by international agencies. 
Safe water supplies were limited to the province capitals, and were not 
always adequate with a resultant high incidence of waterborne diseases. (4)
It was difficult to assess the general health situation in the Southern 
Region . The majority of hospitals and health centres were under-reporting 
the number of attendances and with the general lack of facilities in the 
rural areas a large number of cases went unreported , undiagnosed and 
untreated. The unexpectedly low census returns may show that the 
general level of health had been lower than the health statistics indicated. 
The following diseases constituted some of the major health problems in 
the Southern Region: malaria,tuberculosis, leprosy, sleeping sickness, 
gastro-enteritis, kala-azar, river blindness and general malnutrition. (5 ) 
Attemptsfto improve the situation in the immediate post-war period were 
bedevilled by a lack of finance and a shortage of qualified personnel.
Fuel shortages and transportation deficiencies affected the distribution 
of drugs and the disease prevention programmes. There was a general 
unwillingness among medical personnel to work unsupported in the rural areas 
and in the major towns working conditions were generally very bad with 
constant shortages of essential drugs and other supplies. (6 )
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The shortage of medical personnel reflected not only the unwillingness 
of Northerners to work in the Southern Region, but also the short­
comings of the educational system, which had produced so few qualified 
Southerners.
Education
The low level of educational effort in the Southern Region, compared with 
the rest of the country, was one of the most glaring examples of retarded 
development in the area. In 1970, the ratio of school enrolment to 
population, which was 3.1% for the Sudan as a whole, was only 0.7% for 
the Southern provinces. The situation in intermediate education was 
equally bad with the South accounting for only 6.5% of all enrolments. 
Much of the educational system, already deficient in quality and coverage, 
was destroyed during the period of hostilities and the re-establishment 
of education proved a major problem to the new Regional Government.
TABLE VII SCHOOL ENROLMENT AS A PERCENTAGE OE RELEVANT AGE GROUPS 1971
Province Primary General Secondary Higher Secondary
7-12 yrs 13-15 yrs 16-18 yrs
Khartoum 62.3% 28.3% 20.9%
Northern 53.7% 18.3% 6.5%
Blue Nile 39.4% 11.4% 4.0%
Kassala 28.6% 6.0% 2.3%
ICordofan 16.6% 3.5% 1.2%
Darfur 16.5% 3.5% 1.0%
Bahr El Ghazal 4.5% 1.0% 0.7%
Equatoria 6.8% 0.8% 0.2%
Upper Nile 5.7% 0.8% 0.2%
Source: Ministry of Education.
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Primary education was most seriously affected by the period of unrest, 
with 120 schools being destroyed or badly damaged. Although many were 
rebuilt in 1972, they remained overcrowded with very large classes. The 
construction of over 200 Anya Nya schools, mainly in Equatoria, indicated the 
willingness of people to build and operate their own schools, but the first 
Regional Government was faced with the decision whether to continue to 
operate these sub-grade schools or to raise the standard in only a limited 
nuntoer of schools. Secondary school places were very limited and higher 
education virtually non-existent. At all levels there was a lack of 
suitable buildings and equipment and a severe shortage of trained teachers.
It is difficult to assess the educational status of the total population 
of the Southern Region, Data on the highest level of school attended were 
collected in the 1973 census, but oily for the 7-24 years age group. This 
group accounted for a little over one million people, or 36% of the total 
population, of whan 20% were attending school or had attended school.
There were considerable provincial differences. In Equatoria 44% of the 
7-24 year age group were or had attended school, 19% in Upper Nile, and 
only 6% in Bahr El Ghazal. (7) It was estimated that of the total population 
of the Southern Region, only 10% had attended or were attending school.(8)
A study undertaken in 1974 discovered that the marked differences at council 
level continued two years after the settlement. For example in 1974, of 
the children in the 7-13 year age group in Yei, as many as 49% were 
attending school, while in Fan gale the level was as low as 1%.(9) Of those 
employed in the modem sector, over half (58%) had never attended school.
Of the 80,000 who had received at least one year of education, almost all 
had left at primary level. Only 15,000 people had passed through secondary 
school and only 4,300 had been to university or some other centre of 
higher education. Of agricultural workers employed in the modem sector,75% 
had never attended school, and among administrative officers 23% had been 
educated to only junior secondary level. Throughout the Southern Region 
there was a severe shortage of people with any kind of technical training, 
especially mechanics, drivers, builders and carpenters.
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The shortage of trained personnel affected all sectors of the economy, 
but was perhaps most marked in the Regional administration. Of a sample 
of administrative officers considered in 1974, 67% had only two or less 
years of experience in the administrative service, and as many as 65% 
were under 35 years of age. As we have noted the overall educational 
standard of such officers was low, with only 18% being graduates. Not 
only were there marked differences in educational attainment levels, but 
also in previous experience. While 10% had sane experience of the old 
administrative service, as many as 48% were recruited frcm the parallel 
administration of the Anya Nya. (10) The administration had a broad 
base of Inexperienced new recruits, but was seriously short of experienced 
personnel capable of organizing and training the new cadres. In the 
various ministry headquarters in Juba the situation was equally bad.
There was a severe shortage of personnel at the highest levels, and for 
example in the Ministry of Agriculture alone there was a 50% vacancy rate 
in 1975. Although the level of education among the key decision makers 
in the Regional Government was high, there was a general lack of 
administrative experience among Regional Ministers.
Transportation
The adnhnistration of the Southern Region and the operation of basic social 
services was severely hampered by the virtual non-existence of any modem 
transport infrastructure. Deficiencies in transport and communications 
had contributed markedly to the relative under-development of the Southern 
Region. The colonial policy of strictly controlled movement hampered 
the growth of an adequate transport network, and limited interaction 
between North and South. This policy, combined with the climatic 
restraints on road and rail building, limited the innovation diffusion 
frcxn Khartoum, Until the building of the railway to Wau in 1961, the 
River Nile was the only real surface link with the outside world. The 
resultant high transport costs inhibited the development of exports from 
the region; commodities which could have been produced at low cost in Juba 
became uneconomic when compared with imported goods at Khartoum. The 
commodity flow, except for a brief period during World War II, has always 
been heavily incoming.
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Intra-regional conmunications have always been poor, the colonial 
administration depending to a large extent on river transport. In 
Equatoria and parts of Bahr El Ghazal sane all-weather roads were 
constructed, but in Upper Nile movement was virtually impossible by 
land during the rainy season. What transport system did exist was 
designed for administrative purposes, not as an instrument of development. 
Bad communications inhibited the growth pole effect of the provincial 
capitals and the impact of the urban centres was limited to the immediate 
vicinity. The civil war destroyed much of the existing infrastructure, 
roads and railway installations being a favourite target of the guerrilla 
forces. Rail services were restricted to daylight hours, roads were 
mined and bridges destroyed. The total freight forwarded from Juba, 
which had stood at 28.7 thousand tons in 1959/60, had fallen to 2.6 
thousand tons by 1971/72. At the restoration of peace in 1972, the 
Regional Government was faced with the enormous task of developing a 
huge area with virtually no real transport system. (11)
The peripheral position of the Southern Region presented the expected 
problems. Available transport facilities were more likely to be deployed 
in the all-important task of supplying Khartoum. Commodities entering 
the Sudan at Port Sudan were likely to be consumed in Khartoum and the 
North, instead of a percentage being reserved for the South. Similarly, 
with Sudan's limited manufacturing industry running at well below capacity, 
there were insufficient home produced goods to meet northern demands. Food 
and petrol supplies were often affected by these factors. Organization and 
communication within the various transport departments was less than ideal: 
a train loaded with grain would pass areas of shortage such as Aweil, to 
be unloaded at Wau where there was often a surplus. Distribution to rural 
areas was often hampered by a shortage of fuel. A large percentage of 
food suffered from bad handling and storage on route, with a resultant high 
level of deterioration and loss. There was a need for an increase in 
handling points along the various rail and river routes. A shortage of 
local transport meant that very few markets were functioning, and there was 
little incentive for the production of an agricultural surplus. Lack of 
transport coupled with few up-country storage facilities made it impossible 
for the farmer to take advantage of seasonal price rises, or to make any 
in vestment in cash crops.
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Chronic iuel shortages affected all modes of transport, and until 1975 
distribution had to be strictly controlled by the Regional Government, to 
ensure supplies for emergency services. However electricity cuts and a 
lack of filtered water were frequent features of life in Juba in 1974/5. 
Traditionally petrol had been transported by river but, due to the 
inefficiency of river transport, importation of fuel from East Africa 
was initiated although at great cost in foreign exchange and subject to 
the unstable situation in Uganda. Throughout the Southern Region there 
was a severe shortage of all kinds of vehicles, and where vehicles were 
made available by the Government or by international agencies the level 
of maintenance was so low that many relatively new vehicles were off the 
road as a result of misuse or a lack of spare parts. In almost all 
government departments, the implement at ion of development schemes was 
hindered by a lack of transport and fuel. Similarly affected were the 
administrative, security and social organization programmes however the 
most serious result was the government's inability to .alleviate the 
considerable food shortages of 1973/74.
Agriculture
As we have seen, a large proportion of the Southern Region population was 
employed in the production of basic food crops at subsistence level. 
Agricultural practices were at a very low level with shifting cultivation 
almost universal. Hand tools were very rudimentary and, with few improved 
seeds and little knowledge of fertilisers, yeilds were generally very 
low. The use of herbicides and insecticides was introduced on only a 
very limited scale. The average area of cultivation per family was about 
3 feddans with sorghum, millet, and maize as the staple food crops.
Of twenty-three council areas surveyed in 1974, over 75% reported a 
severe seasonal food shortage. (12) Mechanised agriculture had been 
initiated in some areas of Upper Nile and Bahr El Ghazal, but except in 
the Renk area it was generally unsuccess ful, suffering from the usual 
shortages of fuel, machinery and technical expertise. Other factors 
contributed to the low level of production in the agricultural sector. 
The shortage and low productivity of labour limited the area of 
cultivation. The necessity for seasonal cattle movements removed men
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from the land at crucial times, and their agricultural efficiency was 
limited by unproductive methods • There was a lack of local capital and 
self-help schemes were inadequately supported by the government. Without 
organized marketing there was no encouragement for the production of a 
surplus. Despite the large numbers of cattle in the area no use was 
made of then in cultivation or transportation.
What little cash crop production there had been was discouraged by the 
civil war and by the government confiscation of private enterprises in 
the early seventies. Because of the security situation and often as a 
matter of political expediency, cash crop production schemes had been 
mostly located in the North, and what little had been sited in the 
South had been under-manned and under-financed. Small-scale cash crop 
production, as had been common in Z an deland in the 1950's, had been 
discouraged by the complete breakdown of the marketing system.
Domestic animals are kept by most inhabitants in the Southern Region, 
with the exception of those in the tsetse belt; however in 1972 there 
was no real knowledge of the livestock population, the off-take rate 
was very low and the marketing system virtually non-existent. The major 
constraints were as follows. There was a lack of grazing during the 
dry season due to shortage of water supplies, and subsequent overgrazing 
in certain areas. There were serious losses due to a variety of cattle 
diseases, control measures having been abandoned during the war years. 
Traditional husbandry, although being exceptionally skilled in the 
keeping of cattle in extremely difficult conditions, contributed to 
high losses and determined selection of breeding animals in terms of 
appearance rather than in terms of economic considerations. Finally, and 
perhaps most significantly, traditional attitudes operated against 
the marketing of surplus animals, with a marked reluctance to sell, 
especially among the Nilotoc peoples, except during times of severe 
food shortage. As a result the animals offered for sale were either 
old or diseased. A contributory factor to this situation was a general 
shortage of consumer goods or services to encourage sales. (13)
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Although a beginning had been made in the sixties in the establishment 
of agro-industry, many of the installations had been destroyed or fallen 
into disuse during the civil war. Much of the machinery was old or 
obsolete or not functioning because of a lack of spare parts. There was 
a chronic fuel shortage, and insufficient trained personnel. In many cases 
plants had been wrongly located in areas where basic resources proved to 
be unavailable. For example the canning factory established in Wau could 
not find sufficient local supplies of meat or fruit and vegetables for 
processing. In the forestry industry, plantations had been sadly neglected, 
machinery was obsolete and there was no real information as to the true 
extent of reserves. In the fisheries industry, despite vast resources, up 
to a fifth of the annual catch was lost as a result of bad handling 
methods. Food processing plants could not encourage the production of 
sufficient supplies from a population that was as yet to produce a 
sufficiency of basic food crops. All such establishments suffered from 
a lack of fuel, building materials, machinery, personnel and any real 
marketing system. In most cases the area of production was far from the 
potential market, a situation exacerbated by the virtual non-existence 
of any modern transport infrastructure.(14)
Administration and Finance
The new administration in the Southern Region faced considerable 
difficulties, not least the ill-defined relationship with the Central 
Government, which we will consider in detail at a later stage. The work 
of the various departments was complicated by a lack of finance, trained 
personnel and the relative inexperience of certain high-level decision 
makers. Administrative infrastructure was generally insufficient, with 
a shortage of such basic things as suitable office accommodation, telephone 
corrmuni cat ions, transport, fuel and adequate housing. There was no real 
tradition of work in administration, and little delegation of responsibility. 
As a result the implementation rate of many ministries was correspondingly 
low. (15) Financial problems beset all department and development 
progrannies. The financial aspects of the peace agreement provided for
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the establishment of two separate budgets. Ihe Regional Government 
Recurrent Budget was designed to cover recurrent expenditure within 
the Region with three main sources of revenue: a direct transfer from 
the Central Government to cover expenditure on established government 
services within the region; reimbursement by the Central Government of 
direct and indirect taxes originating in the Southern Region, with indirect 
taxation on certain commodities such as sugar, tobacco and alcohol 
accounting for about 70%; and revenue from additional direct or indirect 
taxation imposed by the Regional Government. While transfers under this 
budget from the Central Government proved to be satisfactory, the Regional 
Government met with great difficulties in the collection of taxation 
locally. The main problems were insufficient personnel and the bad 
transportation system, in addition to an Initial unwillingness to tax 
people so recently returned to the country. Ihe recurrent budget for 
1972/73 stood at £S 7.5 million for administration and services with 
£S 4.6 million as grant-in-aid to the provinces. Local revenue unmounted 
to only a little over £S 1 million. Although planning for economic 
and social development is a Central Government function, the Regional 
Government prepares the second, the Special Development Budget, for which 
there are three sources of revenue: direct transfer from the Central 
Government; any surplus from the Regional Recurrent Budget; and any 
external assistance. Of the approved £S 1.4 million budgeted for in 
the 1972/73 Special Development Budget, only 40% was remitted. The 
situation was not to improve significantly in the following year, and of the 
£S 7.3 million approved for 1973/74, only 2.7% had been remitted by October 
1974, rising to only 14% by the end of the financial year. In addition to 
problems caused by the non-remittance of funds from the Centre, the 
Regional Government was also forced to divert funds to specifically Central 
Government projects located in the Southern Region.
The emotional appeal of post-war conditions in the Southern Region 
stimulated a considerable amount of short-term aid from international 
agencies. Great efforts were made by mentoers of the HEC to raise funds, and 
contributions were received from Austria, Denmark, West Germany, Sweden, 
Great Britain, America and the Netherlands. Despite their former anti-Arab 
feelings, the reality of the world financial situation forced the Regional 
Government to direct efforts towards the Arab World, and assistance was 
received from Abu Dhabi, Kuwait and Qatar. (16)
TABLE VIII SPECIAL DEVELOPMENT BUDGET BOR THE SOUTHERN REGION 1974/75:1975/76
1974/75 1975/76
MINISTRY Approved % Spent Approved % Spent
Agriculture 1,086,687 33.1 1,112,153 28.1
Corrmuni cations 376,656 40.1 380,648 26.6
Co-operation & Rural 
Development 525,000 6.2 525,000 31.2
Education 480,694 12.4 390,605 4.8
Finance 900,000 6.8 1,186,178 29.2
Housing 2,074,100 10.3 2,033,600 5.0
Health 400,064 8.9 401,016 2.2
Information 324,275 5.6 325,269 12.8
Ccranerce & Industry 361,429 2.5 223,031 18.7
Public Service 81,380 8.3 79,300 na
Regional Attain 123,625 10.5 123,631 8.1
Wildlife & Tourism 284,600 18,7 243,825 4.3
Grant in aid to 
the Provinces 117,000 53.8 140,000 21.4
TOTAL £S 7,135,510 15.0% £S 7,164,2 16.5%
Source: Democratic Republic of the Sudan, 
People's Regional Assembly, June
Budget Speech Presented to the 
1976. (undated) p.29.
TABLE IX SOUTHERN REGION REVENUE 1975/76
Approved
Revenue collected
by Regional Ministries 2,418,562
Cbllected
519,032
%
21.46
Revenue collected by 
Taxation Dept 1,610,200 1,133,489 70.39
Revenue collected by 
Central Government 1,729,336 64,150 0.04
TOTAL £S 5,758,098 £S 1,716,671 29.81%
Source: Democratic Republic of the Sudan, Ibid., p.2
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Development Constraints and Policies
From this brief look at conditions in 1972 we can appreciate the gravity 
of the situation inherited by the new Regional Government. The major 
constraints on development might be summarized as follows, and are as 
equally applicable today as they were at the time of the peace settlement.
Environment. Of the total area of the Southern Sudan, only a portion is 
usable. Without hydrological control large areas are either permanently 
flooded, or lack domestic water supplies. The shortage of accurate 
information regarding rainfall and soil resources results in wasted crop 
production efforts. Development of livestock production is limited by a 
shortage of pasture and the problem of tsetse, which together render un­
usable 38% of available grazing. Insufficient expenditure on both hunan 
and animal disease control has made the area a virtual reservoir of disease.
Infrastructure and Transportation. Without major improvements in this 
sector any real development will be inpossible. Electricity and water 
supplies are unreliable throughout the area. A lack of building materials 
frequently delays the implementation of building programmes and causes 
administrative difficulties. There is a chronic shortage of adequate 
housing with subsequent low morale. Deficiencies in transportation is the 
greatest single problem within the Region. Bad organization and antiquated 
systems contribute to food shortages and delay the arrival of the basic 
equipment for development. Transport costs from the Region inhibit in­
vestment in import substitute production. Within the Region, a chronic fuel 
shortage and poor road system adversely affect administration, the collection 
of revenue and the provision of social services.
Manpower. The high level of adult illiteracy and low standard of general 
health, throughout what is a relatively small population, effects the 
efficiency of the labour force. There is no tradition of the use of anything 
but the crudest of hand tools. A large percentage of the population have 
no employment experience, and the maintenance of a permanent labour force 
is often problematic where wage levels are very low and necessitate domestic 
food production. There is a severe shortage of trained artisans and 
administrative personnel at all levels.
Traditional attitudes. Insufficient explanation of development 
programmes has resulted in conflict over agricultural and grazing land.
The communal rights in land and cattle limits the effectiveness of 
the more educated members of the community. A shortage of consumer 
goods inhibits the production of a marketable agricultural surplus.
There is little incentive for many people to join the money economy.
Administrative organization. The division of responsibilities inhibits 
attempts at overall planning. High level decision makers are relatively 
inexperienced and all departments suffer from a shortage of qualified 
staff. Of particular importance is the shortage of agricultural extension 
workers. The delicate political situation has resulted in the widespread 
distribution of scarce resources, rather than their concentration in 
the most productive areas.
Finance. The administration and all development programmes are affected 
by a chronic financial shortage and the irregularities in the flow of 
funds from Khartoum. Local revenue is unlikely to show much appreciable 
increase over the next decade. Foreign assistance has given insufficient 
importance to infrastructural deficiencies. Any increase in production 
in the agricultural sector at smallholder level will be impossible 
without the establishment of some system of credit. There is an urgent 
need for some effective price control and the development of new 
marketing systems. With a continued dependence on the Central Government, 
whose financial position is far from good, financial constraints are 
likely to continue for some time to come.
The first Regional Government attacked these problems with a great deal 
of enthusiasm and a sometimes embarrassing honesty, but obviously none 
of these constraints on development could be removed overnight. Accordingly, 
towards the end of the first five year period of regional autonomy, a 
general optimism had been replaced by a more realistic attitude.
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This more realistic attitude was outlined by the president of the HEC,
Abel Alier,in May 1976, and was in part a reply to increasing criticisn 
of the slow rate of development in the Southern Region. He surrmarized 
the task undertaken in 1972 as being 1 ... .to ensure harmony, to ensure 
the growth and enlargement of goodwill among all people resident in 
the Region and, we hoped, all over the country; to ensure that peace 
prevailed being good, desirable and necessary in itself and a prerequisite 
basis for short and long term economic and social progress. I cannot 
pretend that we succeeded, difficult as the task was and still is. We 
only tried our best under difficult conditions....1. New policies for 
the social services were announced which had ’... .no pretence about our 
resources.... ' (17) and aim to take basic services to the 90% of the 
people living in the rural areas, rather than allowing the concentration 
of facilities In urban centres. A primary health care programme is to 
be established in which the emphasis will be placed on preventive 
rather than curative medicine, (IB) Similarly in the educational field 
Alier stressed the need for self-help programmes to provide equality of 
opportunity at the lowest level ’... .we must continue to expand education, 
not limit it to a privileged few... .we have adopted as part of our
CL
development strategy provision of basic education and are devising^more 
acceptable distribution of educational opportunity among communities in 
rural and urban areas.... ’ The educational system was to be in line with 
development objectives and the policy of self-reliance '.,..education 
must prepare a child to be practical and useful to himself and his 
community. This means when the child completes school... .he should have 
been fully prepared to be useful to himself and to the village or town 
from which he originally came and above all to his parents on the farm 
if he comes from a rural area. He should not be educated to become a 
misfit and more of a nuisance to his community. In our agriculturally 
oriented society, he should learn the use of the hoe as much as he is 
required to learn the use of the pen....1 (19)
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In explaining the agricultural policy, Alier focused attention on the 
traditional nature of production methods within a basically subsistence 
economy. However one might wish to change the situation 1.. .the nation 
is poor, though we sometimes find it painful to acknit this, and we 
sane times act and speak as if we had everything of material wealth.... 
it might be potentially rich but it takes considerable resources in terms 
of in-puts and time to develop potential riches .... we must start with 
the resources at our disposal ... .we have no resources for an immediate 
and radical replacement of traditional agriculture except the 500,000 
families .... whom we must mobilize for agricultural activity.' (20)
The government is prepared to help in the provision of inproved seeds, 
hand tools and extension services, and the eradication and control of 
major livestock diseases. The president pointed out that 'where programmes 
have been more ambitious, results have not always been encouraging, and 
he cited the mechanized agricultural schemes where r... . only a few 
citizens get substantial benefits.' In conclusion Alier suimed up the 
policy of self-reliance and self-help as meaning that ’... .the people 
must work to produce food and cash crops and provide essential services 
for themselves. It is primarily they to shoulder these responsibilities 
... .we have accepted to start modestly on development because the reality 
of our financial situation leaves no choice .... there is no alternative 
to patient and painstaking building of the South, and the Sudan for that
matter our expectations have been unrealistic and misguided. A modest
start and full recognition of our poverty would have been more helpful 
to our progress, than living\in a fools paradise.' (21)
This policy statement has been quoted at length to illustrate the attitude 
of the Regional Government after the first few years of autonomy. Gone 
are the initial plans for widespread economic and social change, to be 
replaced by very much reduced expectations. In these first few years
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there was certainly an improvement in living conditions. By 1976 
food shortages had more or less been brought under control and an 
increasing nuriber of schools had been opened. The transportation 
system had been inproved and links established with both the North 
and with East Africa. (22) By 1977 the administrative chaos of 
the early period had been to a large extent reduced. However, even 
after five years the real success has been only in terms of rehabilitation 
rather than in development. A depressing nuntoer of projects fail to 
make any real headway, and many of these were suggested as long ago as 
1950, or have been at various stages of construction since the mid-sixties. 
The Southern Region has so far failed to attract the necessary large-scale 
investment from either Khartoum or frcm foreign sources, and is therefore 
forced back upon its own very limited resources. Part of the reason for 
the disappointment of both the Regional Government and the Southern 
people will be explained by a closer look at the realities of power 
sharing in the five years since the peace settlement.
Local Govemrrent
Tb understand the experience of power sharing in the first five years 
of regional autonomy, it is important first to understand the change 
in policy introduced by the May Revolution. The architects of the 
revolution saw as a major part of their philosophy the need for a 
change in the relationship between government and the people with 
the ultimate aim of decentralization, with provincial autonomy and 
self-sufficiency in basic services at every council level, and the break up
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of grass-roots support for the old politico/religious factions that 
had bedevilled government for so long. (23)
The major vehicle for implementation was the People's Local Government 
Act of 1971, 'which was designed to integrate grass-roots political 
representation and administrative decision malting and implementation, 
from the province level downwards. The system is divided into three 
hierarchies. The professional local government hierarchy is headed 
at province level by the most important individual in the whole system, 
the Provincial Commissioner. Ihe caimissioner is the chief representative 
of government in each province and is responsible for general policy, 
control, co-ordination and supervision of all government departments 
at work in the province, and for the maintenance of law and order.
Athough he heads the local government machinery, he is directly appointed 
by the President, and is more likely to be a politician than a 
professional administrator. Below the commissioner,there is a complete 
hierarchy of local gpvemrrent officers, inspectors, administrators and 
in some areas a native administration, all central or regional appoint­
ments.
The Provincial Commissioner works closely with the People's Province 
Executive Council (PPEC) which heads the second - the representative 
hierarchy. This council has binding policy-making powers in the 
maintenance of law and order, the imposition of taxation, the preparation 
of budgets and the initiation and administration of economic development 
projects. The council is made up of indirectly elected representatives
-  n u ts  -
i ssa ■H
•H
£ CO
C--
0> P  0> 
rH rH
&  ° &8 $ <d 
ftWft
m
mn
>  -*
O P  p to
O *H
LU
Q. p
^  8 O -H
Q
■H
CO< - - GO -
P  f-i
i—I •H P
■H
-H
p
d
E
SKZOT M X  301033 3HX 3DMIA0Ud 3HX
-  209 -
from the subordinate network of people's councils, and nominated 
officials from government departments. Both these hierarchies stretch 
down to the grass-roots level of chief's courts (in the Southern Region) 
and village councils, each body delegating selected powers and duties, 
and taking responsibility for the actions of their subordinates.
The relationship between these two hierarchies is obviously very important 
and the pattern tends to be set by the relationship between the 
Commissioner and the PPEC. The Commissioner is ex-officio chairman 
and treasurer of the council, and his immediate subordinate is secretary 
and deputy chairman. The Commissioner is responsible for implementing 
the decisions of the council but has a staying veto over those with 
which he may not agree. There are no detailed guidelines in the 
legislation for the dividing and sharing of over-lapping responsibilities, 
and,in common with many relationships within the system, much depends 
on the individual personalities involved.
The third hierarchy in the local government system is that of the Sudan 
Socialist Oiion (SSU) Again it is designed to complement and parallel 
the administrative and representative hierarchies, and its main function 
is to mobilize popular participation in policy making and ensure active 
support for the government. Again the commissioner heads the SSU 
hierarchy within the province, and his subordinate officials are also 
required to shoulder political responsibilities. The commissioners' 
political role has recently been slightly altered by the appointment of 
Province political supervisors. They are members of the SSU Executive 
Bureau in Khartoum, who form a direct link between the local party and 
President Nimeiri, and tend to be used as channels of information 
and as trouble shooters. Again their relationship with the commissioner 
is not really defined, but obviously they usually outrank him. Neither 
is the relationship defined between the SSU and the more junior echelons 
of the administration. The unfortunate local government officer can 
cane under fire from three separate directions, and in some cases his 
relationship with the local SSU has been problematic, in that before 
1969 the Sudan local government service had a tradition of political 
non-involvement. Similarly, the local chief in the Southern Region can
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be assailed from all sides, and his position may be extremely difficult, 
especially in societies with no pre-colonial tradition of centralized 
leadership. A further factor contributing to the power of the 
Commissioner is his relationship with the Central Ministries in Khartoum, 
Personnel from these ministries, while at work in the province, are 
actually seconded to him, and therefore under his control.
Obviously there are problems associated with such a complex system and, 
not surprisingly, the main problem is financial. While the aim is 
provincial autonomy and financial self-sufficiency, most provinces are 
far from that state and must rely on grants-in-aid from the centre, a 
source of supply outside their control. There is therefore a very real 
danger of responsibility without resources. In addition, the province 
is required to meet the wages of seconded Central ministry personnel, 
while having no control over Central ministry spending. There is an even 
greater danger of responsibility without resources at the lower council 
levels, which have inadequate revenue bases and only tenous claims 
to provincial or central government funds. There is hardly an existing 
rural council which is not substantially in debt. The disparities in 
revenue ^raising capability will also tend to institutionalize the already 
marked disparities in wealth and development. The massive increase in 
the number of councils -in the Northern Sudan they have grown from 128 
to over 4,000- has severely strained both manpower and infrastructure, 
and in many cases in the South warrants have had to be witheld from 
councils which already exist on paper, (24)
Relationships between the province and the Central ministries have 
become more indirect. Once an official has been seconded to a province, 
although his work may be inspected, complaints could until recently (1977) 
be made through the Ministry of People's Local Government. Since mid - 
1977 the ministry has been closed and such complaints would have to be 
routed straight to the President.
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Despite these obvious drawbacks, the system is gradually being established 
throughout the country, with power increasingly accruing to the Province 
Caimissioner, at the expense of the Central Ministries, and at the same 
time his relationship with the President and the SSU Executive Bureau 
is becoming increasingly direct. In order better to inplement the People’s 
Local Government Act, the northern provinces of the Sudan v/ere sub-divided 
in 1974 into twelve provinces, in an attempt to ensure that each province 
was capable of becoming an economic and socially self-sufficient unit.
The rationale behind the sub-division was the creation of units small 
enough to be efficiently administered, in which, as far as possible, 
ecological conditions were sufficiently uniform to allow the adoption of 
a province development plan for each unit. In addition the sub-division 
was to reflect the life-styles and tribal affinities of the people, in 
that they should be sufficiently close to enable local government 
participation to be representative, and so make people feel that 
governmental decisions had at the very least taken their personal interests 
into account. In 1976 the subdivision of the three Southern provinces 
was announced, and in addition to the original three with their original 
capitals, a further three new provinces were created: Lakes, sometimes 
refered to as El Buheyrat with its capital at Runbek; Jonglei with its 
capital at Bor; and Western Equatoria with its capital at Yantoio. As a 
result of this sub-division and the increasing importance of the Province 
Ccmnissioner, the Southern Region is becoming less of an entity and more 
a collection of six autonomous provinces in direct contact with the 
Presi den cy. (25)
However, rather than a very simple model of a central government and 
eighteen similar provinces, one must see it as a central government and an 
inner and outer ring of dissimilar provinces. The inner ring, made up of 
Khattoun, Blue Nile, Gezira, Red Sea, Nile and White Nile provinces, have a 
variety of advantages. They are physically nearer the centre of power and 
have a greater share of Sudan's limited transport network. They have the 
most developed agricultural sectors and a disproportionate share of 
Sudan's limited manufacturing industry. With better social infrastructure
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they produce a larger proportion of the educated people which is 
reflected in a greater degree of representation in the central 
government. The dominance of these provinces is also likely to be 
continued by Sudan’s profit-oriented policy for the location of 
agricultural and industrial projects - a policy which is often 
insisted upon by foreign investors. In a review of major development 
projects published in June 1977, 65% of the total concerned these 
favoured provinces, while their share of infrastructure projects was 68%, 
rising to 71% of all new manufacturing industry projects,(26)
The outer ring of provinces, namely Northern, Kassala, Northern Kordofan, 
Southern Kordofan, Northern Darfur, Southern Darfur, Bahr El Ghazal, Lakes, 
Jonglei, Upper Nile, Eastern Equatoria and Western Equatoria are generally 
disadvantaged. While constituting about 79% of the total area of the Sudan, 
they have only about 59% of the population, with population densities 
dropping below two persons per square kilometer in Northern and Jonglei 
Provinces. Their economies are largely based on traditional agriculture 
with low levels of production the result of large areas of infertile soils, 
insufficient rainfall or inadequate drainage. They have the added problem 
of a considerable nomadic population. The transportation network is 
generally inadequate throughout the Sudan, but provinces such as Lakes and 
Jonglei have neither a railway link, a major airport nor even a metalled 
road. The newly created provinces in the Southern Region have additional 
problems in the creation of new province capitals. In September 1977, 
more than a year since the subdivision of the Southern Provinces, both 
Ruirbek and Yantoio were still awaiting the installation of an electricity 
service. (27)
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Regional Government
In the previous chapter we outlined the institutional provisions for 
regional autonomy in the Southern Region. Tb recapitulate, regional 
executive power is vested in the High Executive Council whose menbers are 
the now fourteen Regional Ministers, and whose president is Abel Alier.
They are appointed and relieved of of fire by President Nimeiri, and are 
responsible both to the President and to the legislative organ in the 
South, the People's Regional Assembly, (PRA). While some of the ministers 
are members of the PRA, and so consider themselves popularly elected, 
sane are straight nominations. Relations between the PRA, soon to 
have 120 seats, and the HEC are usually very strained, with the Regional 
Ministers often in an inpossible position, between Khartoum and the 
elected representatives of the Southern people, whose chief aim appears 
to be the defence of an autonomy which perhaps they have overestimated.
The HEC's relationship with the PRA is frequently endangered when ministers 
have to obey directions from Khartoum. Accordingly they prejudice their 
individual popularity, which remains a much more important factor in the 
South than in the North. The menbers of the HEC do not have a high level 
of support in the Southern Region, and if the PRA was permitted to decide 
its membership there would be significant changes. Unlike the menbers 
of the National Assembly, who seem to be content with a very secondary 
role, the menbers of the PRA, in perhaps their first experience of 
government, expected a much greater involvement in policy formulation, 
freedom to criticize the government, and an altogether much more democratic 
role than has actually been allowed them. lb llowing the failure of their 
efforts to change policies or to expose government weaknesses, and the 
inprisonment or voluntary exile of several of their menbers, they have 
be cane generally frustrated or have lost interest, and there is often 
difficulty in raising a quorun. One main criticism levelled at the HEC 
by the PRA is the slow rate of development, or perhaps more accurately 
rehabilitation, of the Southern Region. If we look closely at the 
realities of power sharing, sons of the reasons will become apparent.
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The Realities of Power Sharing
Perhaps the biggest problem is the lade of definition of areas of 
responsibility. Within the Region possible areas of conflict exist.(28) 
In the relationship between the HEC and the local government system, more 
of the power of the regional ministries is eroded by the system of 
secondment of personnel to the province. The relationship between 
Ministers and Province Conmissioners is a possible source of conflict 
with more and more of the day-to-day administration be caning the 
responsibility of the ccmnissioner. In fact in Juba, the seat of the 
Regional Government, and the province capital of Eastern Equatoria, many 
decisions have first to be referred to the Province Commissioner, with a 
high degree of confusion over the delimitation of responsibilities.
Having so recently come to power, and being relatively inexperienced, 
all the different agencies and individuals are exceedingly jealous of 
their areas of competence, so that instead of co-operation there is a high 
degree of departmentalization, amounting in some cases to secrecy. Any 
attempt to liaise between the ministries themselves, or between ministry 
and province is made very difficult, with widespread suspicion that any 
attempt at co-operative effort is an attempt to diminish the powers of 
the individual. With the acute shortage of personnel and the lack of 
administrative experience, there is a general disinclination to delegate. 
In addition the ’ethnic arithmetic' policies of Alier have attenpted to 
distribute portfolios and commissionerships between the different ethnic 
groups, rather than strictly according to merit. This all tends to 
frustrate the implementation of anything approaching an integrated 
development policy. The result is a good deal of overlapping and 
duplication of effort or a complete failure to implement programmes. At 
the village level, where once there was perhaps only the local chief, 
there may now be as many as five different agencies operating: the SSU, 
the native administration, the village council, the Regional member of 
parliament and the National member of parliament.
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Lack of co-ordination has resulted in a great deal of disappointment when, 
for example, a village has been encouraged by one agency to build its own 
dispensary, only to find that another agency is not capable of supplying 
the necessary drugs. Numerous villages have responded to the government's 
call for greater self-reliance by building their own schools, only to 
find that the Regional Government cannot supply a qualified teacher, and 
that if they wish their school to operate, they must somehow find both 
the teacher and his salary themselves. This duplication is only a problem 
in the more acessible areas. In places such as parts of Pibor District, 
accessible for cmly three months of the year, many people remain largely 
unaware that much of the organization even exists.
Relationships between the HEC and Khartoum are neither easier nor any 
better defined. The inexperience and inefficiency of Regional Ministries 
lays them open to a good deal of criticism, and they can often be over-ruled. 
If a project is designated as a National project, it remains the overall 
responsibility of the Central Ministry concerned, although located in the 
Southern Region. With this kind of overlap, planning for the Regional 
Ministries is made very difficult. Unilateral decisions taken by President 
Nimeiri also add to the confusion. In 1976 he announced that Juba would 
have television by 1977. The Regional Ministry of Information lacked the 
expertize to contribute to the project and implementation was managed 
entirely by the Central Ministry; however it is the Regional Ministry 
that is left with the day-to-day problems of operating the service. Neither 
do the more defined areas of responsibility facilitate planning. For 
example, while road transport is the responsibility of the Regional 
Government, they have no control over the planning of associated air, rail 
or river services. The Southern Region also tends to be under-represented 
on the various Central Government planning bodies in Khartoum. For example, 
an absolutely vital piece of legislation to the Southern Region, the 
Promotion of Agricultural Investment Act 1976, which governs among other 
things the location of private investment agricultural projects in the 
Sudan, has a deciding body of twelve members, of whom only one is from the 
South. Many Regional Ministers seem not only ill-informed as to what happens 
in Khartoum, but also fairly pessimistic as to their ability to influence 
decisions.
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Southern representation at the centre has in fact been steadily declining. 
Although the president of the HEC, Abel Alier, is a Vice-President 
of the Sudan, of the sixty-eight people who constitute the national 
leadership only seven are from the South. Of these, six are in the SSU 
Executive Bureau, one of whom is a cabinet minister, and one is a state 
minister. Of the two ministers, the cabinet minister is responsible for 
Culture and Information and the state minister for Foreign Affairs; while 
nationally important, neither area is of crucial importance to the economic 
development of the Southern Region. Of the seven Southern representatives 
at the centre, four are Dinka.
One of the areas in which the Regional Government has, in theory, some 
freedom of action, is in the initiation of its own development projects, 
in accordance with national plans. Which brings us to the area of greatest 
difficulty, finance. From our examination of the situation in 1972 we 
can appreciate the early financial problems, and during the first five 
years the situation has not greatly improved. The local revenue raised 
in 1974/75 was only £S 1.5 million, and so the bulk of financial support 
must continue to come from Khartoum. The Regional Government has no 
control over Central Government spending and in 1974/75 only 15% of the 
promised £S 7 million under the Special Development Budget was actually 
remitted. (29) Reports of the situation in mid-1977 would appear to be 
encouraging, with remittances being made regularly, but one would need 
to be very optimistic to expect the total allocation for the Southern 
Region in 1977/78 of £S 58 million to be received. Obviously unless the 
situation changes drastically, little development can be effectively 
planned or initiated, and neither can the Regional Government provide 
more than the very simplest of inputs to encourage people to increase 
production, or to raise the standard of living. The result has been a 
considerable degree of dissatisfaction as both Regional Government and the 
people have slowly realized that many of the hopes and expectations of 
1972 were wildly unrealistic.
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With so much of its possible influence being retained by the Centre or 
eroded by the development of the local government system and the increasing 
power of the Province Commissioners , the Regional Government is being 
increasingly isolated and made Ineffective and would seem to have little 
future other than as a backwater of the main government system. The real 
solution to the problem of power sharing in the Sudan, and the beginnings 
of some kind of national unity, seems then to have been in the policy of 
decentralization outlined in the People's Local Government Act, rather 
than in the provisions for Regional autonomy. Although the Nimeiri 
government could offer what appeared to be a measure of self-government 
in 1972, its decentralization policy ensured the eventual Integration 
of the Southern Provinces within the country as individual units, so 
ceasing to perpetuate the sense of confrontation between North and South, 
and also accommodating the desire for a degree of autonomy among other 
disaffected groups. Dr. Jaafar Ali Bakheit made this quite clear at 
the time of the Addis Ababa Agreement. At a press conference held on 
3rd March, 1972 he stressed the fact that the powers being made available 
to the Regional Government were in fact already available through the 
People's Local Government Act of 1971. He explained that there was no 
basis for the fears of same Northerners at the winning of autonomy by the 
South, and implied a criticism of people in the North for failing to take 
the opportunity to exercise the legal powers granted to all provinces.
' This may be a lesson to Northerners to awaken them.1 (30)
Threats to Continued Peace: Regional Pressures and Military Integration
After the first five years, many outside observers have come to cmsider 
peace as something of an established fact in the Sudan, and they can 
perhaps be forgiven for assuming, on the basis of official information, 
that the settlement has became institutionalised - that its legitimacy 
and effectiveness has been widely accepted throughout the country. However, 
that is not quite the case; the balance of power remains precarious and 
the continuation of peace is subject to a variety of threats. First, we
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shall consider the threats originating in the Southern Region itself.
We have alreacfy noted the dissatisfaction at the slow rate of economic 
development and the erosion of the originally assumed powers of the 
Regional Government by the process of decentralization, and if we look 
mere closely at the composition of the Regional Government we shall 
discover further areas of potential conflict.
At the time of writing the Regional Assembly has sixty seats representing 
constituencies of four different types. There are thirty territorial 
constituencies, evenly distributed throughout the three provinces which 
may be contested by any citizen of the Southern Region over twentyfive 
years of age, regardless of sex or religion. There are a further eighteen 
popular organization constituencies which may only be contested by members 
of the popular organizations of the SSU; workers alliance, farmers and 
village development committees, Sudanese Womens Union, intellectuals,
Sudanese Youth Union and national capitalists. Candidates for these 
constituencies are subject to the scrutiny of the SSU secretariat in 
the province. The organized forces, that is the aimed forces, the police 
and the prison service, have one seat each for which the encuntoants are 
appointed. Finally there are a further nine seats allotted to administrative 
unit constituencies. Of the sixty merrbers, fifty-one are Christians and 
nine are Muslims. It is immediately apparrent that the active members of 
the SSU represent a formidable group within the assembly, especially 
when one notes that the basic rules of the SSU compel a member to follow 
the directions of his party superiors.
When the PRA started work in 1973 it reflected,not only the new political 
consciousness of the SSU, but also most of the old political affiliations 
and splinter groups that had bedevilled the Southern leadership during 
the civil war. A fundamental cleavage soon became apparent between what 
Kasfir has termed the 'outsiders' and the 'insiders' (31), which in effect 
distinguishes between those who had been hardline advocates of secession 
and those who had worked with Khartoum towards a compromise solution. With 
this kind of composition the PRA was bound to look critically at the 
membership of the HEC.
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While the provisional HEC appointed at the time of the agreement was 
fairly representative of the different interests, it has become gradually 
less representative, with insiders out-numbering outsiders. Mere specifically, 
there were suggestions that the Southern Front was ruling the Southern 
Region in the name of the SSU. (32) While some ministries, such as 
agriculture and industry, have enjoyed a degree of stability, others such 
as housing and regional acininistration have had as many as four different 
ministers in five years. There was sore dissatisfaction at the number of 
Dinka In the HEC in 1974 and 1975, when they numbered six out of a total 
of twelve, but by 1977 this majority had disappeared and they now hold 
five out of a total of fifteen portfolios.
There is a tendency for the PRA to see many of the menbers of the HEC
as little more than extensions of central government influence, and some 
have been particularly criticised for their close links with Khartoum.
Others have been attacked for conspicuous displays of wealth relative 
to the general standard of living in Juba, usually manifested in the 
ownership of expensive motor cars, despite the chronic fuel shortage 
and the very United extent of asphalted roads in the Regional capital. 
Attempts to investigate allegations of mal-practice have often not been 
satisfactorily concluded. An enquiry into the alleged misappropriation 
of £S 90,000 had passed through the committee stage in May 1976, but 
had not been resolved by August 1977. (33) At the end of the civil war 
there were many who thought themselves deserving of a prominent position 
in the civilian administration which quite simply had not sufficient posts 
to go around; as a result,some of the dissatisfaction with the HEC must 
be interpreted as personal disappointment rather than true opposition.
The distrust between the legislature and the executive dates from the 
first few sittings of the PRA. The Addis Ababa Agreement stated that the
president of the HEC should be appointed by the President on the
recommendation of the PRA. Following some criticism in the South of Alier's 
first year of office as head of the provisional HEC, Nimeiri endorsed 
Alier's candidature as the nomination of the SSU, in effect presenting a 
fait acompli to the assembly. Alier had not stood as a candidate in the
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elections for the PRA, and so was considered by some to have no popular 
mandate either within the Region or the assembly. This was the first 
sign that those in power might bend the rules when necessary.(34) In May 
1975 a vote of no confidence in the Speaker of the assembly, following 
an investigation into alleged mal-practioe known as the TECMA affair, and 
criticism of two ministers, led Alier to invite the assembly to consider his 
conduct. Again it was made clear that Khartoum would not countenance Alier's 
removal, and the situation remained confused until the election of Hilary 
Logali as Speaker, again as a SSU nominated cadi date. To ensure that his 
candidature was successful, a visit to the assembly was made by the 
Deputy Secretary General of the SSU, who went as far as to suggest that 
the other candidates for the position should stand down in favour of the 
SSU candidate. (35) In a Regional Government re-shuffle that followed 
these events, two Regional Ministers who had supported the original vote 
of no confidence, were removed from their posts, so confirming the widely 
held belief that the members of the HEC owed their positions primarily to 
the support of President Nimeiri and the SSU in Khartoum. The position 
of Alier and the HEC was not improved by the inprisonment in 1975 of 
two veteran Southern leaders and former ministers, Joseph Oduhu and 
Clement Mboro, as well as the Deputy Speaker of the PRA and one of its 
members. They were accused of sedition and planning against the Regional 
Government with Sudanese exiles.
It must be remembered that, at the time of the Addis Ababa Agreement, the 
SSU was in only a very early stage of development, and in fact no mention 
of it or the part it would play in the organization and implementation of 
regional autonomy was made in the agreement. In practice it would seem 
that resolutions are prepared by the HEC and the SSU group within the PRA, 
and then merely presented to the assembly for its approval. Understandably, 
many members of the PRA envisaged a role other than that of merely a rubber 
stamp.
While many people have attacked Abel Alier and the record of the executive 
over the first five years, others maintain that his policies have been 
instrumental in maintaining peace, and certainly he has shown a high 
degree of patience and tact in what has been a very difficult period.
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However there is growing criticism that while his policies of appeasement 
and his careful balancing of the ethnic arithmetic of the situation have 
facilitated the rehabilitation of the area, he lacks the dynamism to 
really motivate the people and effect something closer to real development. 
This criticism is probably both inevitable and necessary, but his 
contribution should not be under-estimated, both in helping to engineer 
the peace settlement and in tackling the very difficult task of its 
implementation. Fundamental changes were ejected following the elections 
for the PEA in November 1977, but these have now been postponed until 1978, 
and there has been much speculation about a sucessor to Alier. Certainly 
an HEC that more fully reflected professional ability rather than rewards 
for services rendered would perhaps be more effective in the task of 
developing the area. It will be instructive to see whether the process 
will be allowed to go ahead without pressure being exerted by the Central 
Government.
Suspicions that the Central Government has not kept to the letter of the 
agreement by interfering in the workings of the Regional Government, have 
been re-inforced by suspicions concerning the implementation of the 
provisions governing military strength in the Southern Region. As we 
have seen, it was agreed that the Southern Command should have a strength 
of 12,000 men, of which 6,000 would be from the established People's 
Aimed Forces (PAF), mainly Northerners, and 6,000 from the Anya Nya.
After initial administrative reorganization and training, the process 
of integrating the two forces would begin. While the operation of the 
ceasefire and the selection of ex-Anya Nya into the Southern Command was, 
under the circumstances, remarkably peaceful, the trouble began with the 
integration of the force into mixed units.
For the purposes of an initial trial, one ex-Anya Nya battalion from 
Juba and one PAF battallion from Yei were selected for integration in 
1973. They were chosen because of their proximity to the Southern 
Conmand HQ in Juba, and under close supervision the integration was 
achieved smoothly. However in September 1974 a unit of the ex-Anya Nya 
refused to obey an order to join a PAF unit, and noimality was only 
restored by the personal intervention of Joseph Lagu. (36) In March 1975
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ex-Anya Nya forces at Akobo in Upper Nile mutinied when PAF forces 
from Malakal were sent to join them, in the belief that they were 
to be disarmed. The Southern commanding officer and several soldiers 
were shot dead. At least thirteen soldiers escaped across the border 
into Ethiopia.(37) In the subsequent trial a further eight were 
executed and forty-eight imprisoned.(38) Again peace was restored 
by the personal intervention of Joseph Lagu and Abel Alier.
As part of the original plan it was thought necessary not only to Integrate 
the ex-Anya Nya with the PAF but also to mix all units in the Southern 
Region to break down the tribal basis of the Anya Nya units. In early 
1976 it was proposed to move troops from Kapoeta in Equatoria to Rumbek 
in Bahr El Ghazal, However they refused to be moved. By this time the 
government appreciated that the use of force would result only in desertions 
and an increasing number of armed men at large in the bush - rather as the 
situation had been in 1955. In February 1976 a unit of ex-Anya Nya forces 
deserted the garrison at Wau. Although many subsequently returned, this 
was not before the Commanding Officer for Bahr El Ghazal, Emmanuel Abur 
Nhial, had been shot dead. (39) The leader of the mutiny was eventually 
recaptured in the Central African Empire in 1977. On 2nd February 1977, 
fifty-seven members of the Air Defence Force mutinied in Juba and occupied 
the airport for seven hours. During the fighting ten people were killed. 
According to official sources their aim was to kill the leadership of 
the Regional Government. (40)
While not all these incidents stemmed directly from attempts at integration, 
they do indicate a lack of confidence among the ex-Anya Nya forces. 
Integration has continued, but not without the frequent personal intervention 
of Joseph Lagu, and the prooess will continue to necessitate extreme tact 
and consideration. A report on the military situation made by Abel Alier 
in May 1976 indicated that there were other areas of disquiet in the 
Southern Region over the implement ation of the peace agreement's military 
provisions. Alier was at pains to discount rumours that the number of
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Northern troops stationed in the South stood as high as 18,000, and had 
in fact not been substantially reduced since 1972. He maintained that 
the Southern Command was made up of 6,519 officers and men from within 
the region, and only 4,545 from the rest of the Sudan. It was also 
necessary for Alier to counter rumours that the Southerners in the Southern 
Command were issued with inferior arms and that, together with the strategic 
positioning of camps, the Northern units enjoyed a stronger military 
position that the ex-Anya Nya. (41) It is impossible to verify these 
figures, but the fact that it was thought necessary to clarify the issue 
indicates the degree of suspicion in the South as to the faithful 
implementation of the peace agreement. In seeking to explain the series 
of military incidents in the South over the past five years, the official 
government spokesman has drawn attention to the timing of the incidents, 
usually to coincide with the celebration of Unity Day on the 3rd of March 
when the country celebrates the end of the civil war, and has attributed 
them to the actions of the opposition to the Nimeiri regime. (42) This 
brings us to a consideration of the pressures on continued peace emanating 
from the Northern Sudan.
Northern Pressures
The Addis Ababa Agreement is by no means accepted as being institutionalised 
by the people of the Northern Sudan. While those who can appreciate the 
advantages that it has brought are not optimistic as to the likelihood of 
continued peace, others opposing the present regime oonsider that the whole 
political and constitutional framework of Sudanese life will be revised, 
if and when Nimeiri falls from power. They see the agreement as being very 
much linked to the person of Nimeiri, and they consider that his demise 
would necessitate, and in fact present an opportunity for a complete 
reappraisal of the situation between the North and the South. An attack 
upon the stability of the South is therefore, more often an attack upon 
Nimeiri himself. While the peace agreement remains his major achievement, 
it will remain the area most subject to attack.
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Over the past five years there have been repeated allegations of attempts 
made in the North to sabotage the development of the South. These 
allegations are usually made against the workers in the transport sector, 
who before 1969 were among the most organised labour forces in the Sudan.
In this sense the South retains its old position as an adjunct to 
Northern politics. There is also a great deal of dissatisfaction in the 
North about the cost of peace, and it is generally believed that peace 
has been more expensive than war. In parts of Eastern Sudan and in the 
far West, conditions are equally as bad in some areas as they are in the 
South, and the population resents the amount of money it believes has 
been spent on the South, and the international assistance attracted by the 
emotional appeal of the situation in the South in 1972,In many conversations 
with Northern Sudanese the writer was faithfully assured that the Southern 
leadership was hopelessly corrupt and that the country's money was being 
wasted in the Southern Region.
What goodwill there is towards the South in the rest of the country is 
very much more a feature of Nimeiri's continued interest and support than 
any widespread popular phenomenon. Among certain echelons of the civil 
service there is scxne reluctance to assign men and resources to the 
Southern Region, and often the most trivial matter has to be taken to 
the highest level. One essential factor to understand is that to most 
Southerners the agreement is embodied in Nimeiri; they expect fair 
treatment from him, while a general distrust of the North tends to continue. 
This respect and devotion to Nimeiri is maintained by his frequent visits 
to all parts of the Southern Region, and his occasional personal and 
direct involvement in problem solving. It is not unusual for Nimeiri to 
personally take over the day-to-day running of a Central Ministry during 
a period of absence by the minister. He recently described his position 
as follows '.... I am acting within my capacity as a symbol of Sudanese 
national unity,1 (43)
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Threats to Nimeiri are threats to the agreement, and during his eight 
years in power there have been many attempted coup d'etats both disclosed 
and undisclosed, against Nimeiri himself and his regime. With the 
virtual demise of the Sudan Communist Party in 1971, the main opposition 
has come from the right wing, centred mainly on the figure of Saddiq El 
Mahdi and his followers among the Ansar sect, in co-operation with the 
remnants of the various political factions outlawed in May 1969. (44)
El Mahdi has been prepared to co-operate with the dissaffected within 
the country, and his alliances have often involved regional interest 
groups. In the attenpted coup d’etat of 1975 he utilized the dis­
satisfactions of the large Nuba component in the People's Armed Forces,(45) 
and in many of the military incidents in the Southern Region he has worked 
through exiled Southern politicians. The political background to the 
various attenpted coup d'etats is not our concern here, but what is 
important is that one of the consistent aims of groups wishing to over­
throw the government has been the reorganization of regional power sharing. 
The leader of the attenpted coup d'etat of September 1975, Colonel Hasan 
Husayn, a member of an influential Kordofan family, outlined his intensions 
at his trial in Atbara in late 1975. The Sudan would be governed by four 
military committees consisting of administrators, army and police officers 
with responsibility for foreign, economic, security and electoral affairs. 
The Southern Region was to be governed by purely military committees.(46)
In the very much more serious coup attempt of July 1976, again launched 
by Saddiq El Mahdi with the assistance of Libya and Ethiopia, there was 
nothing to indicate that the attitude of the opposition had changed, and 
one must assume that should the right wing ever regain power, they will 
wish to abandon the Addis Ababa Agreement, or at the very least, to 
substantially rewrite it.
A further threat to the institutionalization of the agreement and the 
continuance of domestic peace emerged from the statement of Saddiq El 
Mahdi after the abortive 1975 coup d'etat. He is reported as saying 
that one of his major aims would be the establishment in the Sudan of 
a modem Islamic State with an Arab and Islamic identity. (47)
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It is difficult to imagine that the precarious detente between the 
North and the South would withstand such pressures. While Nimeiri 
has recently offered a general amnesty to all Sudanese exiles, and 
Saddiq El Mahdi has returned to the country, it would be foolhardy 
to imagine that there will not be further attempts to overthrow the 
regime with a resultant renewal of domestic strife.
As we have seen the agreement has functioned, not because it has become 
institutionalized, but rather as a result of the personal efforts of 
Nimeiri, Alier and Lagu, and there must be considerable doubt as to 
whether it could continue to function without then. Paradoxically, the 
process of institutionalization is inhibited by Nimeiri's personal style 
of government, succinctly described by Pool. 'In this Presidential system, 
Nimeiri stands at the centre of these multiple structures of control (the 
Cabinet, the SSU, the assemblies) co-ordination and information, none of 
which is permanently dominant. Through a flexible management of the 
governmental, administrative and political situations and the personalities 
heading them, Nimeiri is able to balance, to expand and to limit their 
respective influence and roles so that there is no continuity of 
institutional or factional primacy,' (48) While this policy prevents 
any individual or group within the recognised political framework from 
challenging Nimeri' s position, it undermines the establishment of 
confidence in the dependability of the administrative framework.
External Pressures
While Nimeiri currently appears capable of balancing the different 
forces within the state, his susceptibility to military attack and 
his financial dependence on his Arab neighbours exposes his domestic 
policies to pressures from outside, which indirectly threaten the 
detente with the South.
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Following the repeated attacks on the Sudan by both Libya and Ethiopia, 
the Sudan has sought a closer relationship with Egypt, and in February 
1977 signed a joint political command agreement with Egypt. (49)
The agreement assured Sudan of military support from the other 
signatories, but committed her to closer ties with the Arab World, 
especially with Yemen, Oman, Somalia and Saudi Arabia and the proposals 
to place the Red Sea under wholly Arab control. While this policy 
strengthens Sudan's credibility in the Arab World, it may prejudice her 
position in Africa. For example, the Sudan may now easily be able
to support Somalia's actions against Ethiopia, while her own relations 
with Ethiopia are so bad, but should Somalia turn her attention to 
reclaiming parts of Kenya, Sudan wouild be forced to qualify her support. 
This is Sudan's constant dilemma, to maintain both an African and an Arab 
credibility. In practice her important foreign relationships are with 
the Arab World. As far as Africa is concerned, the Sudan attempts to 
maintain friendly relations with her immediate neighbours, and to be seen 
as an upholder of the main tenants of African unity, but while African 
states can pose no real threat to her security, neither can they offer 
her military or financial assistance. While a pro-Arab stance is 
obviously acceptable in the Northern Sudan, the people Of the Southern 
Region equate commitment to African ideals as an inherent part of the 
Addis Ababa Agreement as it encompased the dignity of the African. Sudan's 
ability to uphold the tenants of African unity are sometimes compromised 
by her commitment to the Arab World. While she can endorse the principle 
of non-intervention and the principle of territorial integrity in respect 
of Zaire and Chad (50), she is compelled to endorse the Arab position 
in respect of the conflict in Eritrea and the Ogaden. In the aftermath of 
the 1976 attenpted coup d'etat the Sudan realized that her armaments were 
woefully inadequate either to defend herself or to make a meaningful 
contribution to any joint Arab defence pact, Fallowing her complete 
break with Russia, she was compelled to approach both France and the USA 
for arms supplies, and Saudi Arabia to finance the purchases. (51)
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Closer links with Egypt have been forged in sectors other than the 
purely military. A Programme of Political Action and Economic Integration 
was announced in August 1974 and established joint technical committees 
in political, economic and cultural spheres. In 1975 joint companies 
were established for irrigation capitalized at £S 1 million, agriculture 
capitalized at £S 5 million, and for navigation and tourism. Immigration 
procedures between the two countries were also relaxed. (52) In addition 
an industrial and mining agreement was signed in 1975 to promote co­
operation in a variety of industries and the exchange of expertise.
As well as Sudan's military and technological dependence on Egypt, her 
financial dependence on the rest of the Arab World, particularly Saudi 
Arabia, has also increased. In 1974 Saudi Arabia guaranteed a $200 million 
loan for the Sudan, and in the following three years Saudi Arabia replaced 
Kuwait as Sudan's major foreign investor. (53) Both private and 
institutional Arab wealth is now heavily invested in agriculture, agro­
industries and animal production schemes. Abu Dhabi, Qatar and the Arab 
Emirates are all involved in development projects. The Kuwaiti Fund 
for Arab Economic Development, the Arab Fund for Economic and Social 
Development and the Arab Development Fund are participating in a variety 
of projects. In January 1976, agreement was reached between Sudan and 
Saudi Arabia on plans for the joint exploitation of the resources of 
the Red Sea. (54)
While Sudan welcomes the Saudi money, and in fact desperately requires it 
to finance development in all parts of the country, not least in the 
Southern Region, the attitudes and requirements that accompany the money 
are less than welcome, and the Sudan's domestic situation is as yet too 
delicate to accept Saudi Arabia's extreme Islamic conservatism. The 
statements of Sudanese leaders while visiting Arab states must cause 
occasional embarrassment in Khartoum and some alarm in Juba. In June 1977 
the head of a Sudanese delegation to Cairo was reported as saying of Sudan
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and Egypt 'We are one country, unified by our objectives and interests' (55) 
and the following report appeared in a Saudi publication: 'President
Nimeiri was right when he aptly stated that the fields of co-operation 
between Saudi Arabia and Sudan transcend their territory into the 
interior of the African continent. Both countries have a vested interest 
in the maintenance and spread of Islam as well as opposition to the 
enforced polarizations formulated by the Marxists,' (56)
On several occasions Nimeiri has tried to comply with the missionary zeal 
of the Saudis by attempting various social reforms. There have been 
various morality canpaigns and an attempt to prohibit the taking of alcohol 
by civil servants, but both have met with quiet resistance from Southern 
politicians, and been quietly forgotten. However, in 1977 there were 
reports of a proposal before the Council of Ministers that convicted 
burglars should be punished by anputation of the hand. (57) Mare inportantly, 
in mid- 1977 a committee was established in Khartoum to review Sudanese 
law to make it conform with ' .. .the principle of the Islamic tradition'(58) 
Fears as to the nature of the committee's work were compounded by the 
conposition of the committee, and according to a leading Southern politician 
'.... membership is characterised by a conspicuous absence of the varying 
shades of national opinion that this Cbmmittee must by necessity consider, 
while it attempts to tie the future laws of the nation to Islam. The 
Committee seems to be dominated by certain right-wing, very traditional 
and very extremist Islamic trends of opinion, whose view of the Sharia 
Ai Islamiah in a modern state would be questionable by many good Muslims.
The recent addition of a few very extremist names to the membership of 
the Committee, although welcomed as part of the national reconciliation 
effort and therefore necessary, has complicated the public view of the 
Corrmittees work, and may indeed have reinforced some people's fears.' (59) 
Understandably, Southern public opinion is alarmed at the possibility 
of Sudanese law coming to be based on traditional Islamic practice.
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Conclusion
Domestic peace in the Sudan is therefore subject to a variety of pressures 
from within the Southern Region, from within the Northern Sudan, from the 
opposition to the Nimeiri regime, and from the Arab World. Peace has 
continued for five years due mainly to the personal commtmsnt of the 
leadership. The continuance of peace must depend on the continued 
stability and control of the Central Government and an acceleration of 
the rate of development in the Southern Region coupled with a mere 
meaningful participation in decision making by the Southern people.
If these requirements are met there is every hope that the power sharing 
arrangement may eventually become institutionalised. At the present time 
the Sudan's policy of unity in diversity is nore of an oft-repeated 
slogan that a political reality, and if anything has been learnt in the 
first five years it is that the process will take a considerable time 
and not a little good fortune.
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CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSION
Despite the initial problems associated with the rehabilitation of the 
Southern Region, and the defining of areas of responsibility, it would 
be a mist alee to underestimate the achievement of the Sudan in finding, 
largely unaided, a solution to a problem with which many more-favoured 
states continue to be faced.
We have seen that the criteria leading to a threat to Sudan's territorial 
integrity have been much the same criteria that resulted in similar threats 
to other states throughout the world. The loyalty of the Southerners was 
cnly to the South, if in fact for the majority it extended beyond the 
immediate social group. As we have seen in Biafra and Eritrea, there was 
an initial willingness to participate in a larger unit on independence, 
but it was very soon felt to be a mistake, and was followed alnost immediately 
after independence with an unwillingness to extend loyalty to the new 
nation state. There was a history of resentment towards all outside inter­
ference and especially towards the Northern Sudan. There was a sense of 
deprivation throughout the Southern economy, from demands for higher wages 
to demands for the large-scale development that had occurred in the North.
There were social and political disparities and a lack of social infrastructure, 
both in terms of quantity and quality, which made it inpossible for 
Southerners to conpete in a united Sudan. Inappropriate education had led 
to a shortage of qualified manpower and to inadequate representation at the
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national level and, as we have seen, there the very potent factors of 
raoe, language and religion to motivate the people. Geographical factors 
added physical distance to the socio-economic distance between the two 
communities and the defensible location of the Southern Region facilitated 
the development of guerrilla warfare; while neighbouring states provided 
adequate international support.
In addition there were the peculiarly African factors that we outlined 
in chapter II: the compartmentalization of colonial rule which entrenched 
hostility and restricted social interaction; the encouragement of cultural
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sub-nationalism as a part of indirect rule; and the localization of 
early political expression which inhibited the development of truly 
national organization. Independence revealed the threat of disintegration 
and brought policies of forced assimilation and insufficient political 
representation leading to a prolonged guerrilla war and an attempt at 
secession.
Unlike several other African states, Sudan achieved the negotiation of 
a peaceful end to the hostilities by a willingness to face the realities 
of the situation and to overcome the bitterness of seventeen years of 
civil war. The most important factors were the recognition of the 
legitimacy of Southern claims to ^ meaningful share in government; the 
preparedness to negotiate with political leaders once considered terrorists; 
the abandonment of a belief in a purely military solution; the courage 
to incorporate a proportion of all conbatants into a national defence force 
and to proclaim a general aimesty; and the willingness to convert promises 
into action with the minimum of delay. In the ability to negotiate 
peace, the nature of the Nimeiri government was undoubtedly a contributory 
factor. As a military government it was able to enter into secret initial 
negotiation and so to establish exactly what proposals would be acceptable, 
and to formulate in advance a legislative expression of agreement for 
immediate implementation. Secondly, it allowed concessions to be made 
that would have been considered extremely dangerous by any government in 
a multi-party state.
Having achieved a cease-fire, the Khartoum government immediately 
implemented the peace agreement. Within only a few weeks, former 
guerrillas were being absorbed into the People's Armed Forces, a Southern 
executive body had been appointed, Northern officials in the South were 
being replaced by Southerners and Central Government representation 
increased, refugees were being repatriated and funds for economic 
development were being remitted. (1)
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As we have seen, there remain problems in defining spheres of 
responsibility, in maintaining peace and in financing both the new 
institutions and the necessary massive rehabilitation. As might be 
expected, the first five years have required a high degree of flexibility 
on all sides, and frequent personal intervention by the prime movers in 
the agreement, with the continuation of peace still subject to threats 
both internal and external. However it is important to realize that at 
the time of the Addis Ababa Agreement the re-direction of government in 
the Sudan was at a very early stage, and that in the past five years the 
implementation of the agreement has been against the background of change 
within the state as a whole.
Earlier we suggested that the Addis Ababa Agreement was being undermined; 
however it may be that in time the agreement will be seen as having 
facilitated the peace negotiations, while the policy of decentralization 
expressed in the People's Local Government Act, will become the real basis 
for national integration. The Nimeiri regime is gradually developing a 
decentralised system of government that is essentially unitary. Power is 
delegated from the central authority to territorial units of self-rule, 
namely the eighteen provinces. Within the provinces there is a conbination 
of central control - embodied by the Province Commissioner, who is appointed 
by the central authority - and popular participation, embodied in the 
locally elected councils. While the Commissioner is responsible to 
Khartoum, the locally elected bodies are responsible and accountable to 
the hierarchy of urban and rural councils and to the local electorate.
So in effect the process of delegation of power moves in two directions - 
from the centre to the province, and from the village to the province - which 
meet in the Province Commissioner and the Province Executive Councils.
The system combines a degree of territorial self-rule with supervision by 
central appointees, and so represents a fulfilment of four requirements 
which this study has shown to be necessary in the Sudan, in Africa and in 
a number of states faced with the problem of human diversity.
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First, it maintains and protects the unity of the state. Secondly, it 
is a positive response to local pressures for a degree of self-rule.
Thirdly, it facilitates greater administrative convenience and flexibility, 
given the size of the country. And fourthly, it satisfies the 
government's ideological commitment.
Hie system is also subject to futher controls. The military nature and 
army backing for the Central Government tacitly underlines its authority 
over the provinces and supports its appointees, the Province Commissioners 
and the Political Supervisors. The restraint of the one-party system 
controls representation in the National and the Regional Assemblies, not 
in that all members must belong to the SSU, but in that they are forbidden 
to form organized opposition parties. With the very subordinate role of 
the assemblies, non-SSU representation is therefore permitted but largely 
paralysed. Popular participation is controlled. While being enthusiastically 
encouraged at the local level through a wide variety of bodies, people's 
councils, workers organizations, women's organizations, SSU units and 
co-operatives, above the province level it is carefully channeled through 
only two avenues-the National and Regional Assemblies or the single party, 
the SSU. With the gradual decentralization of the central and regional 
ministries, a present opportunity for participation in decision jmaking 
above the province level will eventually be largely removed. The policy 
is to transfer all relevant administrative responsibility to the provinces, 
and presumably the only remaining ministries will be those of an 
undeniably national nature - defence, foreign affairs, interior, finance 
and planning - so severely limiting what might be termed professional 
participation above the province level. However, at the national level 
professional participation will still be possible through the technical 
planning bodies or the armed forces.
This system of limited delegation of power has definite advantages. The 
strong Khartoum Government facilitates economic planning and close 
financial control by the centre, essential in a state both poor and under­
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developed. The one-party system allows concentration on economic 
development. Although the SSU may not yet be sufficiently established 
to be a real initiating force in this field, the ban on other political 
parties avoids the disastrous situation of the sixties, when their 
proliferation represented the only true area of growth.
The choice of the economically small province as the unit of territorial 
self-rule discourages the subsequent secession that many similarly placed 
states have feared to be the net result of delegation of power. The 
prominence of the Provincial Commissioner within the system, and his 
strong links with Khartoum, make it very unlikely that provinces could 
combine against the centre, and the system within the province does not 
allow for the emergence of unapproved local leaders. Although one might 
describe the sub-division of the provinces in the Southern Region as a 
kind of divide and rule, the creation of new small provinces and the 
strengthening of their links with Khartoum will definitely help to blur 
the line between the North and the South, and help to end the sense of 
confrontation between the two. The splitting up of the South may 
therefore hasten the integration of the Southern people into the 
Sudanese nation. Nothing can be done overnight to remove the 
provincial inequalities, but by adopting this system of delegation of power 
with controlled popular participation the Sudan will avoid the dangers 
associated with the coincidence of disadvantage and ethnic diversity.
The decentralization of ministries, the delegation of power and 
responsibility and the limiting of popular participation to the province 
level redirects attention to the countryside and to the agricultural sector. 
Any future development in the Sudan must depend on the agricultural sector, 
but for too long Khartoum has been the focus of attention, with 
employment in the capital as the aspiration of every educated Sudanese.
Even among those involved in the more technical ministries, a posting 
away frcam Khartoum has been considered a form of exile. Secondment to the
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province will re-direct technical, expertise away from a theoretical 
and towards a practical expression. An increase in popular participation 
at province level will help to mobilize local initiative and to include 
local knowledge in the decision- maiding process.
The Sudan has approached a working relationship between the nation, the 
homeland and the political state. It is certainly far from ideal. The 
Sudanese people cannot yet be termed a nation, but they are certainly 
nearer that goal than at any time since independence. Despite continual 
threats, the Sudan has remained intact, and the people and the homeland 
have been reconciled through the flexibility of the government which has 
come to recognize the legitimate rights of all the people to a degree of 
participation in decision making.
In a sense the Western ideal of the nation state has been adjusted to the 
post-colonial African reality. We have seen how the dynamic social 
interaction of traditional Africa was compartmentalised into formal units, 
defined by arbitrary lines to facilitate colonial rule and how the resultant 
cultural sub-nationalism undermined the Sudan which emerged at independence 
as a formal political unit, but in no sense as a functioning political 
unit. With the decentralization of power and the attempt at real national 
integration, the formal unit begins to show promise of becoming also a 
functional unit. The prime interest of the majority of the Sudanese 
population coincides mere and more with the interests of the state, and 
as a result an increasing nuntoer of people express their ultimate loyalty 
as being to the Sudan, rather than to tribe or local community.
What has been realized in the Sudan is that for the formal unit to have 
any credibility, to attract any loyalty, it must first be a functioning 
unit. There must be a degree of peaceful interaction, a community of 
purpose and at the same time an equitable division of resources. By this 
process alone will the formal unit gradually encompass the people, the 
territory and the political state, and so develop a real credibility as 
a foimal and a functional unit: a nation state.
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Many African states are faced with a diverse population, and the problem 
of creating from it a nation, if not with actual secession movements. 
Although it would be unwise to attempt to apply the Sudanese formula 
to other states, given the corrplexity of each individual case, there 
are surely lessons to be learned from the Sudanese experience. Perhaps 
the most inport ant of these are that it is dangerous to underestimate 
the conflict potential of hunan diversity; that the solution to the 
problem is unlikely to lie in the use of force or forceable assimilation; 
and that only by recognizing both the diversity and the legitimate rights 
of all cultural and territorial interest groups, can all the people be 
persuaded to transfer their allegiance to the nation state.
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MEMORANDUM ON SOUTHERN POLICY 1930
CS/I.C.I. Civil Secretary's Office
Khartoum, 25th January, 1930
Copies to:
The Governor: Upper Nile Province, Malakal, Mongalla Province, Mongalla,
Balir El Ghazal Province, Wau,
His Excellency the Governor General directs that the main features of the 
approved policy of the Government for the administration of the Southern 
Provinces should be restated in simple teims.
In the strictly confidential memorandum which accompanies this letter an 
attempt has been made to do this, though it will of course be seen that 
Innumerable points of detail arising are not dealt with seriatim.
Your attention is directed to Part II of the memorandum, and I should be 
obliged if you would forward, as soon as possible, your comments on the 
criteria suggested and any suggestions you may wish to make for additions 
to the list.
The carrying out of this policy as described may lead from time to time
OR
to various financial implications^ commitments though it is hoped that 
these will not be great. It will be convenient that any such foreseen 
should be notified to the relevant authority without delay for consideration. 
Application of the policy will obviously vary in detail and in intensity 
according to locality. It is essential however, that the ultimate aim 
should be made clear to all who are responsible for the execution of the 
policy, and the memorandum should therefore be circulated to and studied 
by all your District Gxrmissioners. Sufficient copies for this purpose 
are sent herewith. Copies are also being sent to such Heads of Departments 
in Khartoum as are concerned.
Civil Secretary
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CS/I.C.I.
STRICTLY OCNFIIENTIAL
MEMORANDUM 
PART I
The policy of the Government in the Southern Sudan is to build up a 
series of self contained racial or tribal units with structure and 
organization based, to whatever extent the requirements of equity and 
good government permit, upon indigenous customs, traditional usage and 
beliefs. The measures already taken or to be taken to promote the above 
policy are re-stated below.
A. PROVISION OF NON-ARABIC SPEAKING STAFF
a) Administrative Staff
The gradual elimination of the Mamur, whether Arab or black. This has 
already begun, and it is intended that the process of reduction shall 
continue as opportunity offers.
b) Clerical
It has been the recognised policy for some years that locally recruited 
staff should take the place of clerks and accountants drawn from the 
north and that the language of Government offices should be English.
In the Bahr El Ghazal province the change to English has already been 
made and a large number of local boys are employed. The process has to 
be gradual. It is recognised that local boys are not fit at present to 
fill the higher posts in Government offices, and the supply of educated 
English-speaking boys depends on the speed with which the two missionary 
intermediate schools in Mongalla Province and the intermediate and 
Stack Schools at Wau can produce than. The missions must retain a certain 
number of these boys as teachers for their elementary schools (which are 
an integral part of the educational systan) but since the employment of 
local boys in Government offices is a vital feature of the general policy 
every encouragement should be given to those in charge of mission schools 
to co-operate in that policy by sending boys into Government service. 
Province officials must aim at maintaining a steady supply of boys for 
the elementary vernacular schools which feed the inteimediate schools.
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c) Technical
Generally speaking, the considerations mentioned above apply also to 
the supply of boys for the technical departments, agriculture, medical, 
public works, etc., but in certain cases it may not be essential that 
boys going to these departments should complete the intermediate school 
course.
B GCNTROL OF IMMIGRANT TRADERS FROM THE NORTH
It is the aim of the Government to encourage, as far as is possible,
Greek and Syrian traders rather than the Gellaba type. Permits to the 
latter should be decreased unobstrusively but progressively, and only the 
best type of Gellaba, whose interests are purely conmercial and pursued 
in a legitimate manner should be admitted. The limitation of Gellaba 
trade to towns or established routes is essential,
C FUNDAMENTAL NECESSITY FOR BRITISH STAFF TO FAMILIARISE THEMSELVES 
WITH THE BELIEFS AND CUSTOMS AND THE LANGUAGE OF THE TRIBES THEY 
ADMINISTER
a) Belief and Customs
The policy of Government requires that officials in the South, especially 
administrative officials, should be fully infoimed as to the social 
structures, beliefs, customs and mental processes of pagan tribes. Study 
on these lines is of vital importance to the solution of administrative 
problems and, it is with this fact in view that a highly qualified 
expert has been detailed to work in the South.
b) Language
e
The R^jaf Language Conference recommended the adoption of certain 'group 
languages' for use in schools. It is clearly impossible to develop all 
the languages and dialects of the southern Sudan and the development of 
a limited number of them may tend to cause the smaller languages one by 
one to disappear, and be supplanted by ’group languages’.
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It is of course, true that the adoption of this system carries with it 
the implication of the gradual adoption of a new, or partly new language 
by the population of the areas in which the 'smaller languages' are used 
at present. Such a result is, Indeed inevitable in the course of time, 
for 'smaller languages' must always tend to disappear. It is also 
recognised that in such places as Wau itself, Arabic is so commonly used 
that the local languages have been almost completely excluded. Special 
concessions may be necessary in these places.
The Rejaf Conference did not regard these factors as seriously affecting 
the policy of 'group languages', and it was held to be a matter of first 
importance that books for the study of 'group languages' should be 
available for missionaries and officials and that a specialist should be 
appointed to study the question. A linguistic expert, Dr. Tucker, has 
therefore been appointed for a period of two years, and his chief function 
will be to advise as to the production of suitable books. The Secretary 
for Education and Health has already circulated a memorandum on his 
duties. The production of grammars and vocabularies will facilitate 
the study of the local vernaculars. But this will take time and meanwhile 
it is the duty of our officers to further the policy of the Government 
without delay. It cannot be stressed too strongly that to speak the 
natural language of the people whom he controls is the first duty of the 
administrator. Arabic is not that language, and indeed to the bulk of the 
population of the South it is a new, or a partly new, tongue. Officials 
should avoid the error of thinking that by speaking Arabic they are in 
some way conforming to the principle that the administrator should converse 
with his people in their own language,
D THE USE OE ENGLISH WHERE COMMUNICATION IN THE LOCAL VERNACULAR IS 
IMPOSSIBLE
If
The time has not yet come for the adoption of a general ligua franca for 
the Southern Sudan, and it is impossible to foretell what, if ever 
that time canes, the language would be. At the same time there are, 
without doubt, occasions when the use of a local vernacular is impossible, 
as for instance in the case of heterogeneous groupings such as the Sudan 
Defence Force or the Police. The recent introduction of English words of
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carmand in the Equatorial Corps of the Sudan Defence Force and their use 
in the Police Forces in the provinces concerned, is a step in the right 
direction, but more is required. Every effort should be made to make 
English the means of communication among the men themselves to the 
complete exclusion of Arabic. This will entail in the various units the 
opening of classes in which the men would receive instruction in English, 
and a concentrated effort on the part of those in authority to ensure 
that English is used by the men when local vernacular cannot be. It is 
believed that in a comparatively short time men of these forces could 
learn as much English as they now know of Arabic. It is hoped that those 
in charge of mission schools will assist in providing instructors for 
the classes referred to above. Similarly, an official unable to speak 
the local vernacular should try to use English when speaking to Government 
employees and servants, and even if in any way possible, to chiefs and 
natives. In any case, the "use of an interpreter is preferable to the use
of Arabic, until the local language can be used.
<6
The inital difficulties are not minimized. Inability to converse freely 
at first will no doubt result in seme loss of efficiency, and the dislike 
of almost every Englishman to using his own language in conversing with 
natives is fully recognised; but difficulties and dislikes must be 
subordinated to the main policy. Apart from the fact that the restriction 
of Arabic is an essential feature of the general scheme, it must not be 
forgotten that Arabic, being neither the language of the governing nor 
the governed, will progressively deteriorate. The type of Arabic at 
present spoken provides signal proof of this. It cannot be used as a means 
of communication on anything but the most simple matters, and only if it 
were first unlearned and then relearned in a crude form and adopted as the 
language of instruction in schools could it fullfill the growing requirement 
of the future. The local vernaculars and English on the other hand, will 
in every case be the language of one of the two parties conversing and one 
party will therefore always be improving the other.
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In short, whereas at present Arabic is considered by many natives of the 
South as the official language, and as it were, the fashionable language, 
the object of all should be to conteract this idea by every practical 
means. Incidentally it may be argued that if a District Oonmissioner 
serving in the South is transferred to the North, a knowledge of Nilotic 
Arabic is more of a hindrance than a help to him in learning the Arabic 
of the Northern Sudan.
PART II
PROGRESS OF POLICY
His Excellency the High Commissioner in approving this policy has 
suggested the need for criteria by which progress may be measured. With 
this end in view it is intended to tabulate various important features 
of the policy and to set down the progress made at stated intervals.
It is suggested that the matters to be included in the table should be 
the fol lowing
a) The nurrber of Non-Mohammedans in relation to the total Government 
staff under headings of administrative, clerical and technical with a 
report on the use of English by Government employees of non-British 
origin.
b) The number of British officials who have qualified in the local 
languages.
c) Number of immigrant traders of various nationalities from the North.
d) Number of mission schools, elementary, intermediate and technical 
respectively.
e) Number of Government schools.
f) The amount spent on education including: subsidies to mission schools, 
cost of Government schools, cost of supervisory educational staff.
g) Introduction of English words of command in military or police forces, 
with a report as to the extent to which Arabic is disappearing as the 
language in use among the men of these forces.
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h) Notes on the progress of the use of English instead of Arabic where 
communication in the vernacular is impossible.
i) Progress made in the production of text-books in the group languages 
for use in schools, and grammars and vocabularies for use of missionaries 
and officials.
It is proposed to give information in the Annual Report under these heads 
for the years 1924, 1927 and 1930 and for each subsequent year.
Civil Secretary's Office,
Khartoum. January 25, 1930.
APPENDIX II
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MEM3RANDUM ON SOUTHERN POLICY 1946
CS/SCR/I. C. I. 
SECRET
Civil Secretary's Office, 
Khartoum, December 16,1946.
Copies to:
Financial Secretary, Legal Secretary, Kaid, Director of Agriculture & 
Forests, Director of Economics & Trade, Director of Education, Director 
of Medical Service, General Manager - Sudan Railways, Director of 
Veterinary Service, Governor Equatoria Province, Governor Upper Nile 
Province.
Will you please refer to Khartoum Secret Dispatch No.89 of August 4, 1945, 
of which copies were sent to you (or to your predecessors in Office) 
personally under this number.
2. You will see that in paragraph 2 of the despatch there are contemplated 
three possible political futures for the Southern Sudan. The crucial 
sentence is - It is only by economic and educational development that 
these people can be equipped to stand up for themselves in the future, 
whether their lot be eventually cast with the Northern Sudan or with 
East Africa (or partly with each).
3 Since the despatch was written, and since the decisions on policy which 
it records were taken not only have further decisions on policy for the 
South been taken (of which a list is attatched) but great changes have 
taken place in the political outlook for the country as a whole. Whatever 
may be the final effect, inside the Sudan, of the present treaty 
negotiations, it is certain that the advance of the Northern Sudan to 
self-government, involving the progressive reduction of British executive 
authority, and public canvassing of the Southern Sudan question, will be 
accelerated. It is therefore essential that policy for the Southern 
Sudan should be crystallised as soon as possible and that it should be 
crystallised in a form which can be publically explained and supported 
and which should therefore be based on sound and constructive social 
and economic principles. These principles must not only bear defence
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against factious opposition, but must also command the support of
Northern Sudanese who are prepared to take logical and liberal points of
view: while the relief of doubts now in the minds of British political 
and departmental staff who have the interests of the South at heart is 
also pressing and important.
4. You will see from the foregoing paragraph that I do not suggest that 
the future of the two million inhabitants of the South should be influenced
by appeasement of the as yet immature and ill-informed politicians of the
Northern Sudan. But it is the Sudanese, northern and southern, who will 
live their lives and direct their affairs in future generations in this 
country: and our efforts must therefore now be concentrated on initiating
a policy which is not only sound in itself, but which can be made acceptable 
to, and eventually workable by patriotic and reasonable Sudanese, northern 
and southern alike.
5. Apart from the recent rapid political development in the North the 
following conclusions have further emerged since His Excellency's 1945 
despatch and enclosures were written:
a) with reference to Appendix I to the despatch, Section 7 last sentence 
of penultimate paragraph, East Africa's plans regarding better 
communications with the Southern Sudan have been found to be nebulous, and 
contingent on the Lake Albert Dam. Whatever the possibilities, we have 
no reason to hesitate between development of trade between the South and 
E.Africa and development of trade between the Southern and the Northern 
Sudan.
b) In Education, I believe that while the South may hope to have a 
secondary school, it cannot hope to support post-secondary education 
and I believe that Southerners should get this at the Gordon Memorial 
College - Arabic is not essential there, but should I think be taught 
to Southerners as a subject from intermediate school level upwards.
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c) The distinctions in rates of pay and other conditions of government 
service, the artificial rules about employment of Southerners in the 
North, attempts at economic separation, and all similar distinctions 
are beccming more and more anomalous as the growing demand for Northerners 
to be employed in Southern Development Schemes, the rapidly growing 
conmunication and travel between North and South, and the very application 
of the policy of pushing forward in the South, break down the previous 
isolation of the Southern Provinces and strain these distinctions further.
6. The preceding paragraphs are an attempt to indicate briefly the 
reasons which have led me to think an important decision on Southern 
policy must now be talien. The biennial report to His Britannic Majesty's 
Government is due early next year. Subject to your comments on this 
letter, I propose to advise Hisfkcellency that in His Excellency's next 
report he asks His Britannic Majesty's Government to approve that two of 
the alternatives mentioned in paragraph 2 above be ruled out as practical 
politics at the present time. It may in the future be proved that it 
would be to the advantage of certain of the most southerly tribes, e.g. of 
Opari or Kajo Kaji, to join up with their relatives in Uganda. It may 
be that the feeling which now exists among a few of the wisest Northern 
Sudanese, that they should not, when self-governing, be asked to shoulder 
the financial and comnunal burden which they believe the South will 
always prove to be, may become an important political policy among than. 
But we should now work on the assumption that the Sudan, as at present 
constituted, with possibly minor boundary adjustments, will remain one: 
and we should therefore restate our Southern Policy and do so publicly 
as follows: 'The policy of the Sudan Government regarding the Southern
Sudan is to act upon the facts that the peoples of the Southern Sudan 
are distinctively African and Negroid, but that geography and economics 
combine (so far as can be foreseen at the present time) to render them 
inextricably bound for future development to the middle-eastern and 
arabicised Northern Sudan: and therefore to ensure that they shall, by
educational and economic development, be equipped to stand up for 
themselves in the future as socially and economically the equals of their 
partners of the Northern Sudan in the Sudan of the future.'
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7. Certain changes of detail, in each sphere of Government activity 
in the South, would I think have to follow the approval and publication
of a policy so defined. You will wish to suggest briefly the major points.
8. Will you please consider this matter carefully, consult the senior 
members of your staffs upon it (particularly of course those who have 
experience of the South), and let me have your views as briefly as 
possible. Those of any individual member of your staff which you wish 
to ferward separately with your comments will also be welcome. The views 
of the senior Sudanese in whose judgement and discretion you have 
confidence may also be asked for.
9. Finally I ask you to read again the late Sir Douglas Newbold’s note 
to Council No. GS/SCR/I.C.14 of 3.4.44, reproduced as Appendix 'B'(I) to 
the despatch, and to bear in mind that urgency is the essence of the 
problem. We no longer have time to aim at the ideal: we must aim at
doing what is the best for the Southern peoples in the present circumstances.
J.W.RCBERISCK,
Civil Secretary
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APPENDIX III
DRAFT ORGANIC LAW TO ORGANIZE REGIONAL SELF GOVERNMENT IN THE SOUTHERN 
PROVINCES OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE SUDAN
In accordance with the provisions of the Constitution of the Democratic 
Republic of the Sudan and in realization of the memorable May Revolution 
Declaration of June 9th, 1969, granting the Southern Provinces of the 
Sudan Regional Self-Government within a united socialist Sudan, and in 
accordance with the principle of the May Revolution that the Sudanese 
people participate actively in and supervise the decentralised systen of 
the government of their country. It is hereunder enacted:
Article 1:
This law shall be called the law for Regional Self Government in the 
Southern Provinces. It shall cane into force on a date within a period 
not exceeding thirty days from the date of the Addis Ababa Agreement. 
Article 2 :
This law shall be issued as an organic law which cannot be ammended except 
by a three-quarters majority of the People's National Assembly and 
confirmed by a two-thirds majority in a referendum held in the three 
Southern Provinces of the Sudan.
CHAPTER II DEFINITIONS 
Article 3:
i) Consitution refers to the Republican Order No. 5 or any basic law 
replacing or amending it.
ii) "President" means the President of the Democratic Republic of the 
Sudan.
iii) "Southern Provinces of the Sudan" means the Provinces of Bahr El 
Ghazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile in accordance with their 
boundaries as they stood on January 1st, 1956, and any other areas 
that were culturally and geographically a part of the Southern 
complex as may be decided by a referendum,
iv) "People's Regional Assembly" refers to the legislative body for the 
Southern Region of the Sudan.
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v) "High Executive Council" refers to the Executive Council
appointed by the President on the recommendation of the President 
of the High Executive Council and such body shall supervise the 
adiministration and direct public affairs in the Southern Region 
of the Sudan.
vi) "President of the High Executive Council" refers to the person
appointed by the President on the recommendation of the People's 
Regional Assembly to lead and supervise the executive organs 
responsible for the administration of the Southern Provinces,
vii) "People's National Assembly" refers to the National Legislative 
Assembly representing the people of the Sudan in accordance with 
the constitution.
viii) "Sudanese" refers to any Sudanese citizens as defined by the 
Sudanese Nationality Act, 1957, and any anmendments thereof.
CHAPTER III
Article 4:
The Provinces of Bahr El Ghazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile as defined in 
Article 3 (iii) shall consitute a self-governing Region within the 
Democratic Republic of the Sudan and shall be known as the Southern Region.
Article 5:
The Southern Region shall have legislative and executive organs, the 
functions and powers of which are defined by this law.
Article 6:
Arabic shall be the official language for the Sudan, and English the 
principal language for the Southern Region without prejudice to the use 
of any other language or languages which may serve a practical necessity 
or the efficient and expeditious discharge of executive and administrative 
functions of the Region.
- 279 -
CHAPTER IV
Article 7:
Neither the People's Regional Assembly nor the High Executive Council 
shall legislate or exercise any power on matters of national nature 
which are:
i) National Defence
ii) External Affairs
iii) Currency and Coinage
iv) Air and Inter Regional River Transport
v) Coirmunications and Telecommunications
vi) Customs and Foreign Trade except for border trade and certain 
commodities which the Regional Government may specify with the 
approval of the Central Government,
vii) Nationality and Immigration. (Emmigration)
viii) Planning for Economic and Social Development
ix) Educational Planning
x) Public Audit
CHAPTER V LEGISLATURE
Article 8:
Regional Legislation in the Southern Region is exercised by a People's 
Regional Assembly elected by Sudanese Citizens resident in the Southern 
Region. The constitution and conditions of membership of the Assembly 
shall be determined by law.
Article 9:
Members of the People's Regional Assembly shall be elected by direct 
secret ballot.
Article 10:
i) For the First Assembly the President may appoint additional
members to the People's Regional Assembly where conditions for 
elections are not conducive to such elections as stipulated in 
Article 9, provided that such appointed members shall not exceed 
one quarter of the Assembly.
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ii) The People's Regional Assembly shall regulate the conduct of its 
business in accordance with rules of procedures to be laid down 
by the said Assembly during its first sitting, 
iii) The People's Regional Assembly shall elect one of its members as a
speaker, provided that the first sitting shall be presided over by 
the Interim President of the High Executive Council.
Article 11:
The People's Regional Assembly shall legislate for the preservation of 
public order, internal security, efficient administration and the develop­
ment of the Southern Region in cultural, economic and social fields and 
in particular in the following:
i) Promotion and utilization of Regional financial resources for the
development and administration of the Southern Region 
ii) Organization of the machinery for Regional and Local Administration,
iii) Legislation on traditional law and custom within the framework
of National Law.
iv) Establishment, maintenance and administration of prisons and
reformatory institutions,
v) Establishment, maintenance and administration of Public Schools
at all levels in accordance with National Plans for education 
and economic and social development,
vi) Promotion of local languages and cultures,
vii) Town and Village planning and the construction of roads in
accordance with National Plans and programmes,
viii) Promotion of trade; establishment of local industries and markets;
issue of traders licences and formation of co-operative societies,
ix) Establishment, maintenance and administration of public hospitals,
x) Administration of environmental health services: maternity care;
child welfare; supervision of markets; combat of epidemic diseases;
training of medical assistants and rural midwives; establishment of 
health centres, dispensaries and dressing stations,
xi) Promotion of animal health; control of epidemics and improvement
of animal production and trade,
xii) Promotion of tourism.
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xiii) Establishment of zoological gardens, museums, organization of 
trade and cultural exhibitions, 
xiv) Mining and quarrying without prejudice to the right of the Central 
Government in the event of the discovery of natural gas and 
minerals.
xv) Recruitment for, organization and administration of Police and 
Prison services in accordance with the national policy and 
standards.
xvi) Land use in accordance with national laws and plans,
xvii) Control and prevention of pests and plant diseases,
xviii) Development, utilization and protection of forest, crops and
pastures in accordance with national laws, 
xix) Promotion and encouragement of self-help programmes.
xx) All other matters delegated by the President or the People's
National Assembly for legislation.
Article 12:
The People's National Assembly may call for facts and information 
concerning the conduct of administration in the Southern Region.
Article 13:
i) The People's Regional Assembly may, by a three-quarters majority 
and for specified reasons relating to public interest, request the 
President to relieve the President or any member of the High 
Executive Council from office. The President shall accede to such 
request.
ii) In case of vacancy, relief or resignation of the President of the 
High Executive Council, the entire body shall be considered as 
having automatically resigned.
Article 14:
The People's Regional Assembly may, by a two-thirds majority, request the 
President to postpone the coming into force of any law which, in the 
view of the members, adversely affects the welfare and interests of the 
citizens of the Southern Region. The President may, if he thinks fit, 
accede to such request.
Article 15:
i) The People's Regional Assembly may, by a majority of its members, 
request the President to withdraw any bill presented to the 
People's National Assembly which, in their view, affects adversely 
the welfare, rights or interests of the citizens in the Southern 
Region, pending communication of the views of the People's Regional 
Assembly.
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ii) If the President accedes to such request, the People's Regional
Assembly shall present its views within fifteen days from the date 
of accession to the request,
iii) The President shall communicate any such views to the People's
National Assembly together with his own observations if he deans 
necessary.
Article 16:
The People's National Assembly shall communicate all Bills and Acts to 
the People's Regional Assembly for their information. The People's 
Regional Assembly shall act similarly.
CHAPTER VI THE EXECUTIVE
Article 17:
The Regional Executive Authority is vested in a High Executive Council 
which acts on behalf of the President.
Article 18:
The High Executive Council shall specify the duties of the various 
departments in the Southern Region provided that on matters relating to 
Central Government Agencies it shall act with the approval of the President.
Article 19:
The President of the High Executive Council shall be appointed and 
relieved of office by the President on the recommendation of the People's 
Regional Assembly.
Article 20:
The High Executive Council shall be composed of members appointed and 
relieved of office by the President on the recommendation of the President 
of the High Executive Council.
Article 21:
The President of the High Executive Council and its members are responsible 
to the President and to the People's Regional Assembly for the efficient 
administration in the Southern Region. They shall take an oath of office 
before the President.
Article 22:
The President and members of the High Executive Council may attend meetings 
of the People's Regional Assembly and participate in its deliberations 
without the right to vote, unless they are also members of the People's 
Regional Assembly.
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CHAPTER VII
Article 23:
The President shall iron time to time regulate the relationship between 
the High Executive Council and the central ministries.
Article 24:
The High Executive Council may initiate laws for the creation of a Regional 
Public Service. These laws shall specify the terms and conditions of 
service for the Regional public service.
CHAPTER VIII FINANCE
Article 25:
The People's Regional Assembly may levy Regional duties and taxes in 
addition to National and local duties and taxes. It may issue legislations 
and orders to guarantee the collection of all public monies at different 
levels.
Article 26:
a) The source of revenue of the Southern Region shall consist of the 
following:
i) Direct and indirect regional taxes,
ii) Contributions from People's Local Government Councils,
iii) Revenue from commercial, industrial and agricultural projects in 
the Region in accordance with National Plans,
iv) Funds from the National Treasury for established services,
v) Funds voted by the National Assembly in accordance with the
requirements of the Region,
vi) The Special Development Budget for the South as presented by the 
People's Regional Assembly for the acceleration of economic and 
social advancement of the Southern Region as envisaged in the 
declaration of the June 9th, 1969.
vii) See Appendix B.
viii) Any other sources.
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b) The Regional Executive Council shall prepare a budget to meet the 
expenditure of regional services, security, administration and 
development in accordance with National Plans and programmes, and 
shall submit it to the People's Regional Assembly for approval.
CHAPTER IX OTHER PROVISIONS
Article 27:
i) Citizens of the Southern Region shall constitute a sizeable 
proportion of the People's Armed Forces in such reasonable 
numbers as will correspond to the population of the Region,
ii) The use of the People's Aimed Forces within the Region and outside 
the framework of national defence shall be controlled by the 
President on the advice of the President of the High Executive 
Council.
iii) Temporary arrangements for the composition of units of the People's 
Armed Forces in the Southern Region are provided for in the 
Protocol on Interim Arrangements.
Article 28:
The President may veto any Bill which he deems contrary to the Provisions 
of the National Constitution, provided the People's Regional Assembly, 
after receiving the President's views, may reintroduce the Bill.
Article 29:
The President and members of the High Executive Council may initiate laws 
in the People's Regional Assembly.
Article 30:
Any member of the People's Regional Assembly may initiate any law
provided that financial Bills shall not be presented without a sufficient 
notice to the President of the High Executive Council.
Article 31:
The People's Regional Assembly shall strive to consolidate the unity of 
the Sudan and respect the spirit of the National Constitution.
Article 32:
All citizens are guaranteed the freedom of movement in and out of the 
Southern Region, provided restriction or prohibition of movement may be 
imposed on a named citizen solely on grounds of public health and order.
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Article 33:
i) All citizens resident in the Southern Region are guaranteed equal 
opportunity of education, employment, commerce and the practice 
of any profession,
ii) No law may adversely affect the rights of citizens ennumerated
in the previous item on the basis of race, tribal origin, religion, 
place of birth, or sex.
Article 34:
Juba shall be the capital of the Southern Region, and the seat of the
Regional Executive and Legislature.
APPENDIX (A) FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS
The following should be guaranteed by the Constitution of the Democratic
Republic of the Sudan.
1. A citizen should not be deprived of his citizenship.
2. Equality of citizens.
i) All citizens without distinction based on race, national origin, 
birth, language, sex, economic or social status, should have
equal rights and duties before the law.
ii) All persons should be equal before the courts of law and should
have the right to institute legal proceedings in order to remove
any injustice or declare any right in an open court without delay 
prejudicing their interests.
3. Personal liberty.
i) Penal liability should be personal. Any kind of collective
punishment should be prohibited,
ii) The accused should be presumed innocent until proved guilty,
iii) Retrospective Penal Legislature and punishment should be 
prohibited.
iv) The right of the accused to defend himself personally or through 
an agent should be guaranteed.
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v) No person should be arrested, detained or imprisoned except in 
accordance with due process of law, and no person should remain 
in custody or detention Jar more than twenty-four hours without 
judicial order.
vi) No accused person should be subjected to inducement, intimidation 
or torture in order to extract evidence from him whether in his 
favour or against him or against any other person, and no 
humilitating punishment should be inflicted on any convicted 
person.
4. Freedom of religion and conscience.
i) Every person should enjoy freedom of religious opinion, conscience
and the right to profess then publically and privately and to 
establish religious institutions subject to reasonable limitations 
in favour of morality, health or public order as prescribed by law.
ii) Parents and guardians should be guaranteed the right to educate
their children and those under their care in accordance with their 
choice.
5. Protection of labour,
i) Forced or compulsory labour of any kind should be prohibited
except when ordered for military or civil necessity or pursuant 
to penal punishment prescribed by law.
ii) The right to equal pay for equal work should be guaranteed.
6. Freedom of minorities to use their languages and develop their 
culture should be guaranteed,
APPENDIX (B) DRAFT ORDINANCE CN ITEMS OF REVENUE AND GRANTS IN AID 
FOR THE SOUTHERN REGION
1. Profits accruing to the Central Government as a result of exporting
products of the Southern Region.
2. Business Profit Tax of the Southern Region that are at present 
in the central list of the Ministry of Treasury.
3. Excise Duties on alcoholic beverages and spirits consigned in the 
Southern Region.
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4. Profits on sugar consumed in the Southern Region.
5. Royalties on forest products of the Southern Region.
6. Royalties on leaf tobacco and cigarettes.
7. Taxation on property other than that provided in the Rates Ordinance.
8. Taxes and Rates on Central and Local Government Projects, (5% of 
net profits of factories, cooperatives societies, agricultural 
enterprises and cinemas).
9. Revenue accruing from Central Government activities in the Southern 
Region provided the Region shall bear maintenance expenses, e.g.
Post Office revenue, land sales, sale of forms and documents, 
stamp duties, and any other item to be specified fran time to time.
10. Licences other than those provided for in the Peoples Local 
Government Act, 1971.
11. Special Development tax to be paid by Residents in the Southern 
Region, the rate of which should be decided by the Peoples 
Regional Assembly.
12. Income Tax collected from officials and employees serving in the 
Southern Region both in the local and national civil services as 
well as in the Aimy, Police and Prisons, Judiciary, and Political 
establishment.
13. Corporation Tax on any factory and/or agricultural project 
established in the Region but not run by Regional Government, (5% 
of the initial cost).
14. Contributions from the Central Government for the encouragement 
of construction and development; for every agricultural project, 
industrial project and trading enterprise, (20% of the initial 
cost as assessed by the Central Government).
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15. New Social Service Projects to be established by the Region or 
any of its Local Government units, and for which funds are 
allocated, shall receive grants from the National Treasury in 
the following manner:-
Educational institutions: 20% of expenses.
Trunk and through Road and Bridges: 25% of expenses.
Relief and Social amenities: 15% of expenses.
Tourist attraction projects: 25% of expenses.
Security: 15% of expenses.
Grants for Post Secondary and University education within the 
Sudan: 20% of grants; outside the Sudan: 30% of grants. 
Contribution for Research, Scientific Advancement, and Cultural 
activities: 25% of expenses.
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APPENDIX IV
AGREEMENT ON THE CEASE-FIRE IN THE SOUTHERN REGION
Article 1:
This Agreement shall come into force on the date and time specified 
for the ratification of the Addis Ababa Agreement.
Article 2:
There will be an end to all military operations and to all aimed 
actions in the Southern Region frcm the time of cease-fire.
Article 3:
All combat forces shall remain in the area under their control at the 
time of the cease-fire.
Article 4:
Both parties agree to forbid any individual or collective acts of 
violence. Any underground activities contrary to public order shall 
cease.
Article 5:
Movements of individual members of both combat forces outside the 
areas under their control shall be allowed only if these individuals 
are unarmed and authorized by their respective authorities. The plans 
for stationing of troops from the National Army shall be such as to 
avoid any contact between them and the Southern Sudan Liberation 
Movement combat forces.
Article 6:
A Joint-Commission is hereby created for the implementation of all 
questions related to the cease-fire including repatriation of refugees. 
The Joint-Commission shall include members from all the countries 
bordering on the Southern Region, as well as representatives of the 
International Committee of the Red Cross, World Council of Churches,
All Africa Conference of Churches, and United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees.
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Article 7:
The Joint-Conmission shall propose all measures to be undertaken by 
both parties in dealing with all incidents alter a full inquiry on 
the spot.
Article 8:
Each party shall be represented on the Joint-Commission by one senior 
military officer and a maximum of five other members.
Article 9:
The headquarters of the Joint-Commission shall be located in Juba 
with provincial branches in Juba, Malakal and Wau.
Article 10:
The Joint-Commission shall appoint local commissions in various 
centres of the Southern Region, composed of two members from each 
party.
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APPENDIX V
PROTOCOLS CN INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS
CHAPTER 1 INTERIM ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS: POLITICAL, LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT AND CIVIL SERVICE.
Article 1:
The President of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan shall, in consultation 
with the South Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) and branches of the Sudan 
Socialist Union in the Southern Region, appoint the President and members 
of an Interim High Executive Council.
Article 2:
The Interim High Executive Council shall consist of the President and 
other members with portfolios in:
a) Finance and Economic Planning;
b) Education;
c) Information, Culture & Tourism;
d) Communications & Transport
e) Agriculture, Animal Production & Fisheries
f) Public Health;
g) Regional Administration (Local Government, Legal Affairs, Police
& Prisons);
h) Housing, Public Works & Utilities;
i) Natural Resources & Rural Development;
j) Public Service & Labour;
k) Minerals & Industry, Trade & Supply.
Article 3:
The Interim High Executive Council shall, in accordance with national 
laws, establish a Regional Civil Service, subject to ratification by the 
Peoples regional Assembly.
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Article 4:
The President shall, in consultation with the Interim High Executive 
Council, determine the date for the election to the Peoples Regional 
Assembly, and the Interim High Executive Council shall make arrangements 
for the setting up of this Assenbly.
Article 5:
In order to facilitate the placement in and appointment to both central 
and regional institutions, the South Sudan Liberation Movement shall 
compile and conmunicate lists of citizens of the Southern Region outside 
the Sudan in accordance with details to be supplied by the Ministry of 
Public Service and Administrative Reform.
Article 6:
The Interim High Executive Council and the Ministry of Public Service and 
Administrative Refoim shall undertake to provide necessary financial 
allocations with effect from 1972-73 Budget for such placements and 
appointments.
Article 7:
The Mandate of the Interim High Executive Council shall not exceed a 
period of 18 months.
CHAPTER II TEMPORARY ARRANGEMENTS IOR THE COMPOSITION OF UNITS OF THE 
PEOPLES ARMED FORCES IN THE SOUTHERN REGION
Article 1:
These arrangements shall remain in force for a period of five years 
subject to revision by the President of the High Executive Council acting 
with the consent of the Peoples Regional Assarbly.
Article 2:
The Peoples Armed Forces in the Southern Region shall consist of a national 
force called the Southern Oommand, composed of 12,000 officers and men, of 
whom 6,000 shall be citizens from that region and the other 6,000 from 
outside the Region.
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Article 3:
The recruitment and integration of citizens from the Southern Region 
within the aforementioned Forces shall be determined by a Joint Military 
Commission taking in to account the need for initial separate deployment 
of troops with a view to achieve smooth integration in the national force. 
The Commission shall ensure that this deployment shall be such that an 
atmosphere of peace and confidence shall prevail in the Southern Region. 
Article 4:
The Joint Military Commission shall be composed of three senior military 
officers from each side. Decisions of the Joint Military Commission shall 
be tal^ en unanimously. In case of disagreement, such matters shall be 
referred to the respective authorities.
CHAPTER III AMNESTY AND JUDICIAL ARRANGEMENTS 
Article 1:
No action or other legal proceedings whatsoever, civil, criminal, shall 
be instituted against any person in any Court of Law for, or on account 
of, any act or matter done inside or outside the Sudan as from the 18th 
day of August, 1955, if such act or matter done in connection with mutiny, 
rebellion or sedition in the Southern Region.
Article 2:
If a civil suit in relation to any acts or matters referred to in Article 
One is instituted before or after the date of ratification of the Addis 
Ababa Agreement, such a suit shall be discharged and made null and void.
Article 3:
All persons serving terms of imprisonment or held in detention in respect 
of offences hereinbefore specified in Article One shall be discharged 
or released within fifteen days from the date of ratification of the 
Addis Ababa Agreement.
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Article 4:
The Joint Cease-Fire Corrmission shall keep a register of all civilian 
returnees which register shall serve to certify that the persons therein 
named are considered indemnified within the meaning of this Agreement 
provided that the Commission may delegate such power to the Diplomatic 
Missions of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan in the case of citizens 
from the Southern Region living abroad and to whan the provisions of this 
Agreement apply.
Article 5:
In the case of armed returnees or those belonging to combat forces, the 
Joint Military Commission shall keep a similar register of those persons 
who shall be treated in the same manner as provided for in Article Four. 
Article 6:
Notwithstanding the provisions of Articles Four and Five above, a Special 
Tribunal with ad hoc judicial powers shall be established to examine and 
decide on those cases which in the estimation of the authorities do not 
meet the conditions for amnesty specified in Article One of this Agreement. 
The Special Tribunal shall be composed of a President appointed by the 
President of the Republic and not more than four members named by the 
Cease-Fire Commission.
Article 7:
Cases referred to in Article Six shall be brought to the attention of the 
Special Tribunal by request of the Minister of Justice.
Article 8:
The Amnesty Provisions contained in this Agreement as well as the powers 
of the Special Tribunal shall remain in force until such time as the 
President after consultation with the commissions referred to in this 
Agreement, decide that they have fulfilled their functions.
CHAPTER IV REPATRIATION AND RESETTLEMENT CGMMISSICN
1. REPATRIATION
Article 1:
There shall be established Special Commissions Inside and where required 
outside the Southern Region charged with the responsibility of taking 
all administrative and other measures as may be necessary in order to 
repatriate all citizens from the Southern Region who today are residing 
in other countries and especially in the neighbouring countries. The 
headquarters of the Ooranission shall be in Juba.
Article 2:
The Commissions shall be composed of, at least, three members including 
one representative of the Central Government, one representative of the 
Southern Region, and one representative of the United Nations Commissioner 
for Refugees. For those conmissions operating outside the Sudan, a 
representative of the host Government shall be included, plus the central 
Government representative, who shall be the Ambassador of the Sudan or 
his representative.
Article 3:
The control of repatriation at the borders shall be assumed by the competent 
border authorities in cooperation with the representatives of the 
Resettlement Commission,
Article 4:
The Repatriation Commission shall work very closely with the Commission 
for Relief and Resettlement to ensure that the operation and timing of 
the returning of refugees from across borders is adequately co-ordinated.
II RESETTLEMENT
Article 1:
There shall be established a Special Commission for Relief and Resettlement 
under the President of the Interim High Executive Council with headquarters 
in Juba and provincial branches in Juba, Malakal and Wau. The Commission, 
its branches, and whatever units it may deem fit to create in other 
localities in order to facilitate its functions, shall be responsible for 
co-ordination and implementation of all relief services and planning 
related to Resettlement and Rehabilitation of all returnees, that is:-
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a) Refugees from neighbouring countries
b) Displaced persons resident in the main centres in the Southern
Region and other parts of the Sudan.
c) Displaced persons including residual Anya Nya personnel and
supporters in the bush,
d) Handicapped and orphans.
Article 2:
Although resettlement and rehabilitation of refugees and displaced persons 
is administratively the responsibility of the Regional Government, the 
present conditions in the Southern Region dictate that efforts of the 
whole nation of the Sudan and International Organizations should be pooled 
to help and rehabilitate persons affected by the conflict. The Relief 
and Resettlement Commission shaLl co-ordinate activities and resources of 
the Organization within the country.
Article 3:
The first priority shall be the resettlement of displaced persons within 
the Sudan in the following order:
a) Persons presently residing in overcrowded centres in the Southern
Region, and persons desirous to return to their original areas
and hemes.
b) Persons returning from the bush including Anya Nya supporters.
c) Handicapped persons and orphans.
Article 4:
The second priority shall be given to returnees from the neighbouring 
and other countries according to an agreed plan. This plan shall provide 
for:-
a) Adequate reception centres with facilities for shelter, food supplies 
medicine and medicaments.
b) Transportation to permanent resettlement villages or places of 
origin.
c) Materials and equipments.
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Article 5:
The Relief and Resettlement Commission shall:
a) Appeal to International Organizations and Voluntary agencies to
continue assistance for students already under their support 
particularly for students in secondary schools and higher 
institutions until appropriate arrangements are made for their 
repatriation.
b) Compile adequate information on students and persons in need of 
financial support from the Sudan Government.
Article 6:
The Relief and Resettlement Commission shall arrange for the education of 
all returnees who were attending primary schools.
This Agreement is hereby concluded on this twenty-seventh day of the 
month of February in the year one thousand nine hundred and seventy two, 
A.D, in this city, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, between the Government of the 
Democratic Republic of the Sudan on the one hand and the South Sudan 
Liberation Movement on^ the other.
It shall come into force on the date and hour fixed for its ratification 
by the President of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan and the leader 
of the South Sudan Liberation Movement.
It shall be ratified by the said two Leaders in persons or through their 
respective authorized Representatives, in this City, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 
at the twelfth hour at noon, on the twelfth day of the month of March, in 
the year one thousand nine hundred and seventy two, A.D.
In witness whereof, We the Representatives of the Government of the 
Democratic Republic of the Sudan and the Representatives of the South 
Sudan Liberation Movement hereby append our signatures in the presence 
of the Representative of His Imperial Majesty, the Emperor of Ethiopia 
and the Representatives of the World Council of Churches, the All Africa 
Conference of Churches, and the Sudan Council of Churches.
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For the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan
1. Abel Alier-Wal Kuai
Vice President and Minister of State for Southern Affairs
2. Dr. Mansour Khalid
Minister for Foreign Affairs
3. Dr, Jaafar Moharmied Ali Bakheit
Minister for Local Government
4. Major General P.S.C. Mohammed El Baghir Ahmed
Minister of Interior
5. Abdel Rahman Abdalla
Minister of Public Service and Administrative Reform
6. Brigadier P.S.C. Mirghani Slueiman
7. Colonel Kamal Abasher
For the South Sudan Liberation Movement
1. Ezboni Mondiri Gwonza
Leader of the Delegation
2. Dr. Lawrence Wol Wol
Secretary of the Delegation
3. E.Mading De Garang
Spokesman of the Delegation
4. Colonel Frederick Brian Maggott
Special Military Representative
5. Oliver Batali Albino
Member
6. Angelo Voga Morjan
Member
7. Rev. Paul Puot
Member
8. Job Adier De Jok
Member
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Witnesses
1. Nabiyelul Kif le
Representative of His Inperial Majesty, the Emperor of Ethiopia
2. Leopoldo J.Niilus
Representative of the World Council of Churches
3. Kodwo E. Ankrah
Representative of the World Council of Churches
4. Burgess Carr
General Secretary of the All Africa Conference of Churches
5. Samuel Athi Bwogo
Representative of the Sudan Council of Churches
Attestation
I attest that these signatures are genuine and true.
Burgess Carr
Moderator.
